Suchergebnisse

The prospect of remaining in the country is a bureaucratic categorisation that conflicts with the assessment of each person's reasons for leaving their homes. It creates inequalities among refugees and restricts integration. Federal policy and legislation must stop grouping people into those with "good" or "bad" prospects of remaining and grant all access to integration policy measures from the outset. The integration of refugees through language skills and work is of pivotal importance. Federal politics must create a legal basis that enables language and integration courses from the outset and also take into account differences arising from gender, age or educational background. After having abolished the so-called labour market test (Vorrangprüfung) or prioritisation of access to employment in 2019, the domicile requirement (Wohnsitzauflage) adopted in 2016 must also be lifted. Adequate support by social workers must be provided at the local level. Having your own apartment is an important step towards an independent life. At the local level, ccommodation in flats or self-contained units is preferable to shared accommodation. The state of North Rhine-Westphalia and other federal states must adhere to their policy of not establishing central housing for asylum applicants who have to stay there until their asylum application has been granted (so-called AnkER centres) as these isolate the inhabitants, cause conflicts and impede integration. Refugees often live apart from their family. Some family members, for example, have not left the conflict area. Restrictions on family reunification can hinder integration, as they create a variety of financial and psychological burdens for the people affected. The federal states should work at the federal level to reduce the restrictions on family reunification.

The EU has committed itself to relaxing its trade regime towards Jordan as an incentive to promote the employment of Syrian refugees staying in the country. However, the current limitation to garment, plastic and metal industries in designated special economic zones does not match the skills Syrians have. Therefore, the EU-Jordan Compact should be opened up to further sectors, such as agro-industries.
The government of Jordan has waived work permit fees for Syrian refugees since April 2016 and has now stretched the grace period until the end of 2019. To make the planning for employees and job seekers reliable, the ILO and UNHCR should ensure that the waiver remains in place until Syrians can return home. Transparency about the future cost of work permits and early information before fees for work permits for Syrians are re-introduced are also necessary.
Work permits for Syrians are an entry point for refugees in formal labour relations. However, social security and labour rights are still not guaranteed for the majority of Syrian work permit holders. Agencies that support the implementation of the EU-Jordan Compact should insist on employers' compliance with labour rights and ILO standards of decent work for work permit holders and assist in implementing them.
Establishing a business can alleviate tensions in the Jordanian labour market. The government of Jordan should relax the administrative barriers for Jordanian-Syrian joint ventures and abrogate restrictions for Syrians in access to finance. Small-scale home-based businesses for refugees should also be permitted.
To avoid failures in reaching the targets of the EU-Jordan Compact, Syrian refugees and Jordanian employers need to be included in revising the Compact. UNHCR could support the establishment of a representative refugee council, which should have an advisory role during the negotiations about the contents of the Compact in the mid-term review scheduled for 2020.

The support provided to people in protracted displacement by development actors needs to be based on a thorough understanding of their existing livelihood strategies since these are an expression of their agency and encompass capabilities, (socio-cultural) preferences and networks as well as the needs and obstacles they face. These, together with the skills and expertise of members of the target group, need to be carefully documented and analysed through participatory methods before the start of any project or programme. People in protracted displacement pursue their livelihood strategies in and through complex social interactions, which are a crucial formative condition of their livelihood options. The delicate balance of social relations, especially in displacement contexts, can easily be off-set by external factors including development projects, for example if these are perceived to benefit some people more than others. Development interventions should, therefore, consider the social but also the generally relevant context to achieve a lasting effect and to prevent unintended harmful effects. Participation and ownership by well-trusted local partners as well as participation by the target groups are both vital to ensure a sustainable impact of the project. Not only state actors (both on national and sub-national levels), but also civilian non-state actors should be considered as implementing partners. Training, capacity-building and inclusion, i.e. consulting or employing people and institutions that will take over the work started by the project should be prioritised from the very beginning.

