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The main objective of this article is to describe and evaluate some of the central elements of the US strategy in Iraq, from the beginning of the war to the present. In this case, the term "strategy" refers mainly to the political-military actions directly related to the wider context of the war on terrorism. But the American strategy also involves secondary concerns: those that force the US, as a world power, to have constant commitments and implications in the evolution of the international system.As a result, the US strategy is not just about how the US manages military, anti-terrorist, regional stabilization and nation-building operations in Iraq, but also about how Washington defines its priorities, its political and military actions, and allocates resources not just to achieve the central objectives, but also to solve various side problems of the international scene.When talking about the current situation in Iraq, the starting point of the discussion must be the legitimacy of the US military intervention in 2003. From a strictly legal perspective, as from a strictly moral perspective, the US intervention in Iraq seems not to be legitimate enough. In order to establish a theoretical basis for the US intervention in Iraq, we must analyze the situation through the perspective of realism, as a theory of international relations, and we must recall some of Morgenthau's basic ideas.

The U.S.-led war in Iraq complicates security cooperation between the United States and Central Asia at a time when other regional powers—especially Russia, China, and India—are competing for influence in the region more overtly. Concerned about the implications of the U.S. interest in "regime change" for their own rule, Central Asian leaders now have an added incentive to overstate terrorist threats, persecute political opposition, and crack down on peaceful religious activity. The author argues that the United States should do more to address the underlying human security problems in Central Asia, which increase its vulnerability to terrorist movements. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1767/thumbnail.jpg

The study includes discussion and analysis of the Iranian policy toward the Iraqi crisis, and the effects of this crisis on forming the Iranian external conduct. There are several variables including internal, external and regional variables interacted together and the result of this interaction was affective on the Iranian policy with regard to the crisis. Consequently, Iran aspired to play a central role in Iraq to strengthen its regional influence on the first hand and to strengthen its negotiation situation with the great international powers on the other hand. In this context, Iran adopted an interventional behaviour in the Iraqi affairs by supporting its Allies in various ways and supporting the new political elites and creating strong connections with them as well. That led to a negative result on the Iranian relations with some of the Arab Iraq neighboring countries including Jordan which is afraid of the outcomes of the Iranian intervention in Iraq. The study showed that Iran's activities in Iraq led to strengthen the distrust of Tehran's behavior, therefore Iraq neighboring countries including Jordan are afraid of the Iraqi crisis's consequences on their security and stability.

The unconventional wars taking place in Syria and Iraq are characterized by the involvement of a complex network of state and non-state actors that apply asymmetrical warfare tactics in a region deeply divided along religious and ethnic lines. Given that scenario, the Obama administration intervened militarily in those areas applying the warfare model it used in Afghanistan, a strategy which replaces conventional United States ground forces with local allies supported by United States air power and special operations forces. Although there is consensus that each such type of warfare possesses strengths as well as weaknesses, the implications of the latter mode of warfare on regional stability remain debatable.Through analysis of the status of the conflict in Syria and Iraq as well as of the manner in which the Afghan warfare model has been implemented by the United States administration, this article sets forth implications for regional stability. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that despite the attempt through use of the Afghan model to maintain United States troops outside theaters of operation in Syria and Iraq, their introduction into the area may instead result in progressive United States military involvement as well as in empowerment of local players whose agendas and interests do not coincide with those of the United States, and, in the end, prove detrimental to the delicate regional balance. ; Las guerras no convencionales que tienen lugar en Siria e Irak se caracterizan por la participación de una compleja red de actores estatales y no estatales que aplican técnicas asimétricas de lucha en una región profundamente dividida en líneas religiosas y étnicas. Ante este escenario, la administración Obama intervino militarmente en la zona aplicando el modelo de guerra afgano; una estrategia que reemplaza a las tropas convencionales estadounidenses en el terreno por aliados locales que son respaldados por el poder aéreo norteamericano y por las Fuerzas de Operaciones Especiales. A pesar de que existe un consenso en torno a que cada método de guerra posee tanto fortalezas como debilidades, aún prevalece como una cuestión debatible las implicaciones que este modelo puede generar sobre la estabilidad regional.El presente artículo establece las implicaciones que el modelo de guerra afgano implementado por la administración estadounidense en Siria e Irak puede generar sobre la estabilidad regional. Para ello, se caracteriza la situación de conflicto en cada uno de estos países y se analiza la manera en que el modelo ha sido empleado en cada uno de ellos. Se encuentra que a pesar de que a través del modelo de guerra afgano se ha pretendido mantener a las tropas estadounidenses alejadas del teatro de operaciones en Siria e Irak, su puesta en marcha podría traducirse en un progresivo involucramiento militar estadounidense en la zona, en el empoderamiento de otros actores locales cuyas agendas e intereses no necesariamente se ajustan a los de Estados Unidos y, en definitiva, en un detrimento para el ya delicado equilibrio regional.

