Suchergebnisse

In 2014, Ontario passed Bill 21: Safeguarding Healthcare Integrity Act, which enacted the Voluntary Blood Donations Act, 2014, to ban all forms of compensation for donations of blood and blood components. Ontario justified this action by invoking the principles of the 1997 Krever Commission, which defined blood as a public resource of such value and importance that it must remain under the singular control of an organization that only serves the public interest. This reform was introduced with the intention to prevent another public health disaster like that of the tainted blood scandal in the 1980s, protect voluntary donor pools, and stop potentially exploitative plasma collection techniques. Responding to the licensing of a private plasma collection agency by Health Canada, Ontario met with key stakeholders such as Canadian Blood Services, Canadian Plasma Resources, blood advocacy organizations, and patient groups before finally passing Bill 21. By placing a ban against blood collection agencies besides Canadian Blood Services and by implementing aggressive consequences for violations, Ontario ensured all forms of blood donation would remain voluntary unless deemed necessary by Canadian Blood Services. Similar bills were introduced with differing outcomes in Alberta, British Columbia, and the Canadian Senate in 2017, 2018, and 2019 respectively. The contentious and varying opinions on blood donation regulation at the provincial and federal levels of government demonstrate that this topic will remain relevant to Canadian politics for the foreseeable future. En 2014, l'Ontario a adopté le projet de loi 21: loi sur la sauvegarde de l'intégrité des soins de santé, qui a mis en exécution et validé la loi sur les dons de sang volontaires, afin d'interdire toutes formes d'indemnisation pour les dons de sang et de composants sanguins. L'Ontario a justifié cette mesure sur la base des principes de la Commission Krever de 1993, définissant ainsi le sang comme une ressource publique d'une valeur et importance telles qu'il doit rester sous le contrôle singulier d'une organisation qui ne sert que l'intérêt public. Cette réforme a été introduite dans le but de prévenir une autre catastrophe de santé publique comme celle du scandale du sang contaminé dans les années 80, de protéger les donneurs volontaires et d'empêcher les techniques de collecte de plasma pouvant conduire à l'exploitation des donneurs. En réponse à l'agrément d'une agence privée de collecte de plasma par Santé Canada, l'Ontario a rencontré des intervenants clés, tels que la Société canadienne du sang, Canadian Plasma Resources, des organisations de défense du sang et des groupes de patients avant de finalement adopter le projet de loi 21. En interdisant la collecte de sang par les agences outre la Société canadienne du sang et en mettant en œuvre un arsenal répressif en cas de violation, l'Ontario a veillé à ce que toutes les formes de don de sang restent volontaires, autres que la Société canadienne du sang juge le contraire nécessaire. Des projets de loi similaires ont été présentés, avec des résultats différentes en Alberta, en Colombie-Britannique et au Sénat canadien respectivement en 2017, 2018 et 2019. Les opinions tranchées et divergentes des gouvernements provincial et fédéral sur la réglementation des dons de sang aux paliers de gouvernement provincial et fédéral démontrent que ce sujet demeurera d'importance pour la politique canadienne dans un avenir proche.

AbstractGovernment officials exert tremendous power when they buy goods and services from private companies. By setting the terms and conditions under which public procurement takes place, public officials help determine which companies will thrive and which ones will fail. This is one of the important ways governments help create and sustain monopolies in the private sector. But since the bidding process to sell products or services to the government is supposed to be an open and fair competition, how does it become skewed toward businesses that already dominate markets? We examine a particular source of bias: the eligibility criteria for bidding in public procurement tenders. These criteria often allow a few large, private companies to bid on government contracts, but they exclude a large number of small and medium‐sized enterprises. We study the terms by which offers are solicited in India through tenders floated for transportation projects: roads, highways, bridges, and civil construction. We find that the eligibility criteria impose an unnecessarily heavy burden on small firms, potentially knocking them out of the competition and discouraging them from participating in other procurement processes. In this way, the process reinforces monopolies instead of breaking them up. While this study focuses on India, the results also apply to similar economies.

This paper proposes a cognitive interpretation of place. The argument is based on the artistic presentation of geographical boundaries in novel that goes beyond social and political control and accepts the 'desired' possible worlds. In this paper I will analyse Anita Nair's novel Mistress and the art of Kathakali on which the structure of the novel is developed. Approaching Mistress, one identifies the work to be an acute combination of visionary narrative and intensely persuasive study into the search for purpose in life and art. The Idealized Cognitive Model proposed by Gilles Fauconnier offers a productive interaction between base space (the reality space) and built space (the desired space). Further his concept of 'mental spaces' examining the historical, mythological and emotional blend in the novel. Through Michel Foucault's heterotopic approach towards society, I will compare and contrast past' impression on present, man-woman relationship and image of women in Kerala through the novel.

AbstractAn investigation of the source of power of mafia‐type organizations may reveal how other non‐state actors can operate as if they are independent of the state. This study of the coal mafia in Dhanbad, India shows that power often derives from socially hierarchical relationships involving debt and/or caste. It also demonstrates how state policies that are thoughtlessly implemented may solidify existing hierarchies. By analogy, modern corporations gain some of their power by behaving as if they were semi‐sovereign institutions that draw their strength informally from social networks and other extralegal relationships.The mafia in the Dhanbad coalfields emerged through a series of institutional changes. Labor shortages were initially resolved by labor intermediaries, who eventually controlled the labor through linkages associated with debt, caste, and social obligations. These intermediaries eventually assumed official positions in labor unions, which gave them a platform for electoral politics. When the coal industry was nationalized, the union leaders further solidified their position in the nationalized corporation. In this way, private labor intermediaries became local political leaders who controlled the state apparatus to some extent.Corporations follow similar patterns. Both mafias and corporations exploit weak governments, collude with them, and often operate with a high degree of independence. Like mafias, corporations often derive their power from socially embedded networks that they craft in local communities and populations. Because the roots of their influence are embedded in social networks, simple legal and regulatory changes are often insufficient to limit their power. Transnational corporations engaged in extraction of natural resources share with mafias the ability to leverage monopoly power in one domain into control of other domains. As a result, this case study of the coal mafia in India offers a unique entry point to understand corporate sovereignty.