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The 2016 German Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) comes at a time of increasing awareness about the interdependence between energy security and hard, economic, and human security. Energy risks are endemic in the OSCE area. Because these risks have an impact on regional security, there are good reasons for the OSCE to assume a stronger role in addressing energy security issues and reducing energy risks in the OSCE area. In so doing, the OSCE can utilise its existing capabilities in the areas of awareness-raising, early warning, prevention, mitigation, and crisis management and can build on its missions, tools, and field presence. Furthermore, the OSCE's focus on connectivity can contribute towards reducing energy risks arising from outdated or insufficient infrastructure by addressing physical connectivity jointly with legal and regulatory compatibility to improve the investment climate and foster stable policy frameworks. (SWP Comments)

During an intense period of only 14 months, from June 2010 to August 2011, six major cooperation agreements between oil companies were announced in Russia. Almost all of these partnerships involved offshore projects, with an international oil company as one of the partners and Rosneft as the other. The agreements were concentrated along Russia's Arctic petroleum frontier, and the three that survived the longest involved oil or gas extraction in the Arctic. This article analyses and compares the contents and contexts of the agreements, to ascertain what they have to tell about access for international companies to Russia's offshore petroleum resources and the influence of competing Russian political actors over the country's petroleum sector. The article argues that the new partnerships did represent an intention to open up the Russian continental shelf, and that the agreements were driven and shaped by a series of needs: to secure foreign capital and competence, to reduce exploration risk, to lobby for a better tax framework, to show the government that necessary action was being taken to launch exploration activities, to improve Rosneft's image abroad, and either to avert or prepare for future privatisation of state companies such as Rosneft.

This article explores how declining oil revenue might shape the amount of international conflict initiated by major oil producers (petrostates). We analyze four potential mechanisms through which variation in oil prices could affect petrostate conflict initiation: emboldenment, battling over a smaller market, signaling strength, and diversionary conflict. The empirical findings suggest that higher oil prices are associated with lower rates of petrostate conflict initiation. From one standard deviation below the mean oil price to one standard deviation above it, the predicted number of militarized interstate disputes declines twofold, from .025 [95% CI: .016–.034] per petrostate per year to .012 [.007–.016]. Moreover, the evidence suggests that petrostates are more likely to target other petrostates when oil prices are low. This suggests that the energy transition may not be a boon for international peace among petrostates, and for a time, it may even prove to be the opposite.

This data article surveys the government policies in support of renewable energy in the five Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. It begins by providing general information and key energy statistics for these countries. It then presents comparative data on their regulatory policies, fiscal incentives, and public financing policies. The data were collected from government institutions of the Central Asian states, official national statistics, media reports, and international organizations. ; Renewable Energy Policies of the Central Asian Countries ; publishedVersion

The Arctic region contains large amounts of natural resources considered necessary to sustain global economic growth, so it is unsurprising that it is increasingly susceptible to political, economic, environmental, and even military conflicts. This book looks in detail at the preconditions and outlook for international cooperation on the development of Arctic petroleum resources, focusing on Norwegian-Russian cooperation in the Barents Sea towards 2025. The authors provide a cross-disciplinary approach including geopolitical, institutional, technological, corporate and environmental perspectives to analyse the underlying factors that shape the future development of the region. Three future scenarios are developed, exploring various levels of cooperation and development influenced by and resulting from potential political, commercial and environmental circumstances. Through these scenarios, the book improves understanding of the challenges and opportunities for Arctic petroleum resource development and promotes further consideration of the possible outcomes of future cooperation.

This study analyzes the factors that have facilitated Vietnam's recent rapid solar and wind power expansion and draws policy insights for other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A policy-mix analysis focusing on targets, incentive instruments, enabling regulations, and policy implementation is carried out, informed by semi-structured interviews with 20 Vietnamese experts during the period January–March 2021. A comparative analysis between Vietnam and the other ASEAN countries provides policy insights. Generous feed-in tariffs are found to have been a key driver, with income tax and land lease payment exemptions also being important. The main barriers include a high level of policy uncertainty and an underprepared transmission grid. Vietnam's case indicates that a strong price signal and a supportive investment environment can pave the way for rapid solar and wind power uptake. Another key lesson is that early preparation of transmission systems for solar and wind electricity is needed to maximize the potential for expanding the use of these technologies. ; publishedVersion

This article carries out a multisectoral qualitative analysis (MSQA) and policy integration analysis of six sectors important for climate mitigation in Southeast Asia in order to assess the status of the climate-energy nexus in the region. It concludes that Southeast Asia will be heavily affected by climate change but the mitigation efforts of the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are incommensurate with the threat they face. Their nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement are modest, they have a low proportion of renewable energy in their energy mixes, a modest target for raising the share of renewable energy and they are not likely to reach this target. The ASEAN countries have also been slow to adopt electric vehicles and to accede to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), while continuing to burn their forests, channel subsidies to fossil fuels and invest in new coal power plants. If ASEAN accelerated decarbonization, it could seize business opportunities, secure its standing in the international political system and climate justice discussions, and increase its chances of reaching the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). ; publishedVersion