The development of major oil and gas reserves in the autonomous Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) is a recent phenomenon which has attracted major media and industry interest. It represents the rare case, in recent history, of the discovery of a large new onshore conventional petroleum province. The Kurdistan Region Government (KRG)'s formulation of its own oil policy presents an important case of sub-national authority over the natural resource sector, which may be relevant to other oil-producing countries or territories. The development of Kurdish hydrocarbons has major political implications for the KRI, its possible independence, for regional politics and energy security of its neighbours. This paper outlines the history and development of the KRI's hydrocarbon resources, the economic, legal, and political issues and debates, and the wider implications of Kurdish oil and gas, as well as some lessons for other comparable regions.

The development of major oil and gas reserves in the autonomous Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) is a recent phenomenon which has attracted major media and industry interest. It represents the rare case, in recent history, of the discovery of a large new onshore conventional petroleum province. The Kurdistan Region Government (KRG)'s formulation of its own oil policy presents an important case of sub-national authority over the natural resource sector, which may be relevant to other oil-producing countries or territories. The development of Kurdish hydrocarbons has major political implications for the KRI, its possible independence, for regional politics and energy security of its neighbours. This paper outlines the history and development of the KRI's hydrocarbon resources, the economic, legal, and political issues and debates, and the wider implications of Kurdish oil and gas, as well as some lessons for other comparable regions.

The George W. Bush administration resorted to war to respond to the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, whereas it virtually ruled out the use of force to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. By utilizing various strands of realist international relations theories, we trace motivations behind the administration's divergent foreign-policy choices toward rogue states. That the United States rushed to war against Iraq while procrastinating on North Korea presents a puzzle to conventional realism, which postulates that great powers observe changes in relative capabilities and respond accordingly. We argue that policy differences should be embedded in discussion of the administration's foreign-policy grand strategy, which sought to sustain the hegemonic status of the United States in the world. Iraq and North Korea had different implications for Bush's grand strategy, thereby calling for different approaches. By tracing the strategic design of the Bush administration, we attempt to provide a more complete account of policy differences toward rogue states, as well as indicate the significant changes in US policy during the George W. Bush administration and since. (Asian Perspect/GIGA)

This article analyzes the discursive-ideational barriers restricting regional cooperation by examining Turkey's relations with Iraqi Kurds from a critical, theoretical perspective in the context of Turkey's domestic reforms and its relations with the USA and the EU. It is argued that the ethnicity discourse undermines cooperation, insofar as it feeds the perception of rival groups with zero-sum interests. Presenting a simple model, the article argues that replacing the ethnicity discourse with alternative, post-ethnic discourses requires combining alternative discourses with policies that produce positive-sum interests, coordination between groups, and opportunities for joint collective actions. Hence, state capacity to formulate and implement such policies is crucial. Predictions and policy implications are generated accordingly. First, further reconciliation of Turkey's domestic Kurdish conflict through democratic and administrative reforms, EU integration, and the promotion of national-identity models that are more flexible and more reflective of diversity will facilitate cooperation with Iraqi Kurds. Second, prosperity and democratic stability in Iraq will help achieve a lasting resolution in Turkey. Third, regional cooperation requires that domestic and external actors promote the positive-sum perception of Turkish and Kurdish interests. Fourth, research can help by developing linguistic-analytical categories that transcend the narrow discourse of ethnicity in favor of discourses that reflect multiple and compatible group belongings.

The issues which provided Iraq with the pretext for its invasion of Kuwait were oil pricing policies and oil revenues. Of course, Iraq had broader political and regional objectives, but its most immediate and pressing concern was to loosen the economic and financial noose that was threatening strangulation. Low oil prices, technical limitations on current oil output and financial constraints on the investments required to reclaim or expand productive capacity were causing intractable problems for the government and severe hardship for the population. President Saddam Hussain was finding himself pushed further and further into a corner and tried to get out of it by invading Kuwait. This behaviour was utterly unacceptable and rightly condemned by the international community. But for the purposes of this analysis it is relevant to recall that oil was an integral part of the story.

