Resident Fellows Zsolt Darvas and Jakob von Weizsäcker wrote this paper on the pros and cons of a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) following testimony von Weizsäcker gave for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. They argue that a small tax on financial transactions is justifiable in order to limit socially undesirable transactions.
In this paper, original written for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) of the European Parliament on 30 November as part of the series entitled 'The threat of currency wars: global imbalances and their effects on currencies', Bruegel Fellows Jean Pisani-Ferry and Zsolt Darvas argue that the currency war has three manifestations: 1) the inflexible pegs of undervalued currencies; 2) attempts by floating exchange-rate countries to resist currency appreciation; 3) quantitative easing. Europe should primarily be concerned about the first issue, which relates to the renewed debate about the international monetary system.
The case for taxing financial transactions merely to raise more revenues from the financial sector is not particularly strong. Better alternatives to tax the financial sector are likely to be available. However, a tax on financial transactions could be justified in order to limit socially undesirable transactions when more direct means of doing so are unavailable for political or practical reasons. Some financial transactions are indeed likely to do more harm than good, especially when they contribute to the systemic risk of the financial system. However, such a financial transaction tax should be very small, much smaller than the negative externalities in question, because it is a blunt instrument that also drives out socially useful transactions. There is a case for taxing over-the-counter derivative transactions at a somewhat higher rate than exchange-based derivative transactions. More targeted remedies to drive out socially undesirable transactions should be sought in parallel, which would allow, after their implementation, to reduce or even phase out financial transaction taxes.
This paper introduces a method of calculating physical capital stock figures in transition countries and derives data for Hungary. On the basis of international experience, we set investment and saving paths for future income levels. Confrontation of savings prospects of different sectors with investments needs leads to an economic policy analysis of the fiscal policy needed to catch up to 70 per cent of Austrian per capita income by 2030.
The additional public investment need required to meet the European Union's climate goals is between 0.5 percent and 1 percent of GDP annually during this decade. Increasing green public investment while consolidating deficits will be a major challenge. While our simulations show that budget consolidation can be done at a moderate pace in line with EU rules if those rules are interpreted flexibly, past consolidation episodes resulted in major public investment cuts. This time, there is a need for a major increase in investment. A 'green golden rule' (excluding net green investment from the fiscal indicators used to measure fiscal rule compliance) is the most promising option to address this tension. Relaxing the strictness of the EU fiscal framework beyond its existing flexibility and the proposed green golden rule does not appear necessary in the next few years. The uncertain growth impact of green public spending and the risks to growth from climate change create difficult trade offs in fiscally weaker countries. In any case, better regulatory policy and a higher price on emissions should incentivise private green investment and reduce public costs. These ingredients should be combined to form a "green fiscal pact".
The academic literature on the effectiveness of the European Union's cohesion policy is inconclusive: some studies find positive long-term impacts, others find positive but only short-term impacts, while others find no or even negative impacts. This range of results arises from major complicating factors, related to complex local environments, the diversity of policy interventions beyond cohesion policy, varying time frames, cross-regional spillover effects, lack of appropriate data for the analysis and various econometric problems and related estimation biases. We adopted a novel methodology that first estimated 'unexplained economic growth' by controlling for the influence of various region-specific factors, and then analysed its relationship with about two dozen characteristics specific to projects carried out in various regions in the context of EU cohesion policy. We found that the best-performing regions have on average projects with longer durations, fewer priorities, more inter-regional focus, lower national co-financing, more national (as opposed to regional and local) management, a higher proportion of private or non-profit participants among the beneficiaries (as opposed to public-sector beneficiaries) and a higher level of funding from the Cohesion Fund. No clear patterns emerged concerning the sector of intervention. Interviews with stakeholders suggested that cohesion policy is the most evaluated of all EU policies and generates European value added. In some countries, local stakeholders have different attitudes towards cohesion and national funds, which sometimes leads to less-careful management of EU funds. The Performance Framework is seen as creating an additional layer of administrative burden, without a clear connection to results or the quality of interventions. Beyond the crucial role of administrative capacity and institutional quality, there are no clear-cut characteristics that contribute to the success of cohesion programmes. Cohesion policy reform should focus on addressing the underlying problems, involving more strategic planning, fostering simplification but with stricter controls when the corruption risk is high, increasing the interregional focus and exploring synergies with other EU and national programmes. Focused and longer-term strategic programmes do not require high levels of flexibility. The national co-financing rate should be set on the basis of fiscal constraints, the additionality principle and corruption risk. The importance of a locally-led perspective should be reconciled with our finding that centralised management works better. Thematic concentration along with fewer EU goals is well justified for more-developed regions, but not for less-developed regions. A strengthened link with the European Semester should be avoided. Transparency over data, design and implementation of projects should be increased.
