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Rules can make tax law certain in simple and stable regulatory domains. A theory of how to make the law more certain is developed for more complex, dynamic domains. Its first step is to define overarching principles and make them binding on taxpayers. One of those overarching principles would be a general anti-avoidance principle. Next, a set of rules to cover the complex area of tax law is defined. The legislature lays down that in a contest between a rule and an overarching principle, it will not be the rule that is binding. That is, the principle is not merely used to assist in interpreting the rule. Rather it is the principle that is binding with the rules used to assist in applying the principle. Specific sets of rules for the most commonly used types of transactions or business arrangements are also written. This might involve a dozen different sets of rules to regulate concrete arrangements. Such rules actually merely specify examples of how the principles apply. Each of the dozen sets of illustrative rules are followed with an explanation that the reason for the rules being this way in this concrete situation is to honour the overarching principles. This is a way for the legislature to make it clear to judges that it is the principles that are the binding feature of the law. The paper also discusses what to do when judges do not respect this, reverting to old habits of privileging rules. It also discusses how to nurture shared sensibilities around the principles among judges, practitioners and the community.

Risk society and reflexivity as themes in contemporary sociology are brought together in a concrete way in the concept of meta risk management. Two case studies of the risk management of corporate risk management systems by the Australian Taxation Office are used to argue that meta risk management can be a cost‐effective and responsive regulatory strategy, at least in the context of a complex risk environment such as business taxation. Meta risk management is a promising strategy when risks are volatile and difficult for the regulator tocomprehend when the risks are effectively under the control of an organization over which the regulator has leverage.

This paper develops a different kind of analysis of the compliance policy of the High Wealth Individuals (HWI) Taskforce of the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office). It takes as its starting point the perceptions of HWI advisers who report that they have a considerable capacity to secure compliance with the law simply by pointing out to clients that something is illegal. Hence, working with advisers is important. Most advisers say they want more face-to-face communication with analysts. It is concluded that there is a set of good policy reasons for the Tax Office to respond to this concern. When advisers did have contact with HWI Taskforce staff, they overwhelmingly found them fair and professional. There was only one case of a specific complaint of non-compliance with the Taxpayers' Charter from the 27 advisers interviewed. The majority of advisers are also quite concerned about compliance costs from completing expanded returns. While abandoning the expanded return program would be a major mistake, there are a variety of ways the Tax Office can respond to these concerns. There was a lot of angst among advisers over the atmosphere of political 'witch hunt' that they felt permeated the initial establishment of the Taskforce. A number of more specific perceptions, future evaluation research ideas and recommendations are listed at the back of this report. The key elements of the Australian Taxation Office Compliance Model (ATO Compliance Model) - understanding taxpayer behaviour, building community partnerships, increasing flexibility of Tax Office operations, and more and escalating regulatory options to enforce compliance - seem to be working to bring about some improvement in HWI compliance.

An exploration of white-collar crimes committed by transnational pharmaceutical corporations looks at interdiction problems. It is noted that the pharmaceutical industry, with the worst record for corporate crime, is involved in bribery, product-safety & antitrust offenses, misrepresentations of its products, & improprieties in the safety testing of drugs. Enforcement of legal restrictions on tax evasion practices (eg, profit shifting) is hindered by transnational corporations' ability to evade enforcers within national boundaries. Progress in law compliance can only be made by decentering criminal enforcement by the state, using a legal-pluralist analysis. In addition, consumer & professional activism, industry self-regulation, & strict enforcement of state, regional, & international standards are necessary. Adapted from the source document.

While the pharmaceutical industry arguably has the worst record of serious corporate crime of any industry, international law evasion rather than outright law violation has been the biggest problem in the industry. To understand how these problems can be and are being brought under control, a legal-pluralist analysis is needed that decenters criminal enforcement by the state. Consumer and professional activism and a variety of levels of self-regulation in combination with state, regional, and international regulation are all important to understanding how progress is possible. Creative work within this web of controls can actually transform lowest-common-denominator regulation into highest-common-factor regulation and self-regulation when actors are capable of thinking strategically in world-system terms.