PREFACE -- FIGURES -- SUMMARY -- AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK -- IRAQ AS AN ADVERSARY -- THE HISTORICAL RECORD -- IRAQ'S VULNERABILITIES AND COUNTERMOVES -- IMPLICATIONS FOR COERCION -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- ABBREVIATIONS -- INTRODUCTION -- UNDERSTANDING COERCION -- DEFINING COERCION -- DIFFICULTIES IN DISTINGUISHING COMPELLENCE FROM DETERRENCE -- COERCION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS -- THE UNCERTAIN MEANING OF "SUCCESS" -- IRAQ AS AN ADVERSARY -- HOW SADDAM STAYS IN POWER -- Security and Regime Protection Forces -- Political Techniques -- IRAQ'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS -- SADDAM'S SHIFTING STRATEGY -- Saddam as an Adversary: A Cagey Foe or Foolish Thug? -- U.S. OBJECTIVES, OPTIONS, ASSUMPTIONS -- ANALYTIC ASSUMPTIONS -- CONTAINING IRAQI AGGRESSION -- PREVENTING NBC BUILDUP -- TOPPLING SADDAM'S REGIME -- PRESERVING REGIONAL STABILITY -- CONSTRAINTS ON THE UNITED STATES -- Fear of Iraqi Fragmentation -- Discomfort with Sanctions -- Preserving an International Alliance -- Humanitarian Ambivalence -- Domestic Limits to Any Concessions -- ATTEMPTS TO COERCE IRAQ: THE HISTORICAL RECORD -- ESTABLISHING UNSCOM INSPECTIONS (1991) -- CREATING A KURDISH SAFE HAVEN (1991-1992) -- ESTABLISHING A SOUTHERN NO-FLY ZONE (AUGUST 1992- PRESENT) -- RESPONDING TO INSPECTION AND NO-FLY ZONE STANDOFFS (DECEMBER 1992- JANUARY 1993) -- DETERRING AN INVASION OF KUWAIT (1994) -- PUNISHING THE IRAQI THRUST INTO NORTHERN IRAQ (1996) -- HALTING DEFIANCE OF UNSCOM (1997-1998) -- FORCING COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCOM (OPERATION DESERT FOX, DECEMBER 1998) -- THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF CONFRONTATION -- ATTEMPTS TO COERCE IRAQ: A SCORECARD -- U.S. POLICY TRADEOFFS AND GULF SECURITY -- IRAQ'S VULNERABILITIES: AN ASSESSMENT -- IRAQI PRESSURE POINTS -- WHAT IRAQ IS NOT SENSITIVE TO -- IRAQI COUNTERMOVES TO OFFSET VULNERABILITIES -- IMPLICATIONS FOR COERCION -- RECOGNIZING ADVERSARY CENTERS OF GRAVITY.

This thesis examines Yezidi perceptions of access to formal education for Yezidi children and youth from the Sinjar region of Iraq, a primary homeland of the Yezidi people and an officially disputed territory between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government of Iraq in Baghdad, between the periods of 2003–2014 and 2014 onwards. These two time frames are selected and differentiated to reflect two major events in the recent history of Sinjar – the downfall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 and subsequent de facto control of Sinjar by the KRG, and the seizing of the area by the Islamic State (IS) group and subsequent displacement of the majority of the Yezidi community in 2014. This thesis also seeks to understand prominent Yezidi discourses around this issue and the implications for Yezidi children and youth from Sinjar, and for the Yezidi community as a whole. This research is conducted according to a qualitative approach. The data set was obtained on the ground in Iraq through the use of in-depth semi-structured and narrative interviews conducted according to the Responsive Interview Model between August and December 2016. Thematic analysis was then applied to the research data. The theoretical framework of the thesis broadly follows the typologies of sovereignty, identity, and education, with more defined theoretical concepts applied which fall under one or two of these typologies. Supporting information is found in documentation released by United Nations agencies, reports from think tanks and NGOs, and published media pieces. A strong effort is made throughout to preserve the voices of the research participants, the majority of whom are themselves displaced Yezidis from Sinjar. This work aims to illuminate a pressing but underexamined problematique that affects the lives of vulnerable people and has significant implications for the future of the nation of Iraq. Particular attention is paid to political competition between competing bodies of authority in Iraq, especially between the KRG and the federal Iraqi government. The thread of trauma as a result of the attempted genocide of the Yezidi people by IS from 2014 is observable throughout the work, as it would be through any research on this minority that either focuses on this time period or involves research participants from the community.

This article explains why Iran was unsuccessful in its efforts to persuade Shiʿi Iraqis to support Iran during the critical early years of the Iran–Iraq war. Analysis of Iranian and Iraqi framing communicated to that target population shows Iran failed due to both structural and cultural factors. Its media strategy lacked reach and variety and it misunderstood the cultural identity of Shiʿi Iraqis. The author makes use of original archive material of radio transcripts from 1981–1983 as well as other primary sources and historical accounts. The research makes an original theoretical contribution by applying media contest theory to a military confrontation between two sovereign states, rather than between a state 'authority' facing a non-state 'challenger'. The findings have implications for considering how Iran today may communicate more effectively beyond its borders through regional media strategies and thus the viability of a mediatized Shiʿism.

Developing an original theoretical approach to understanding the roots of regional conflict and cooperation, International Relations in the Middle East explores domestic and international foreign policy dynamics for an accessible insight into how and why Middle Eastern regional order has changed over time. Highlighting interactions between foreign policy trajectories in a range of states including Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey, Ewan Stein identifies two main drivers of foreign policy and alignments: competitive support-seeking and ideological externalisation. Clearly linking political, ideological and foreign policy dynamics, Stein demonstrates how the sources of regional antagonisms and solidarities are to be found not in the geopolitical chessboard, but in the hegemonic strategies of the region's pivotal powers. Making the case for historical sociology - in particular the work of Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser - as the most powerful lens through which to understand regional politics in the Middle East, with wider implications for the study of regional order elsewhere.