Suchergebnisse
Filter
92 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
Art and history: images and their meaning
In: Studies in interdisciplinary history
Democracy and the depth of intelligence sharing: why regime type hardly matters
In: Intelligence and national security, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 68-84
ISSN: 0268-4527
Democracy and the depth of intelligence sharing: why regime type hardly matters
In: Intelligence and national security, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 68-84
ISSN: 1743-9019
Democracy and the depth of intelligence sharing: why regime type hardly matters
In: Intelligence and national security, S. 1-17
ISSN: 0268-4527
BOOK REVIEWS - Worker's Control in Latin America, 1930-1979
In: International labor and working class history: ILWCH, Heft 55, S. 211-212
ISSN: 0147-5479
Workers' Control in Latin America, 1930-1979
In: Labour / Le Travail, Band 44, S. 283
REVIEWS - Worker's Control in Latin America, 1930-1979
In: Journal of Latin American studies, Band 31, Heft 1, S. 212
ISSN: 0022-216X
Oil and Revolution in Mexico
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Band 73, Heft 4, S. 173
ISSN: 2327-7793
Is more institutional coup-proofing better or worse for regime protection? Evidence from the Philippines, 1986–1987
In: Asian journal of political science, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 109-129
ISSN: 1750-7812
Overthrowing the "loyalty norm": the prevalence and success of coups in small-coalition systems, 1950 to 1999
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 60, Heft 2, S. 256-282
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
Overthrowing the "Loyalty Norm": The Prevalence and Success of Coups in Small-coalition Systems, 1950 to 1999
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 60, Heft 2, S. 256-282
ISSN: 1552-8766
This article examines two competing theories that link variation in the size of a winning coalition to its members' incentives and ability to orchestrate coups d'état against authoritarian leaders. Selectorate theory's "loyalty norm" focuses on the incumbent's ability to buy support and the challenger's inability to guarantee inclusion in a future coalition. It suggests that, in small-coalition systems, the probability of coup attempts and successes decreases as coalition size decreases. We develop an alternative theory of political accountability that focuses on a coalition's capacity to coordinate sanctions against a leader. It generates a rival expectation—in small-coalition systems, the probability of coup attempts and successes increases as coalition size decreases. We evaluate these hypotheses through quantitative tests on coup attempts and successes during 1950 to 1999 and with an illustrative case study of the Saint-Sylvestre Coup in the Central African Republic. These analyses provide strong support for our theory of political accountability.
Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy
In: Security studies, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 141-170
ISSN: 1556-1852