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AbstractRecent political changes in established democracies have led to a new cleavage, often described as a juxtaposition of 'winners' and 'losers of globalization'. Despite a growing interest in subjective group membership and identity, previous research has not studied whether individuals actually categorize themselves as globalization winners or losers and what effect this has. Based on survey data from Germany, we report evidence of a division between self‐categorized globalization winners and losers that is partially but not completely rooted in social structure and associated with attitudes towards globalization‐related issues and party choices. We thereby confirm many of the assumptions from prior research – such as that (self‐categorized) losers of globalization tend to hold lower levels of education and lean towards the radical right. At the same time, the self‐categorizations are not merely transmission belts of socio‐structural effects but seem to be politically consequential in their own right. We conclude that the categories of globalization winners and losers have the potential to form part of the identity component of the globalization cleavage and are important for understanding how political entrepreneurs appeal to voters on their side of the new divide.

Items on which scalogram analysis is performed are items which have been selected because they `belong on the same dimension'. When an item is selected for inclusion as a poll question, it is presented in a heterogeneous context of questions, & thus unidimensionality may disappear: the context in which `items' appear may lead to the loss of unidimensionality & the 0-point. If the context has the above effect 4 hypo's are postulated: (1) a series of items occurring together may produce a satisfactory CofR, whereas items occurring separately & in mixed contexts will not; (2) scores made on a series of items in a homogeneous context will not r highly with scores made on same series of items separately or in mixedd context; (3) responses to specific items appearing in mixed contexts will be poor predictors of responses to the same items in a homogeneous context; & (4) hypo's (1), (2), & (3) will be more clearly confirmed when items deal with subjectively unimportant than when items deal with subjectively important issues. It was found that hypo (1) was not supported, hypo (2), (3) & (4) confirmed. L. P. Chall.

AbstractSeminal models in political economy imply that rising economic inequality should lead to growing public demand for redistribution. Yet, existing empirical evidence on this link is both limited and inconclusive – and scholars regularly doubt it exists at all. In this research note, we turn to data from the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) Social Inequality surveys, now spanning the period from 1987 to 2019, to reassess the effect of rising inequality on support for redistribution. Covering a longer time series than previous studies, we obtain robust evidence that when income inequality rises in a country, public support for income redistribution tends to go up. Examining the reaction across income groups to adjudicate between different models of how rising inequality matters in a second step, we find that rising inequality increases support for redistribution within all income groups, with a marginally stronger effect among the well‐off. Our results imply that insufficient policy responses to rising inequality may be less about absent demand and more about a failure to turn demand into policy, and that scholars should devote more attention to the latter.