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In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private information pertains to the ideological intensities but the ideological positions are publicly known, it may not be possible to have informative communication from the legislator who is ideologically distant from the proposer, but the more moderate legislator can communicate whether he would 'compromise' or 'fight' on ideology. If instead the private information pertains to the ideological positions, then all parties may convey whether they will 'cooperate', 'compromise', or 'fight' on ideology. When the uncertainty is about ideological intensity, the proposer is always better off making proposals for the two dimensions together despite separable preferences, but when the uncertainty is about ideological positions, bundling can result in informational loss which hurts the proposer.

AbstractThis paper provides a novel explanation for collusion between two procurement service providers (PSPs) and investigates effective contracts to collapse tacit collusion. By analyzing a benchmark contract with compensation designed solely by a retailer, we find that compensation alone has no effect on intensifying PSPs' competition such that the PSPs still fully control the total service fee by increasing/decreasing the commission fee imposed on manufacturers. To effectively abate collusion, we propose two potential tactics to intensify PSPs' competition: setting a reserve price and introducing a direct sourcing channel. We find that both are effective in combating PSPs' pricing power. The underlying force is that both tactics create credible threats to walk away from this transaction with PSPs, and hence, both incentivize PSPs to lower the total service fee. However, the retailer reduces total welfare to improve its own profit: (a) when the retailer sets a strategic reserve price and the product's value in the market is moderate or (b) when the retailer introduces a direct channel but its search capability is weak. By comparing these two proposed contracts, we find that the retailer should introduce a direct sourcing channel when the product's value is high.

This study adopted the theoretical framework of narrative mediation to investigate a storied conflict talk between a landlord and her tenant in which the mediator played the role of a story recipient in the co-construction of stories with disputants. The focus of this research is on the function of questions posed by the mediator in the production of turning points which are favourable to the evolution of "better-formed" stories. The results of this study indicate that there are at least two types of questions mediators ask: 1) the questions that can help disputants reflect on their imperfectness; 2) the questions that awaken disputants' memories of their good stories from the past. It is shown that the de-legitimacy for Self laid a foundation for the production of a good story towards a meaningful outcome for the mediation. The inadequacy of the context formed by first having legitimacy for Other followed by the de-legitimacy for Self led to the failure of destabilizing the problematic story in the mediation. The lack of the dominant party's legitimacy for Other resulted in the absence of legitimacy from the marginalized side and would likely cause unfavourable consequences to the mediation in the long term.

AbstractIn various scenarios, consumers may become satiated with products, and the degree of satiation is directly associated with their prior experiences. Confronted with consumer satiation, the seller is unable to either identify consumers who have a higher likelihood of being satiated ex ante or distinguish satiated from non‐satiated consumers ex post. Therefore, the seller should address dynamic selling, valuation uncertainty, and quantity decisions, all of which are important operational issues. We consider a two‐period problem in which consumer types are influenced by their prior consumption experiences. Faced with these consumers, the seller intends to optimize quantities and adjust the prices of the products in each period to maximize revenue. We find that the seller may reduce ex ante production quantity as some consumers become satiated. Moreover, the ex ante quantity is first decreasing and then increasing with regard to the satiation rate. Furthermore, two‐period information asymmetries may provide a rationale for upward distortion in quantity when consumer preferences are highly sensitive to first‐period consumption. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 386–400, 2016