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The role of the European Union (EU) as a key international economic player is both highly developed and widely recognized. The Union's profile as an international political actor is much more limited, even though its activities are considerable. One of the principal objectives of the workshop on "The Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP] of the European Union: Germany's Dual Role as Architect and Constrictor" was to familiarize American policy and research communities with the realities of the structure, practice and limits of this policy initiative. The workshop, held on May 10, 1995, and sponsored by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, the U.S. Army War College, and the Delegation of the European Commission to the United States, also highlighted the special role Germany has played in the development of the CFSP, while considering, as well, the contributions of France and the United Kingdom. The future course of the CFSP matters to the United States as it raises questions about the nature of sovereign decision making on the part of principal American allies. Will these allies increasingly come to the table with singular collective positions? Will such a development enhance European stability? Will greater European unity diminish U.S. influence? How will NATO accommodate the change? The resolution of these issues in the early years of the coming century will have a profound impact on U.S. European relations and gives added salience to this report. The workshop involved presentations by Fraser Cameron (European Commission, Brussels), Roy Ginsberg (Skidmore College and Center for Strategic and International Studies), Josef Janning, (Forschungsgruppe Europa, Universitaet Mainz), whose papers are reproduced in this volume; commentary by Daniel Hamilton (U.S. Department of State), Philip Thomas (British Embassy), Lily Gardner Feldman (American Institute for Contemporary German Studies), Gerd Wagner (Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany), Karen Donfried (Congressional Research Service), Pierre Buhler (Embassy of France); and extended discussion with the audience. Mr Stuart Mackintosh has provided a superb summary of the discussions. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1237/thumbnail.jpg

1. Harsh V. Pant, Introduction 1. - Part I. Major Themes in Indian Foreign Policy . - 2. Devin T. Hagerty, India and the Global Balance of Power: A Neorealist Snapshot 23. - 3. C. Raja Mohan, India and the Emerging Non-Proliferation Order: The Second Nuclear Age 43. - 4. Timothy D. Hoyt, India and the Challenge of Global Terrorism: The 'Long War' and Competing Domestic Visions 73. - 5. Manjeet S. Pardesi and Sumit Ganguly, India and Energy Security: A Foreign Policy Priority 99. - Part II. India and Major Global Powers . - 6. C. Christine Fair, India and the US: Embracing a New Paradigm 131. - 7. Mohan Malik, India and China: As China Rises, India Stirs 163. - 8. Deepa M. Ollapally, India and Russia: Renewing the Relationship 192. - 9. Fraser Cameron, India and the EU: A Long Road Ahead 209. - Part III. India's Regional Policy . - 10. Stephen F. Burgess, India and South Asia: Towards a Benign Hegemony 231. - 11. Harsh V. Pant, India and the Middle East: A Re-Assessment of Priorities? 251. - 12. Stephen Blank, India and Central Asia: Part of the New Great Game 277. - 13. Manish Dabhade, India and East Asia: A Region 'Rediscovered' 305. - Harsh V. Pant, Afterword 323

The European Union-China relationship, based on an optimistic joint strategic agenda agreed in 2013, has shifted direction, with the EU in March 2019 describing China as a "systemic rival" in some areas. The EU has struggled to find a common approach to China, but this change was agreed at record speed and occurred against the background of growing United States pressure on its European allies to support the Donald Trump administration's hard-line approach to China. As the new EU leadership team takes over, it will have to navigate a difficult path in relations with China and the US.
The main reason for the shift in the EU's approach was business frustration at China's failure over many years to implement promises to open up its economy and accept a level playing field. Chinese foot-dragging in the negotiations for a bilateral investment agreement, now running for over six years, was another factor in the changed EU approach.
A number of key players, including commissioners dealing with China, members of the European Parliament, and EU ambassadors who had served in Beijing, played a key role in securing this changed approach, which was agreed very quickly despite some long-standing divisions between member states on how to deal with China.
Pressure from the Trump administration - which, unlike the EU, views China as a "strategic rival" - also played a part. It is likely that the new EU leadership under Ursula von der Leyen will maintain the tougher line, and place greater emphasis on reciprocity and strategic autonomy as guidelines for dealing with China.
Meanwhile there is continuing useful cooperation between the EU and China on the foreign policy front, notably on Iran, and on global issues such as climate change and support for the multilateral trading system.
The EU has to invest more in understanding China, which is a growing and formidable rival. EU leaders need to spend more time discussing China and agreeing a comprehensive approach covering all sectors. It should work with like-minded partners where there are shared interests concerning China.

Global economic power is shifting rapidly to Asia, now the EU's most important trade partner. The EU has a vital stake in the peace and security of Asia as few of its policy goals, including climate change and preservation of the multilateral system, can be achieved without the positive engagement of Asia. This is even more important because of the attitude of President Trump to Asia and global affairs. The EU thus needs to give greater priority to Asia and develop a more coherent policy approach. Growth rates in Asia have outstripped those in the EU and US for many years. Projected economic growth of 5.5 per cent this year in the Asia-Pacific region is far ahead of the 2.1 per cent and 1.9 per cent projected in the US and the EU, respectively. With economic clout comes political influence, which means that the EU has to pay more attention to Asia to achieve its own policy goals, whether in trade, climate change, migration, or terrorism. The EU has to prioritise and should concentrate on its strategic partners (China, Japan, India, and South Korea) and support for ASEAN. The withdrawal of the US from the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) offers the EU an opportunity. The policy of bilateral free trade agreements with selected partners should be continued as there is little prospect of any region-to-region agreement. The EU has a major stake in Asian security as any conflict would immediately impact global supply chains. It should do more to tackle "hot spots," such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Myanmar, and emphasise its integrated approach to security, as demonstrated in Operation Atalanta. The EU should not give up its normative agenda but should promote it in a more sensitive and realistic manner. The EU could also do more to help resolve the historical disputes in Asia, including paying more attention to its own historical role in the region. With the multilateral system under threat from the Trump presidency, the EU needs to engage more with Asia to secure its policy goals. It should revitalise its strategic partnerships as the centrepiece of a new Asia strategy. At the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit in Brussels in 2018, the EU should highlight its commitment to a stronger partnership with Asia. While trade will still be at the centre of EU-Asia relations, the agenda needs to be expanded to include a range of global issues.