The Council of the European Union and the member states have failed to counter the substantial weaknesses of EU arms export controls. It is now the European parliament's turn to take the debate forward by developing its own concept of restrictive EU arms export controls. A communitisation of arms export controls under the authority of the European Commission is unrealistic and undesirable. While it would offer the possibility of formal sanctions, it might lead to an even less restrictive control system than the existing one. Instead, the European parliament should build on the regulatory potential of social sanctions and naming and shaming-effects within the current division of competencies. Arms exports to non-EU countries should not be permitted on principle. An exemption to this exclusion would have to be specifically justified. Therefore, member states should agree on a 'White List' of recipient countries for European arms, which are assessed unanimously as acceptable. If member states nevertheless grant licences to non-EU countries that are not listed on the White List, they would be obliged to justify these decisions on COARM or Council level. To stimulate the debate on these instruments, the European parliament itself should work on a 'White List' and assess the member states' export practices against this background. The European parliament should create a subcommittee on arms export controls to discuss improvements of EU arms export controls and to act as a supervisory body. The subcommittee would publish an annual report assessing member states' export practices. An advisory body that ensures exchange between members of the European parliament, national parliamentarians and societal actors should assist this subcommittee.

Re-instate a national body to ensure coordination and harmonization of policies across different sectors, which would help institutionalize a transparent national multi- stakeholder dialogue on energy planning. Include different interest groups in policy consultation and optimize domestic research capabilities to provide innovative solutions and evidence-based policy advice in addressing Tunisia's main energy transition challenges.
Assess local socio-economic impacts of energy projects through mandatory social impact studies. Ensure further effective local grievance mechanisms and independent judicial prosecution of pollution and threats to public health. Legally substantiate local governments' stake in the development and implementation of public and private energy projects with respect to their local impacts and adhere to legally required participatory processes and open governance principles. Use the technical potential of renewable energy to increase decentralized electricity production and encourage local communities and local governments to develop their own local energy projects.

Bei der Bleibeperspektive handelt es sich um eine bürokratische Kategorisierung, die im Widerspruch zur individuellen Prüfung von Fluchtgründen steht. Sie schafft Ungleichheiten zwischen Geflüchteten und schränkt Integration ein. Die Bundespolitik und –gesetzgebung muss die Selektion in Menschen mit "guter" bzw. "schlechter" Bleibeperspektive einstellen und allen Geflüchteten von Anfang an Zugang zu integrationspolitischen Maßnahmen gewähren. Die Integration geflüchteter Menschen in den Bereichen Sprache und Arbeit ist von zentraler Bedeutung. Die bundespolitische Ebene muss gesetzliche Grundlagen schaffen, die Sprach- und Integrationskurse von Anfang an ermöglicht und dabei auch die Unterschiede, die sich etwa aus Geschlecht, Alter oder dem Bildungshintergrund ergeben, berücksichtigen. Aufgehoben werden müssen die Vorrangprüfung und die 2016 beschlossene Wohn- sitzauflage, die beide die Arbeitsmarktintegration behindern. Auf kommunaler Ebene muss eine ausreichende sozialarbeiterische Betreuung gewährleistet werden.
Eine eigene Wohnung ist ein wichtiger Schritt zu einem selbstverantwortlichen Leben. Auf kommunaler Ebene ist die Unterbringung in Wohnungen bzw. abgeschlossenen Wohneinheiten Gemeinschaftsunterkünften vorzuziehen. Das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen und andere Bundesländer müssen an ihrer Politik festhalten, keine AnkER-Zentren einzurichten, da diese die Bewohner isolieren, zu Konflikten führen und der Integration entgegenstehen. Geflüchtete leben häufig getrennt von anderen Familienmitgliedern, die sich beispielsweise noch im Konfliktgebiet aufhalten. Die Restriktionen beim Familiennachzug können Integration behindern, da sie vielfältige materielle wie psychische Belastungen für die betroffenen Menschen schaffen. Die Länder sollten sich auf der Bundesebene dafür einsetzen, die Einschränkungen des Familiennachzugs abzubauen.

