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Employing the analytic technique of game theory, we attempt to answer questions about how individuals with different proclivities to use crime to accomplish ends, and different beliefs about society's fairness, are likely to respond to different incentives and disincentives that are derived from strain and neoclassical deterrence theories. Our analysis indicates that the crime control policies typically recommended by adherents of both theories are often logically invalid, given the premises upon which they are supposedly based. For example, our analysis suggests why punishment strategies like "three strikes and you're out" and "entitlement strategies" such as welfare and other short‐term redistributive payment programs fail to deter crime. Finally, after including notions of equity with traditional rational choice assumptions, our analysis identifies a mix of theoretically derived strategies that may more effectively deter crime.

We assume that in a conflict between a nation with a nuclear capability and one without, the conflict may become nuclear, while, in a conflict between two nuclear powers, the conflict is unlikely to become nuclear by reason of fear of retaliation. Then, as the number of nations with nuclear weapons increases, the chance of bilateral conflict becoming nuclear initially increases and then decreases to zero when all nations are nuclearly armed. Empirical evidence suggests that nuclear deterrence does in fact work in the way the model assumes. We set forth an expected utility model for initiating conflict when nuclear weapons are held by both sides, by one side, and by neither side. While there are dangers in proliferation, these dangers may not be as great as dangers of asymmetry in nuclear power.

Introduces a special journal issue devoted to the dissolving boundary between comparative politics & international relations. The extent to which this is & should be occurring is explored, focusing on issues related to domestic & international security & conflict. The relatively uncontroversial ideas that domestic variables impact issues of international security & international variables impact domestic security are considered. More controversial is the notion that international & comparative politics are connected not only because conditions in one environment influences the other, but because it is possible to employ a single theoretical framework to comprehend domestic & international security issues. Here, an overview is provided, arguing for a true termination of what are seen as obsolete boundaries between the fields. It is contended that the fields can be unified under a theoretical framework targeting political leaders as actors keen on gaining & maintaining power while subject to institutional & political constraints. Contributions are disparate but share the belief that theoretical advance in the study of conflict lies at the nexus of comparative & international politics. 14 References. J. Zendejas

Governments are likely to be held accountable for the success or failure of their foreign policies. Consequently, we claim that international wars can, under specified conditions, have domestically instigated consequences for violent regime change in the political systems of the participants. Drawing upon all international war participation between 1816 and 1975, we seek to answer the question, Do wars lead to violent changes of regime and if so, under what conditions? Three hypotheses set out the expected associations of a nation's initiator or target role in a war, the war outcome, and the costs of the war with domestically instigated violent changes of regime. Direct relationships are found for all three and hold even against possible threats to their validity and robustness. The results suggest that domestic politics play a larger role in national security policy than is generally believed by realist or neorealist theorists.

The appropriate model of international conflict and war has been much discussed in recent years, and considerable progress has been made in modeling. Nevertheless the assumptions, conditions, and specifications for international conflict models remain eminently debatable. In the December 1986 issue of this Review, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman presented a generalized expected utility model of international conflict. Here Seif Hussein takes issue with their model in various particulars, aiming to perfect and strengthen the model. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman respond.