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The literature of the last decade indicates two important lessons for future research. The first is that political scientists and scholars in related fields have rediscovered the nature and ubiquity of politics. In particular, they have realized that neither public administration nor organization theory can solve political issues. The second lesson is that the growth of government has enlarged the list of important political actors with the addition of numerous 'public' groups, organizations, and institutions. The combined message of the two lessons is that analyses of the public sector and policy‐making should be sensitive to the importance of political actors in the public sector. This paper is a preliminary attempt (based on elite questionnaire data) to map the general structure of the Danish policy‐making system by focusing on the interactions among government bureaucrats, interest organizations, and MPs. These elites are further included in an analysis of public expenditure problems, with particular emphasis on the (often neglected) role of political parties and their relationships to various groups and segments of society. The emergent overall picture of the policy‐making system indicates problems that presumably cannot be 'solved' within the framework of a democratic polity.

With a summary and list of tables and figures in English

ABSTRACTDespite assertions about the ubiquity of coalition behavior in politics, theories of coalition formation have not usually been tested on data pertaining to the legislative process. The paper explores advantages and shortcomings of existing coalition theory for studying law‐making in a multi‐party parliamentary democracy with highly cohesive parties, using Denmark as the test case. All passed government bills 1953–1970 are studied in terms of the size and composition of the winning coalitions and policy area of bills. In all cabinet periods a certain number of bills are passed by minimal majorities, but most are not, indicating that minimal majority behavior is not a principal strategy in law‐making. However, the traditional left‐right model of the Danish party system is very successful in accounting for the coalitions formed. Classification of bills into policy areas also shows considerable variation with respect to levels of conflict, with taxation as the most conflict‐generating area. The findings suggest that if we are ultimately to understand the significance of coalition behavior in politics, it is imperative that we relax strict rationalistic behavior assumptions and concentrate efforts on developing ways for systematic study of the content and perceived consequences of decisions made by winning coalitions.