Réinstituer un organisme national pour assurer la coordination et l'harmonisation des politiques dans différents secteurs et contribuer à institutionnaliser un dialogue national pluripartite transparent sur la planification énergétique.
Inclure les différents groupes d'intérêt dans la consultation politique et optimiser les capacités de recherche nationales pour apporter des solutions innovantes et un conseil en matière politique scientifiquement fondés concernant les principaux défis de la transition énergétique en Tunisie.
Évaluer les conséquences socio-économiques locales des projets énergétiques au moyen d'études d'impact social obligatoires. Garantir des mécanismes locaux supplémentaires efficaces de recours et des procédures judiciaires indépendantes concernant la pollution et les menaces liées à la santé publique.independent judicial prosecution of pollution and threats to public health.
Justifier juridiquement l'intérêt des collectivités locales au développement et à la mise en œuvre des projets énergétiques publics et privés dans l'optique de leur impact local, à leur adhésion aux processus participatifs exigés légalement et à la création de principes de gouvernance ouverte.
Exploiter le potentiel technique des énergies renouvelables afin d'augmenter la production décentralisée d'électricité, et encourager les communautés et les collectivités locales à développer leurs propres projets énergétiques locaux.

Jordan, with a population of about ten million, hosts 1.3 million Syrians of whom 670,000 are UNHCR-registered refugees, as well as nearly 85,000 registered refugees from other countries and is thus one of the countries with the highest proportion of refugees in the world. Most of them (83 per cent) are staying outside camps and many have rented flats mainly in the Jordanian capital Amman and its surroundings. The particular conditions for refugees from Syria staying in a receiving area among people with a history of protracted displacement are in the focus of this Working Paper. How do refugees from Syria secure their livelihood in the neighbourhoods of Palestinians who share the experience of a volatile legal status and limited economic rights? Does the EU-Jordan Compact improve Syrians' livelihoods? These questions are addressed by an analytical livelihood approach that includes social relationships as a significant conducive or constraining factor for refugees' agency (ability to act) in making use of local livelihood options. The findings generated in field research between November 2016 and July 2017 reveal dynamics within the Palestinian receiving community that have shifted from empathy and solidarity to more ambiguous interaction up to the exploitation and seclusion of refugees. The Paper shows how self-organised assistance groups of Jordanians with Palestinian origin take care of refugees from Syria in dire need for help, no matter what legal status they have. They support some refugees in regaining their agency and thus contribute to securing their livelihood. The central argument of this Paper is that the agenda of international aid and development agencies of enhancing resilience and promoting self-reliance of refugees does not strengthen refugees' agency. Instead of considering the refugees' own priorities and intentions about their livelihood, it pre-designs basic needs to different refugee groups and attempts to integrate them into a presumed market economy that in fact is distorted for political purposes (mainly shielding Jordanians from foreign competitors). This is most pronounced in the EU-Jordan Compact, established to provide Syrians with preferential access to (low-skilled) employment in return for alleviated access of Jordanian companies to the European market. The study discloses how the Compact contradicts the idea of resilience of the refugees. In the conclusion, the Paper questions the collusion of the international community with the Jordanian government in using the presence of the refugees for external interests - promoting liberal market expansion through the EU - Jordan Compact in return for continuous aid.

The rule of law in Sierra Leone is still not firmly established after the war (1991-2002). While the Sierra Leone Special Court only treated the war crimes of top leaders, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) strove for an amnesty of a large number of mid-range commanders, who had exposed their deeds in public and asked for forgiveness. As a lesson for peace processes elsewhere, international agencies should assist in transparent cooperation between TRCs and Special Courts and support post-war governments in designing the two institutions as building blocks for the establishment of the rule of law to ensure that impunity does not become entrenched in politics in the long term. Sixteen years after the end of the war, only very few victims received compensation whereas ex-combatants were provided with vocational training and startup capital. As a lesson for future engagement of international agencies after wars, any bias towards perpetrators should be avoided by providing all-encompassing support - for reparations and compensations of war victims equally with DDR programmes, reintegration of displaced people and returning refugees as well as reconstruction of the economy. In rural Sierra Leone, local chiefs organised collective agricultural work, which facilitated interaction and exchange between IDPs and refugees, victims, ex-combatants and perpetrators of war crimes. Combined with ceremonial reconciliation, this led to reintegration and community cohesion. No external intervention was needed. International agencies should learn for such post-war engagement to let local reconciliation and reconstruction happen where it works well and avoid interference. However, indiscriminate projects that bring the different groups of youth together are crucial and need support to foster reintegration. The general attitude and behaviour of large population groups in Sierra Leone are still shaped by aid dependence, often resulting in their refusal to take responsibility for community projects or start their own initiatives for the benefit of communities. As a lesson, humanitarian and development agencies should define a clear exit strategy, communicate it to the receiving groups from the outset and stick to the strategy without making exceptions. This also requires a clear strategy of transferring responsibility to domestic authorities and societal agencies.

