Suchergebnisse

Abstract
In 2020, the European Parliament (ep) issued a resolution calling for all European Union (EU) Member States to adopt feminist foreign and security policies, and for a gender-transformative vision in the EU's own external policy. Drawing on the literatures on negotiations and norm contestation, this article3 asks why the resolution was so progressive. It also asks how we can characterize and explain the nature of the negotiations leading to the resolution. The findings demonstrate a low level of contestation and negotiations mainly characterized by integrative strategies and solutions. The main opponents to the resolution, the populist radical right groups, were more or less absent from the negotiations but opposed by verbal contestation in plenum and through amendments to the text. We find that individual- and organizational level factors have high explanatory power: the gender equality-friendly institutional culture in the ep was further strengthened by the entrepreneurship of two committed rapporteurs.

Introduction / Ole Elgström & Michael Smith -- Role theory and European foreign policy : a framework of analysis / Lisbeth Aggestam -- A multilateralist role for the EU? / Knud Erik Jorgensen -- Interpreted values : a normative reading of EU role conceptions and performance / Sonia Lucarelli -- The symbolic manifestations of the EU's normative role in world politics / Ian Manners -- Values or rights? : alternative conceptions of the EU's "normative" role / Helene Sjursen -- Muscles from Brussels : the demise of civilian power Europe? / Richard Whitman -- The EU's role as a promoter of human rights and democracy : enlargement policy practice and role formation / Ulrich Sedelmeier -- The constraints to EU action as a "norm exporter" in the Mediterranean / Stefania Panebianco -- The limits of proactive cosmoplitanism : the EU and Burma, Cuba, and Zimbabwe / Karen E. Smith -- Pro-active policy entrepreneur or risk minimizer? : a principal-agent interpretation of the EU's role in the WTO / Bart Kerremans -- Punching its weight? : the EU's use of WTO dispute resolution / Alasdair R. Young -- Institutions, ideas, and a leadership gap : the EU's role in multilateral competition policy / Chad Damro -- The EU's roles in public health : the interdependence of roles within a saturated space of international organizations / Sebastien Guigner -- Conclusion / Ole Elgström & Michael Smith.

A small but growing literature has started to analyse the European Union (EU) 'as an effective peacemaker'. We make a contribution to this field by investigating EU mediation effectiveness in the Russia–Ukraine conflict. The focus is on perceptions of effectiveness. Based on information from semi-structured interviews, we compare EU self-images with Ukrainian evaluations of EU mediation efforts. How effective is the EU, including its Member States, deemed to be? What factors are believed to lie behind perceived (in)effectiveness? We concentrate on four such factors, derived from the mediator literature: perceived (im)partiality, coherence and credibility and, finally, evaluations of the EU's mediation strategies. Both internal and external views singled out EU member states as the most effective actors in current mediation. The role of EU was seen in ambivalent terms by both sides. All the four determinants of mediation effectiveness are discussed in our material, but differ considerably in the degree of attention given to each of them. While (im)partiality is not a factor that is linked to effectiveness in any straightforward way, EU incoherence is associated with inconsistent and weak policies, notably in the Ukraine material.

The debate surrounding the challenge of improving coherence in European Union (EU) foreign policy is ongoing. EU Delegations (EUDs), operating under the European External Action Service (EEAS) were recently established to provide a focal point for the EU in third countries, providing potential for improving EU coherence. Using the case study of the EUDs, this article adds to theorizations of EU coherence – defined as the absence of contradictions between policies and positions, and between words and deeds – through elaborating the notion of external engagement coherence. Questioning the assumption that improvement of EU foreign policy coherence leads to the improvement of its effectiveness, the article analyses perceptions of the EUDs in three EU strategic partners – China, Russia and India. The article finds that the creation of the EUDs does not necessarily mean more perceived coherence for the EU. In spite of this finding; EUDs were nevertheless often viewed as effective, especially in certain areas.

Abstract. In 2002, Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations were initiated between the European Union (EU) and the Pacific Island states. As of 2009, interim EPAs have been initialled with two Pacific countries, while no agreements have been made with the remaining Islands. Why such meagre results? We offer an explanation to this puzzle by pinpointing fundamental incompatibilities in basic beliefs and role conceptions. Behind the superficial consensus on negotiation goals, we find incongruent understandings of what development means and of the role of EPAs in this context. We demonstrate the existence of incompatible role conceptions: the EU's representation of itself as a generous benign partner is contrasted with the Pacific view of the EU as a benign master. Furthermore, the EU was perceived throughout the Pacific as putting undue pressure on their negotiators during the negotiations. These findings can inform the EU's general role as a normative power: such power depends on shared understandings of basic ideas and values, as well as on coherence between EU rhetoric and practice.

How did the three Nordic European Union member states approach their periods as holders of the European Union (EU) Council Presidency? Two radically different predictions about the impact of the Presidency on member state behaviour can be found in the literature. Some maintain that the position functions as an amplifier, strengthening the already existing tendency to propagate national concerns. Others argue that the Presidency functions as a silencer, subordinating national material interests to the benefit of common European concerns. In this article we analyse the ways in which Finland, Sweden and Denmark actually performed the Presidency role. Which of the competing interpretations is most appropriate? Was the Presidency role performed differently by the three countries? Our main finding is that the Presidency generally functioned as an amplifier during the Nordic presidencies. There are, however, interesting differences between the three states, Denmark being the least constrained in using the Presidency to further national interests whereas Finland was most anxious not to violate norms of impartiality and neutrality, even in cases where such behaviour ran contrary to national interests.