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Political opposition to globalisation has risen in industrialized countries, although the positive overall effects on the growth of the world economy and the alleviation of poverty are empirically verifiable. However, the effects of globalisation vary according to regions, professional groups, and education. In the period of intensive globalisation, unemployment and inequality have risen, and people feel their lives to be determined by forces they cannot influence. Since the many new challenges, such as climate protection, can be better solved by worldwide efforts, it is indispensable to avoid new national barriers and to strengthen the endorsement of globalisation and the concomitant welfare effects. However, it is also necessary to respect cultural differences in preferences and to view globalisation as a search and learning process. Instruments for the implementation of such a strategy may vary according to regional specifics. Social and ecological goals - gaining higher importance with rising per capita incomes - are well-represented in the European model, but for worldwide solutions other socio-economic models will offer preferences and solutions. Apart from the announced partial withdrawal of the United States from globalisation and the upcoming dominance of China in world affairs and large scale investment, Europe would be well-advised to take a greater responsibility if not the lead in determining the rules of globalisation. Based on an opinion-forming process within Europe, responsible globalisation can significantly improve the quality of life in Europe and its partners worldwide.

The European project is a long-run success story. Up to the 1990s, Europe thrived and experienced rising prosperity, as well as a catching up process with technology frontiers, while simultaneously extending its welfare model. The integration process, starting with six member states, led to a single market of 28 countries. It culminated in the creation of a currency union for 330 million Europeans. The political integration of former communist countries and their economic catching-up with Western Europe were achieved at an unprecedented historical pace. European integration has never been a smooth process. Stress during the process was referred to under the lemma of "eurosclerosis" and entailed competitive devaluations. The Lisbon Strategy was never fully implemented. Disappointment was counter-balanced by "Europe 2020", which intended to address structural problems and give the member states a greater opportunity to adapt the strategy to their specific situations. The financial crisis quickly spread from the US to Europe, highlighting unresolved governance issues and neglected public sector reforms. These also prevented adequate responses to new problems and opportunities arising from globalisation, technology, demography, the environment and most recently the refugee crisis .

Europa ist ein langfristiges Erfolgsmodell, weist aber seit der Finanzkrise ein niedriges Wachstum und eine erhöhte Arbeitslosigkeit auf. Die Einkommensdifferenzen sind zudem hoch. Europa hält sich auch nicht an seine geplante längerfristige Strategie. Die Notwendigkeit einer immer stärkeren Integration wird von den Bürgern nicht akzeptiert. Sezessionsbestrebungen und politische Polarisierung sind die Folgen. Karl Aiginger und Teresa Bauer beleuchten in diesem Zusammenhang die Rolle der europäischen Industrie, ihre relative Entwicklung im Verhältnis zur Gesamtwirtschaft und zu den USA. Auch Industriepolitik braucht neue Konzepte und eine stärkere Anbindung an gesellschaftliche Ziele; dies nicht zuletzt, um falsche, nur kurzfristig attraktive Ansätze zu verhindern. ; Europe is a long-run success model in a mid-life crisis. In the wake of the financial crisis, European growth has been low, unemployment is high and income disparity has increased - developments that have resulted in less support for the European project, manifested in populism and Brexit. The best answer to the current problems is a new strategy based on new drivers of growth and "Beyond GDP" goals, as proposed in the WWWforEurope project. A new industrial policy would be an important part of the new European strategy. It has to be systemic, working in alignment with competition, energy and innovation policy, and it must support social and ecological goals instead of calling for cheap labour or energy as a precondition for success. High ecological standards will lead to a competitive advantage for Europe in technologies that will become all-important if the Paris 2015 goal of decarbonisation is implemented. A European technology lead in low-carbon technologies, energy efficiency and renewables constitutes a core part of a new industrial policy that can help Europe end its mid-life crisis. It should be implemented in a European-wide dialogue with industry and citizens.

WWWforEurope has developed a comprehensive strategy to set Europe on a path to a socio-ecological transition. The strategy begins by renouncing the long-established concept of using GDP growth figures as the benchmark for economic and societal progress. In contrast, it sets "well-being in a sustainable environment" as the optimal benchmark for economic performance and social progress.

The European project is a long-run success story. Up to the 1990s, Europe thrived and experienced rising prosperity, as well as a catching up process with technology frontiers, while simultaneously extending its welfare model. The integration process, starting with six member states, led to a single market of 28 countries. It culminated in the creation of a currency union for 330 million Europeans. The political integration of former communist countries and their economic catching-up with Western Europe were achieved at an unprecedented historical pace. European integration has never been a smooth process. Stress during the process was referred to under the lemma of "eurosclerosis" and entailed competitive devaluations. The Lisbon Strategy was never fully implemented. Disappointment was counter-balanced by "Europe 2020", which intended to address structural problems and give the member states a greater opportunity to adapt the strategy to their specific situations. The financial crisis quickly spread from the US to Europe, highlighting unresolved governance issues and neglected public sector reforms. These also prevented adequate responses to new problems and opportunities arising from globalisation, technology, demography, the environment and most recently the refugee crisis .

