Suchergebnisse

One effect of the cosmopolitan turn in recent political philosophy is that widely held beliefs and intuitions are being called into question. My purpose here is to scrutinize one of these beliefs—that we should attend to the needs of our compatriots before the needs of the foreigners—from the perspective of a rights-based theory. After sketching a theory that takes the right of autonomy as its cornerstone, I consider four arguments that might support the intuition that compatriots take priority. Only one of the four is sound, I conclude, and even this argument, the argument from reciprocity, supports the intuition only in a highly qualified form.

Mulford Sibley is not the sort of scholar who makes a career of elaborating variations on a theme. There are recurring themes in his work, however, and I want to sound two of them, participatory democracy and technology, in this essay. These themes may be joined in a number of ways, but here I shall take up only one - the possibility that advances in communications technology may actually promote democracy by extending and enhancing opportunities for political participation.

In a recent essay, "Political Obligation", R. M. Hare sets out a utilitarian account of the obligation to obey the law which he believes to be immune to an objection often brought against such accounts. In what follows I shall briefly review this objection and Professor Hare's response to it; than I shall go on to argue that Hare's response, ingenious as it is, fails to defeat the objection. Hare's argument is instructive nonetheless, for its failure tells us something about wrongs and harm as well as utility and political obligation.

While I do not accept all of these rationalistic readings of the general will, I do share the general conviction that we can make sense of Rousseau's concept, and his argument, without resorting to metaphysics or psychology. What I shall offer here, accordingly, is in some respects only a variation on a theme now well known to students of Rousseau's political philosophy. It is an important variation nonetheless, for it enables us to reconcile passages in the Social Contract which otherwise appear to be contradictory. That, at least, is what I shall argue in this essay.

Of the many developments in the area of criminal justice over the last twenty years or so, the rediscovery of the victim may well be the most heartening. This rediscovery has produced both a new field of study, victimology, and a number of interesting programs and proposals that aim to redress the injuries suffered by the victims of crime. To this point, however, the rediscovery of the victim has not worked a fundamental transformation of our system of criminal justice. The question I wish to address here is whether it should do so.