Pastoral counties of northern Kenya are expected to undergo massive change in the
coming years due to the government's ambitious infrastructural development agenda.
However, the area frequently experiences violence as a result of conflict between pastoralist communities, and also due to ethno-political contestations. Isiolo County is one
such place where planned development projects and conflict risks coincide, making it
an important case study for understanding how the future may unfold.
This Working Paper is written in the framework of a larger project called "Future Rural
Africa: Future-making and social-ecological transformation" by the Universities of
Bonn and Cologne and BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion). BICC is interested in the kinds of claims that are being made on land and its resources and how
these may change the existing dynamics of organised violence. The Paper explores the
complexity of existing conflict in Isiolo and the emerging effects of new plans and land
claims. At its most basic level, conflict between pastoral groups, or between pastoralists
and farmers is motivated both by survival (pastoral mobility and access to water and
pasture in a climatically challenging area) and the accumulation of livestock wealth.
Politics, which is generally extended along ethnic lines, adds another layer to the inter-communal conflict through the need for political survival and the accumulation of
personal wealth. The devolution of many powers and budgets to county level since 2013
has then raised the stakes for political power. Since plans for infrastructure have been
made known, tensions have emerged, and fears of exclusion and dispossession of customary land users through speculative land-grabbing and uncompensated state acquisition. With Isiolo being a hub of the illicit small arms trade, guns have become a conflict
multiplier at every level.
The county is highly securitised with several specialised police units. However, they lack
capacity and their actions have tended to be either inadequate or overly reactive and
their relationship with communities is poor. As a result, day to day security of pastoralist
communities and their livestock relies on the rather informal and unprofessional
National Police Reserve, who are armed by the state, and community members, who
purchase their own arms through illicit markets. Politicians on occasion have also supplied arms and ammunition to communities. The Paper concludes that the various layers
of conflict should be considered and addressed simultaneously, and that development is
a new and potent factor in conflict at both political and community levels. A careful,
inclusive conflict-sensitive approach to development is essential, but this is unlikely to
happen if leaders look for personal power and gain.

This project's approach of analysing protracted displacement through the perspectives and
experiences of the displaced persons themselves has proven key to understanding the actual
dynamics, complexities and possible solutions to it. It uncovered and documented a wealth of
different coping strategies across diverse contexts, thus providing new insights into what living
in protracted displacement means for people affected by it and into which kind of support they
require. The project points out new research avenues on protracted displacement, such as the
impact of social relations and interactions on displaced peoples' livelihood options—both locally
and trans-locally—or the various types and patterns of mobility representing livelihood strategies of the displaced.
People in protracted displacement face multiple exclusions from access to livelihood-sustaining
resources and services. Such exclusions are not only layered on top of each other in terms of
generalised marginalisation but can also condition each other, in that a lack of access to certain
realms of societal life may block access to others. Moreover, this research has found that the living
conditions of people in protracted displacement often do not improve after the initial emergency
phase is over; lack of access to vital resources and services may be a constant feature of protracted
displacement or even become worse over time. Peoples' de facto (re)integration strategies, i.e.
livelihood-making in contexts of displacement or return, take place in highly fragmented and
disintegrated societies and are confronted with deliberately disintegrating forces, such as legal
exclusion, discrimination and violence.
National and international legal regulations and government action provide a crucial framework condition for the chances of displaced persons to (re)integrate and can be supportive or
disruptive. However, their actual effects on the displaced persons and local level are mediated by
alternative social norms in the respective context and can be stronger or weaker depending on a
person's positionality in society.
Due to the multiple exclusions and insecurities of protracted displacement, the diversification
and re-combinations of livelihood sources through spatial mobility is one of few chances for
the displaced to sustain themselves and their families and is thus essential to their livelihoods.
Mobility is, however, not automatically a resource in itself; it can simply be the permanent
search for safety and livelihood opportunities. Social relations and interactions at the place of
residence are perhaps the most important resource for displaced persons' livelihoods. Pre-existing
ties between communities often help to facilitate local integration of displaced persons. However,
a marginal status of local residents, poverty and scarcity of resources in receiving areas and
external influences can have a negative impact on community relations, lead to tensions and
reduce livelihood options for the displaced.