The reconsideration of the complex set of European fiscal rules should be a priority in terms of euro-area reform. The rules contributed to excessive fiscal austerity during the crisis, thus helping to aggravate and prolong its economic, social and political consequences. Moreover, either because countries did not abide by the rules or because the rules were not sufficiently strictly applied during good years, there was insufficient debt reduction in many countries in the 2000s, which reduced their fiscal capacity during bad years. In addition, the rules suffered from large measurement problems. They are based on a valid theoretical concept - the structural budget balance - but this is not observable and its estimation is subject to massive errors. The post-2010 pro-cyclical fiscal tightening caused by the fiscal rules also led to the European Central Bank becoming overburdened as the main remaining stabilisation instrument. The fiscal framework has also put the European Commission in the difficult position of enforcing a highly complex, non-transparent and error-prone system, exposing the Commission to criticism from countries with both stronger and weaker fiscal fundamentals. The rules are used as a scapegoat by anti-European populists because they are seen as a manifestation of centralised micro-management which infringes on national sovereignty. However, fiscal rules to ensure debt sustainability in the euro area are a necessity because the no-bail-out clause in case of fiscal crises is not credible in a monetary union. The fiscal rules need a major overhaul. They are not a silver bullet and cannot be substituted for the national democratic debate on fiscal choices and debt sustainability, but should help frame this debate. They should be as transparent and simple as possible, should set targets under the direct control of the government, should allow countercyclical fiscal policy and should incentivise the reduction of excessive public debt. This Policy Contribution assesses the current framework and proposes a major simplification. We recommend substituting the numerous and complex rules with a simple new rule: nominal expenditures should not grow faster than long-term nominal income, and they should grow at a slower pace in countries with excessive debt levels. Our simulations suggest that this rule would help reconcile fiscal prudence and macroeconomic stabilisation of the economy. We set out a national and European institutional framework that could implement such a rule. We advocate the credible enforcement of fiscal rules, mixing several instruments pertaining to surveillance, positive incentives, market discipline and increased political cost of non-compliance. Finally, one example of a country in which the national fiscal framework could be improved is France: we recommend the better integration of the French independent fiscal council (Haut-Conseil des finances publiques) into the national budget process by broadening its mandate to include endorsement of fiscal forecasts and debt sustainability analysis, by increasing its capacity to independently produce fiscal and macroeconomic forecasts.
European Union countries offer a unique experience of financial regulatory and supervisory integration, complementing various other European integration efforts following the second world war. Financial regulatory and supervisory integration was a very slow process before 2008, despite significant cross-border integration especially of wholesale financial markets.However, the policy framework proved inadequate in the context of the major financial crisis in the EU starting in 2007, and especially in the euro area after 2010. That crisis triggered major changes to European financial regulation and to the financial supervisory architecture, most prominently with the creation of three new European supervisory authorities in 2011 and the gradual establishment of European banking union starting in 2012. The banking union is a major structural institutional change for the EU, arguably the most significant since the introduction of the euro. Even in its current highly incomplete form, and with no prospects for rapid completion, the banking union has improved financial supervision in the euro area and increased the euro area's resilience. Asian financial integration lags well behind Europe, and there is no comparable political and legal integration. Nevertheless, Asia can draw useful lessons from European experiences in multiple areas that include the harmonisation of the micro-prudential framework, proper macro-prudential structures, and participation in global financial authorities.
Due to problems with existing methodologies that aim to identify the causal impact of European Union cohesion policy on economic growth, we adopted a novel methodology. We first estimated 'unexplained economic growth' by controlling for the influence of various region-specific factors, and then analysed its relationship with about two dozen characteristics specific to projects carried out in various regions in the context of EU cohesion policy. We found that the best-performing regions have on average projects with longer durations, more inter-regional focus, lower national co-financing, more national (as opposed to regional and local) management, higher proportions of private or non-profit participants among the beneficiaries (as opposed to public-sector beneficiaries) and higher levels of funding from the Cohesion Fund. No clear patterns emerged concerning the sector of intervention.