The 2016 German Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) comes at a time of increasing awareness about the interdependence between energy security and hard, economic, and human security. Energy risks are endemic in the OSCE area. Because these risks have an impact on regional security, there are good reasons for the OSCE to assume a stronger role in addressing energy security issues and reducing energy risks in the OSCE area. In so doing, the OSCE can utilise its existing capabilities in the areas of awareness-raising, early warning, prevention, mitigation, and crisis management and can build on its missions, tools, and field presence. Furthermore, the OSCE's focus on connectivity can contribute towards reducing energy risks arising from outdated or insufficient infrastructure by addressing physical connectivity jointly with legal and regulatory compatibility to improve the investment climate and foster stable policy frameworks. (author's abstract)

The Philippines set the target of increasing the share of renewable energy in its energy mix from 16.9% in 2019 to 26.9% by 2030. This ambitious target requires significant additional investment in renewable energy. It has been estimated that the Philippines could attract USD 20 billion in renewable energy investment through auctions between 2020 and 2030. To achieve this, the investment climate for renewables needs to be improved. Over the last few years, other ASEAN countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand have been viewed as more attractive markets by foreign investors. We propose five actions that can improve the attractiveness of Philippines' investment climate for renewable energy and help it join the regional race for investment: prioritise renewables in the energy governance system; enforce existing regulatory and fiscal policies; raise the targets and develop an investment roadmap; facilitate market entry for renewable energy investors; build capacity for renewable energy governance. ; This policy brief is a product of the ASEAN Climate Change and Energy Project (ACCEPT) ACCEPT is funded by the Norwegian Government under the Norwegian-ASEAN Regional Integration Programme (NARIP) and is jointly implemented by the ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). ; publishedVersion

Singapore has limited renewable energy potential due to its small surface area and the limited space available. Solar power has the greatest potential. Given the country's limited spare land, rooftops and vertical spaces on high-rise buildings are of particular importance. Singapore set a target of producing solar energy to cover 350,000 households in 2030 that would be equivalent to 4% of the country's current electricity demand. In 2019, solar energy accounted for less than 1% of Singapore's total energy mix. We propose four actions to improve the investment climate for renewable energy in Singapore: develop incentive and regulatory support mechanism; consolidate solar energy governance; mobilise equity investors and lenders; specialise in the long-distance trade of renewable energy, especially in the form of hydrogen. ; This policy brief is a product of the ASEAN Climate Change and Energy Project (ACCEPT) ACCEPT is funded by the Norwegian Government under the Norwegian-ASEAN Regional Integration Programme (NARIP) and is jointly implemented by the ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). ; publishedVersion

Lao PDR adopted the Renewable Energy Development Strategy in 2011 and set a target of 30% small-scale renewables in the energy mix by 2025. The country relies heavily on large hydropower in electricity production and is an attractive investment destination for hydropower. At the same time, Lao PDR has also significant small-scale hydro and solar power potential. We propose five actions that can improve the investment climate in Lao PDR for small-scale hydropower, solar and wind energy: establish an autonomous government agency for renewables; join IRENA and build capacity for renewable energy governance; adopt a feed-in tariff and build a robust regulatory framework; develop a roadmap for small-scale renewable energy; facilitate market entry for investors. ; This policy brief is a product of the ASEAN Climate Change and Energy Project (ACCEPT) ACCEPT is funded by the Norwegian Government under the Norwegian-ASEAN Regional Integration Programme (NARIP) and is jointly implemented by the ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). ; publishedVersion

Brunei Darussalam has yet to make major progress in renewable energy and become an attractive destination for investors. Only 0.05% of Brunei's electricity came from renewable energy sources, while 99.95% was based on fossil fuels. In 2014, the country set a renewable energy target of 10% in the power generation mix by 2035. To reach the target, it needs to increase the share of renewables by 0.66% every year from 2020 to 2035. The country still needs to adopt a regulatory regime to scale up the development of renewable energy, particularly solar energy, which is more abundant than wind energy. We propose five actions to build the investment climate for renewable energy in Brunei Darussalam: prioritise renewable energy in the governance system; adopt and implement key legislation; mobilise domestic investors; improve market entry for foreign investors; join IRENA and expand capacity building. ; This policy brief is a product of the ASEAN Climate Change and Energy Project (ACCEPT) ACCEPT is funded by the Norwegian Government under the Norwegian-ASEAN Regional Integration Programme (NARIP) and is jointly implemented by the ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). ; publishedVersion

Cambodia has not attracted significant investment in renewable energy until mid-2020 and, unlike other ASEAN countries, has not set exact renewable energy targets. Despite this, the country is viewed as a model to learn from for other ASEAN countries implementing solar power auctions. In order to keep up this momentum and attract more investment, Cambodia needs to address a number of persistent gaps in its investment climate. We propose five actions that may have strong immediate benefits and make Cambodia's business climate for renewable energy more attractive: prioritise renewables in the energy governance system; request support from IRENA for capacity building; adopt targets and develop a regulatory framework; enhance project bankability; improve market entry for foreign investors. ; This policy brief is a product of the ASEAN Climate Change and Energy Project (ACCEPT) ACCEPT is funded by the Norwegian Government under the Norwegian-ASEAN Regional Integration Programme (NARIP) and is jointly implemented by the ASEAN Centre for Energy (ACE) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). ; publishedVersion