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Examines adoption of European Union internal market legislation and policies in the case of one European Economic Area country; based on a 1996 survey of central government officials.

This article reviews the nature of direct interest organizational participation in government in Norway. Organizational involvement, while high, varies markedly across different kinds of associations and issues. Activities are concentrated in the two organizational forms of the committee and remiss systems. The analysis of the linkage patterns with the ministries suggests that corporatism is a somewhat inadequate concept for describing the Norwegian system in general.

A basic insight in public governance and administration research is that career officials tend to play an important role in public policy development as well as in its implementation. Surprisingly, however, despite of being an enduring theme on the research agenda, the jury still seems to be largely out as regards how to account for bureaucrats' actual decision behaviour, a fact reflected in the numerous competing theories and perspectives available. By applying a novel large-N questionnaire survey as well as an alternative method, this paper sheds new light on this highly contested area of research. We find that government bureaucrats' (formal) organizational position is by far the most important explanatory factor, while classical demographic factors like geographical background, gender and age play a rather minor role. Among officials' many early experiences, only their educational background and former job experience really count. Nor the political attitudes of officials seem to matter. The crucial role of bureaucrats' organizational position for understanding their behaviour does not seem to depend on intra-organizational socialization. Importantly, the key role of factors that may be relatively subject to deliberate change, such as organization structure and the former job experience and educational background of those recruited, entails a considerable potential for organizational design. ; acceptedVersion

A basic insight in public administration research is that career officials play an important role in public policy development as well as in its implementation. Surprisingly, however, despite being an enduring theme on the research agenda, the jury still seems to be out regarding how to account for bureaucrats' actual decision behaviour, a fact reflected in the numerous competing theories and perspectives available. By applying a novel large-N questionnaire survey as well as an alternative method, this article sheds new light on this highly contested area of research. We find that government bureaucrats' (formal) organizational position is by far the most important explanatory factor, while classical demographic factors like geographical background, gender and age play a rather minor role. Among officials' many early experiences, only their educational background and former job experience really count. The political attitudes of officials do not matter. The crucial role of bureaucrats' organizational position for understanding their behaviour does not depend on intra-organizational socialization. Importantly, the key role of factors that may be relatively subject to deliberate change, such as organization structure and the former job experience and educational background of those recruited, entails a considerable potential for organizational design.

Les études montrent que les administrations publiques qui pratiquent le recrutement au mérite sont nettement moins touchées par la corruption que les autres. Les données sont nombreuses sur la situation des États membres de l'U.E. en ce qui concerne le degré de recrutement au mérite au sein de leurs administrations, ainsi que sur les résultats de l'administration de la Commission européenne à cet égard. En revanche, on en sait beaucoup moins sur les pratiques de recrutement des agences de réglementation (décentralisées) de l'Union européenne, de plus en plus nombreuses. Dans le présent article, nous tentons d'analyser les méthodes de recrutement pratiquées au sein des secrétariats de ces agences. Nous examinons également la question de l'influence potentielle du fait que l'agence de l'Union européenne est située ou non dans un pays caractérisé par une culture administrative non méritocratique. Notre article indique que les agences de l'Union européenne appliquent massivement des instruments méritocratiques lors de l'embauche de personnel, indépendamment de leur localisation. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Dans le présent article, nous soutenons et démontrons que le recrutement basé sur le mérite favorise la bonne gouvernance et une gouvernance non corrompue. Nous nous intéressons au cas des agences de l'Union européenne. Les données présentées montrent que ces agences appliquent généralement des instruments méritocratiques lorsqu'elles embauchent du personnel administratif. Notre étude montre également que les méthodes de recrutement ne sont pas affectées par la situation géographique des agences de l'Union européenne. Ces agences ont tendance à appliquer les normes communes de l'Union européenne fondées sur le mérite, quel que soit leur lieu d'implantation, étant donné qu'elles font partie de l'administration de l'Union européenne.

Studies show that public administrations that practise merit-based recruitment of their personnel are significantly less marked by corruption than administrations that do not recruit in this manner. While we know a lot about how EU member states score with regard to the degree of merit-based recruitment within their administrations, and also how the European Commission administration performs in this respect, recruitment practices within the increasing number of European Union regulatory (decentralized) agencies seem to remain a white spot in the literature so far. In this article, we make a first step in mapping recruitment practices within the secretariats of such agencies. We also investigate if it matters whether a European Union agency is located in a country marked by a non-meritocratic administrative culture or not. The article shows that European Union agencies seem to overwhelmingly apply meritocratic instruments when hiring people, regardless of their location.Points for practitionersThis article argues and shows that recruitment based on merit enhances good and non-corrupt governance. The case in point is European Union agencies. The data presented illuminate that these agencies generally apply meritocratic instruments when hiring administrative staff. The study also shows that recruitment practices are not affected by the geographical location of European Union agencies. These agencies tend to practise the common merit-based European Union standards regardless of their location since agencies are components of the European Union administration.