Suchergebnisse

From 1897 to 1898, the German Reich under Kaiser Wilhelm II, Bülow and Tirpitz changed the course of its policy with regard to arms and foreign relations. The objective was "equality" with Great Britain, the leading naval and world power, and to achieve it the construction of a powerful battle fleet seemed necessary. However, in order to realize Admiral Tirpitz's plan, the navy was obliged to depend on the "co-operation" of German shipyards. The latter complied willingly, hoping that - after years of crisis - the naval contracts would keep their facilities at full capacity and bring in high profits. The Reich Naval Office was also optimistic that state contracts would turn the shipyards into a new and leading sector of German industry and, by compensating for economic fluctuations, would have a stabilizing effect on the country's domestic policy. After in-depth consideration, the Reich Naval Office decided that it still wanted to retain its autonomy with regard to the placement of contracts for warships - if necessary it also awarded contracts to the generally more expensive state shipyards, in order to combat overly high prices. At first the hopes for a great future in German shipbuilding seemed justified: The shipyards authorized to build warships - Blohm & Voss, Vulcan, Germaniawerft, AG "Weser," Howaldtswerke and Schichau - invested considerable sums in the expansion and modernization of their facilities. Only a few years later, however, reality caught up with them. Steep economic downturns rapidly threatened the existence of several shipyards which could no longer keep their expensive facilities running at full capacity. The profits, satisfactory at first, gradually began to dwindle, and eventually the yards made a loss on most of their business. One contributing factor was the circumstance that the German shipyards - against their hopes - were unable to increase their international market share, either in trade or in warship construction. For the Reich Naval Office this development was positive on the one hand, because it meant that prices, and thus the costs of building a fleet, could be kept low; on the other hand it eyed the crisis in the shipbuilding industry with concern, because the collapse of a major shipyard could bring considerable political problems in its wake. There was also the worry that a shipbuilding cartel might form, and possibly drive the price of warship construction to horrendous heights. In sum, the hopes placed in fleet construction as a means of rescuing the German shipbuilding industry turned out to be illusory.

Rüstung, Rüstungspolitik und Rüstungsexporte gehören aufgrund ihres moralisch anrüchigen, innen- und außenpolitisch brisanten sowie wirtschaftlich fragwürdigen Charakters seit jeher zu den umstrittensten Themen in der Öffentlichkeit wie in der historischen Forschung. Der enge Zusammenhang von Rüstung und Krieg sowie die teilweise skandalösen Geschäftspraktiken der "merchants of death" führen häufig zu einer stark emotionalen Betrachtung dieses facettenreichen Problems. Vor diesem Hintergrund versteht sich der vorliegende Beitrag als Anstoß zu einer "Historisierung" dieses komplexen Themas, die mit tradierten Legenden und Mythen "aufräumt", ohne dabei jedoch in das andere Extrem einer Beschönigung und Exkulpierung zu verfallen. Der Autor versucht diesen Anspruch durch differenzierte Analyse der Motive und Interessen der beteiligten Partner in diesem "Netz reziproker Abhängigkeiten" im untersuchten Zeitraum zu erfüllen. Dabei wird versucht, die jeweiligen Gewichte innerhalb dieses Beziehungsgeflechts zu verdeutlichen und die Mechanismen zu beschreiben, die bei der Formulierung von Rüstungspolitik, der Organisation von Rüstung und der Produktion von Rüstungsmaterial wirksam waren und sich gegenseitig beeinflussten. (ICA2)

This article examines both the structure of the German armament industry and military-industrial relations in imperial Germany. As in other European countries, before 1914 the structure of the armament industry was mixed: state arsenals and naval dockyards on the one hand and private enterprises on the other hand supplied the armed forces with rifles, guns, and naval vessels. The relationship between the military and private enterprises, of which the Essen firm of Krupp was the most important one, was never really smooth. Whereas armaments were of little importance from a macroeconomic point of view, armament firms such as Krupp did, however, benefit from both the production and, especially, the export of arms, which was supported by the government in order to keep up a modern arms industry and to increase its influence in foreign countries.

Der Autor vergegenwärtigt zunächst den strukturellen Wandel bei der Herstellung von Waffen und die am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland getroffenen politischen und militärischen Entscheidungen. Dann stellt er die Beziehungen zwischen Militär und Industrie in seiner Komplexität dar, speziell die Rolle Krupps in diesem komplizierten und profitablen Geschäft. (LI)