Suchergebnisse

A series of experiments, in which nine participants trade an asset over 15 periods, test the hypothesis that an initial imbalance of asset/cash will influence the trading price over an extended time. Participants know at the outset that the asset or "stock" pays a single dividend with fixed expectation value at the end of the 15th period. In experiments with a greater total value of cash at the start, the mean prices during the trading periods are higher, compared with those with greater amount of asset, with a high degree of statistical significance. The difference is most significant at the outset and gradually tapers near the end of the experiment. The results are very surprising from a rational expectations and classical game theory perspective, because the possession of a large amount of cash does not lead to a simple motivation for a trader to bid excessively on a financial instrument. The gradual erosion of the difference toward the end of trading, however, suggests that fundamental value is approached belatedly, offering some consolation to the rational expectations theory. It also suggests that there is a time scale on which an evolution toward fundamental value occurs. The experimental results are qualitatively compatible with the price dynamics predicted by a system of differential equations based on asset flow. The results have broad implications for the marketing of securities, particularly initial and secondary public offerings, government bonds, etc., where excess supply has been conjectured to suppress prices.

This paper studies how the durability of assets affects financing. We show that more durable assets require larger down payments making them harder to finance, because durability affects the price of assets and hence the overall financing need more than their collateral value. Durability affects technology adoption, the choice between new and used capital, and the rent versus buy decision. Constrained firms invest in less durable assets and buy used assets. More durable assets are more likely to be rented. Economies with weak legal enforcement invest more in less durable, otherwise dominated assets and are net importers of used assets. (JEL D25, G31, G32, O31)