The 'Brexit bill' is an expected payment to be made by the United Kingdom that would settle its financial commitments when it leaves the European Union. While authors of this Working Paper consider the financial settlement the least important economic issue in the Brexit negotiations, a conditional agreement at least on the methodology for calculating the Brexit bill could be a prerequisite for the more meaningful discussions on the new EU-UK economic relationship after Brexit, such as future trade, financial services and labour mobility cooperation. To bring transparency to the debate and to foster a quick agreement on the bill, the authors make a comprehensive attempt to quantify the various assets and liabilities that might be factors in the financial settlement. The size of the Brexit bill will depend on fundamental political compromises and choices, which is discussed. Based on the different scenarios, the long-run net Brexit bill could range from €25.4 billion to €65.1 billion, possibly with a large upfront UK payment followed by significant EU reimbursements later.
[Highlights] Pro-cyclical fiscal tightening might be one reason for the anaemic economic recovery in Europe, raising questions about the effectiveness of the EU's fiscal framework in achieving its two main objectives - public debt sustainability and fiscal stabilisation. In theory, the current EU fiscal rules, with cyclically adjusted targets, flexibility clauses and the option to enter an excessive deficit procedure, allow for large-scale fiscal stabilisation during a recession. However, implementation of the rules is hindered by the badly-measured structural balance indicator and incorrect forecasts, leading to erroneous policy recommendations. The large number of flexibility clauses makes the system opaque. The current inefficient European fiscal framework should be replaced with a system based on rules that are more conducive to the two objectives, more transparent, easier to implement and which have a higher potential to be complied with. The best option, re-designing the fiscal framework from scratch, is currently unrealistic. Therefore we propose to eliminate the structural balance rules and to introduce a new public expenditure rule with debt-correction feedback, embodied in a multi-annual framework, which would also support the central bank's inflation target. A European Fiscal Council could oversee the system.
European Union (EU) countries offer a unique experience of financial regulatory and supervisory integration, complementing various other European integration efforts following the Second World War. Financial regulatory and supervisory integration was a very slow process before 2008, despite significant cross-border integration, especially of wholesale financial markets. However, the policy framework proved inadequate in the context of the major financial crisis in the EU starting in 2007, and especially in the euro area after 2010. That crisis triggered major changes to European financial regulation and to the financial supervisory architecture, most prominently with the creation of three new European supervisory authorities in 2011 and the gradual establishment of European banking union starting in 2012. The banking union is a major structural institutional change for the EU, arguably the most significant since the introduction of the euro. Even in its current highly incomplete form, and with no prospects for rapid completion, the banking union has improved financial supervision in the euro area and increased the euro area's resilience. Asian financial integration lags well behind Europe, and there is no comparable political and legal integration. Nevertheless, Asia can draw useful lessons from European experiences in multiple areas that include the harmonization of the microprudential framework, proper macroprudential structures, and participation in global financial authorities.
The euro area's sovereign debt crisis continues though significant steps have been taken to resolve it. This paper proposes a comprehensive solution to the crisis based on three pillars: a plan to restore banking sector soundness in the whole euro area, a resolution of sovereign debt crisis -including a revision of EU assistance facilities and a reduction of the Greek public debt- and a strategy to foster growth and competitiveness. The paper provides novel estimates and analysis focusing on the current situation of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
Using a panel of 21 OECD countries and 40 years of annual data, we find that countries with similar government budget positions tend to have business cycles that fluctuate more closely. That is, fiscal convergence (in the form of persistently similar ratios of government surplus/deficit to GDP) is systematically associated with more synchronized business cycles. We also find evidence that reduced fiscal deficits increase business cycle synchronization. The Maastricht "convergence criteria," used to determine eligibility for EMU, encouraged fiscal convergence and deficit reduction. They may thus have indirectly moved Europe closer to an optimum currency area, by reducing countries' abilities to create idiosyncratic fiscal shocks. Our empirical results are economically and statistically significant, and robust.