The term "competitiveness" has been used in conceptually distinct ways at the firm, regional and national levels. After primarily reviewing existing concepts at the national level, we introduce a new definition of regional competitiveness adapting definitions used in the academic literature. Specifically, we connect "outcome competitiveness" with new perspectives on a more socially inclusive and ecologically sustainable growth path, as envisaged in the WWWforEurope research program, in which 33 European research groups are taking part. Evaluating competitiveness requires both an input assessment (costs, productivity, economic structure, capabilities) and an outcome assessment. We define regional outcome competitiveness as the ability of a region to deliver Beyond GDP goals. For regions in industrialized countries, this ability depends on innovation, education, institutions, social cohesion and ecological ambition. Given this new perspective (of broader Beyond GDP goals), social investments and ecological ambitions should not be considered costs, but rather drivers of competitiveness. This is compatible with a new innovation policy fostering non-technical innovations and a new industrial policy supporting societal goals. Applying this concept to European regions, we show which regions take the "high road" to competitiveness and compare our results with the existing literature.

There is evidence that a budget consolidation strategy can work with only a small and shortlived negative impact on growth. However, many countries are currently trying to consolidate at the same time as firms and consumers are deleveraging. We develop ten guidelines for consolidation during such a difficult economic period and cross-check whether the upcoming consolidation programmes being implemented in the EU countries comply with our guidelines. We propose following a 'high road' on cutting deficits, which includes an active growthenhancing component during the consolidation period. The active component should be financed by deeper cuts in subsidies, by eliminating obsolete government expenditure as well as by increasing the efficiency of the public sector. Taxes should not be raised permanently - a temporary contribution to consolidation will be needed, but tax structures in general should be made more growth and employment friendly.

There is evidence that a budget consolidation strategy can work with only a small and short lived negative impact on growth. However, this time consolidation is taking place in the aftermath of a deep crisis which had lead to increased levels of uncertainty. In addition the financial sector, as well as its regulation is under reconstruction. Firms and consumers are deleveraging, and many countries are trying to consolidate at the same time. We develop ten guidelines for consolidation during such a difficult economic period. We compare them to other guidelines published and, to the extent possible, cross-check whether the upcoming consolidation programs being implemented or revealed in various countries comply with our guidelines. We propose to follow a "high road" on cutting deficits, which includes an active growth enhancing component during the consolidation period. The "active component" should be financed by deeper cuts in subsidies, by eliminating obsolete government expenditure as well as by increasing the efficiency of the public sector. Taxes should not be raised permanently - a temporary contribution to consolidation will be needed, but tax structures in general should be made more growth and employment friendly.

Industriepolitik ist ein umstrittener, aber notwendiger Teil der Wirtschaftspolitik. Sie entwickelte sich von sektoralen Eingriffen über eine Förderung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit durch breite, horizontale Politiken schließlich zu einer Kombination von primär horizontalen und ergänzend sektoralen Maßnahmen (Matrix-Ansatz der Europäischen Union). Generell wird aus einer isolierten Politik ein systemisches Konzept, in dem Innovation, Ausbildung und andere wirtschaftpolitische Bereiche kombiniert werden ("Neue Systemische Industriepolitik"). Besonders durch die Wirtschaftskrise, aber auch als nationale Ergänzung zu einer Globalisierung der Wirtschaft gewinnt Industriepolitik eine neue Bedeutung. ; Industrial policy is a controversial but necessary part of economic policy. In its early stages, it consisted mainly of sectoral interventions. It then evolved into a broader competitiveness policy driven by horizontal policies. Nowadays it is a mixture of mainly horizontal and of complementary sectoral measures (the so-called matrix approach of the European Union). In general, industrial policy has changed from an isolated policy to a systemic concept which combines innovation, training and other areas of economic policy ("New Systemic Industrial Policy"). As a result of the crisis, but also as part of a national extension to the globalisation of the economy, industrial policy is becoming more important.

This paper analyses the main characteristics of the European Socio-Economic Model. We discuss how the model varies across countries within Europe, examine how the model has changed over time and compare the European model with the corresponding US model. While the differences with regard of growth dynamics are very small in the long run (1960 to 1990), growth rates diverge in the past 15 years. Performance differences as well as the reforms which have taken place, allow us to delineate elements of a "Reformed European Model", which on the one hand upholds important characteristics of the European Society, but on the other hand can still be competitive in the globalised economy.