Flucht und Vertreibung sind in Lateinamerika vielfach die Folge krimineller Aktivitäten. Organisierte Kriminalität ist nicht nur Ursache von Flucht, sondern strukturiert die Ausprägung von Fluchtbewegungen maßgeblich. Flüchtlingspolitik muss daher kriminelle Aktivitäten als Fluchtursache ernst nehmen und dementsprechend ihre Maßnahmen neu ausrichten. Zudem ist die internationale Gemeinschaft aufgefordert, kohärente und präventive Maßnahmen zu entwickeln, um die Bevölkerung vor organisierter Kriminalität zu schützen. Lateinamerikanische Entwicklungen sind in vielerlei Hinsicht prototypisch für den Globalen Süden. Die "Erklärung von Brasilien", die 2014 lateinamerikanische Staaten verfassten, rückt organisierte Kriminalität, Binnenvertriebene und Flüchtlinge in einen gemeinsamen Kontext. Dies bietet der internationalen Gemeinschaft einen Ansatz, um die Ausbreitung von Gewaltrisiken, die globale Vernetzung transnationaler krimineller Gruppen und die Etablierung von Gewaltmärkten einzudämmen. Praxisorientierte Strategien, die Bürgerkriege, organisierte Kriminalität, Binnenvertreibung, Migration und Flucht ganzheitlich mit einer Kombination von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, humanitärer Hilfe und Friedensförderung angehen, versprechen ein Mehr an Nachhaltigkeit. Um entsprechend der New Yorker Erklärung der Vereinten Nationen von 2016 globale Lösungsansätze für Flucht- und Migrationsbewegungen zu finden, ist es nötig, die aktuellen, auf internationaler Ebene verhandelten Konzepte wie den Migrations- bzw. Fluchtpakt miteinander stärker zu verbinden. Dabei gilt es, auch neue Formen der Vertreibung als Fluchtursachen anzuerkennen. Zu nennen sind explizit organisierte Kriminalität und kriegsähnliche Situationen. Die Bundesregierung muss dazu beitragen, dass die Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention inhaltlich – gemäß ihren ursprünglichen Zielen – wieder zur zentralen Referenz für globale Lösungsansätze im Umgang mit Flüchtlingen wird.

Sierra Leone is known for the successful reintegration of a high number of returning refugees
and internally displaced people (IDPs), many of whom had stayed in protracted displacement situations during the eleven years of a most cruel internal war. The war was intertwined with the civil war in Liberia and ended with a peace agreement in 2002. The extremely high number
of returnees in relation to the total population caused particular hardship for the 'leastdeveloped' country. Yet, Sierra Leone managed the task of reintegration of returnees from war,
returning refugees from the West African region and IDPs without major disruptions and renewed outbreaks of violence. Neither a severe armed conflict nor new waves of forced displacement have re-occurred during the past 17 years. However, the acts of violence in the context of the 2018
national election - and during the three previous post-war elections - justify the question whether the recurrent violence is related to shortcomings in the overall process of reintegration.
This Working Paper, therefore, takes a retrospective look into the reintegration process at large.
From the perspective of the communities that received returnees, not only returning refugees and IDPs but also former fighters who came back and reintegrated into civilian life. Furthermore, the perspective of people that did not reintegrate in Sierra Leone should not be overlooked in an assessment of the success of reintegration. Therefore, this Working Paper also incorporates the
perspective of Sierra Leoneans that have stayed in Liberia and never returned. It hence addresses
the following guiding questions: How did the reintegration of displaced people, refugees and former fighters in Sierra Leone take place, and how did the various groups returning after war manage to live together in the long run? What prevented people from reintegrating? The author and her team's research in 2018 benefitted from the fact that returnees, communities and the 'non-returnees' in Liberia were able to reflect on reintegration in hindsight. Reparation
and reconciliation turned out to be crucial to make reintegration feasible. Therefore, the Working Paper argues that reconciliation among returning people and the communities where they settle is a crucial dimension that has to be closely linked to the concept of reintegration. The study shows that the reintegration process replicated the deep regional divide and the marginalisation of the youth that had caused the armed conflict and shaped the course of the war. The paper concludes that refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants reintegrated into a disintegrated society - an environment producing grievances that fuel election-related violence. The insights
from Sierra Leone should inform interventions of the international community in war-torn countries elsewhere and lead to a comprehensive reintegration process that incorporates refugees, IDPs
as well as former fighters and is linked to reconciliation, reparations and development programmes.

Since the failed coup attempt by parts of the Turkish military against
President Erdogan in the summer of 2016, the Turkish government has suspended
more than 100,000 civil servants on the pretext that they had planned
a coup. Out of fear of persecution and arbitrary arrests, around 21,000 Turkish
citizens have since applied for asylum in Germany. Many of them found refuge
in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). At the same time, communities
of people with a migration background related to Turkey have been living in
this federal state, particularly in the large cities, since the 1960s. This Working
Paper examines how members of both groups in NRW perceive each other and
how they interact with each other in everyday life, which conflicts arise, and
how the political developments in Turkey affect these processes. The study
shows that Turkish refugees experience solidarity and sympathy from people
with a Turkey-related migration background and their organisations, but also
encounter some hostility from them in everyday life. This reflects the strong
polarisation within the communities of people with a Turkey-related migration
background in NRW since 2016, which the Working Paper also addresses. The
author advocates a differentiated, empirically-based approach to the subject
area and strongly warns against generalisations. Approaches to conflict resolution
must incorporate the complexity of actors and interactions, as well as
the diversity of opinions and positions within communities with a connection
to Turkey.

There is an urgent requirement to endorse the Presidential decree on the modalities of the allocation of ranks, command functions, and the reclassification of ex-combatants of signatory movements in the relevant structures established by the state, including the army and security forces. If first tranches of ex-combatants are not successfully (re-)deployed, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the government need to halt and reconsider the pilot process. DDR has to be more closely tied to progress in reforming the Malian security sector. Distrust in the state and its failure to provide protection have been quoted as one of the main drivers of armed conflict in Mali. Integrating more individuals into a force that lacks accountability and oversight mechanisms might indeed worsen the problem rather than solving it. International assistance to the DDR process should be conditioned upon government efforts to enhance the capacity of the military justice system and the strengthening of the oversight role of civil society and parliament. The discourse on Mali, which is currently driven by counter-terrorist rhetoric, needs to be reframed. It has to shift from fighting terrorism to broader multidimensional peacebuilding. Stabilisation policy in Mali needs to avoid a too narrow programmatic focus on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). International stabilisation actors, the Malian government and civil society need to develop and strengthen programmes and tools addressing the root causes that drive non-state armed groups to use violence. Taking a broader perspective in dealing with non-state armed actors in Mali requires a better analysis of the grievances these actors have. The government, supported by the international community, needs to work on strategies that acknowledge and better respond to these grievances rather than primarily focusing on 'defeating terrorists' through military security approaches. International assistance to other policy areas must be conditioned upon political will on the side of the Malian government to address the root causes of the conflict.