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Operationalized as a simulation and checked against 1,737 policy shifts in twenty-four post-war democracies, this theory of party position-taking offers both an explanation and specific postdictions of party behaviour, synthesizing some previous approaches and linking up with mandate theories of political representation. These wider implications are considered at the beginning and the end of the article.

ABSTRACTPolitical parties learn from foreign incumbents, that is, parties abroad that won office. But does the scope of this cross-national policy diffusion vary with the party family that generates those incumbents? The authors argue that party family conditions transnational policy learning when it makes information on the positions of sister parties more readily available and relevant. Both conditions apply to social democratic parties. Unlike other party families, social democrats have faced major competitive challenges since the 1970s and they exhibit exceptionally strong transnational organizations—factors, the authors contend, that uniquely facilitate cross-national policy learning from successful parties within the family. The authors analyze parties' policy positions using spatial methods and find that social democratic parties are indeed exceptional because they emulate one another across borders more than do Christian democratic and conservative parties. These findings have important implications for our understanding of political representation and of social democratic parties' election strategies over the past forty years.

Political parties learn from foreign incumbents, i.e., parties abroad that won office. But does the scope of this cross-national policy diffusion vary with the party family that generates incumbents? We argue that party family conditions transnational policy learning when it makes information on the positions of sister parties more readily available and relevant. Both conditions apply to Social Democratic parties. Unlike other party families, Social Democrats faced major competitive challenges from the 1970s and they exhibit exceptionally strong transnational organizations – factors that, as we contend, uniquely facilitate cross-national policy learning from successful parties within the family. We analyze parties' policy positions using spatial methods and find that Social Democratic parties are indeed exceptional as they emulate one another across borders more than Christian Democrats and Conservatives. These findings have important implications for our understanding of political representation and of Social Democratic parties' election strategies over the last forty years.

Previous research suggests that political parties respond to left–right policy positions of successful foreign political parties ("foreign leaders"). We evaluate whether this is an effective electoral strategy: specifically, do political parties gain votes in elections when they respond to successful foreign parties? We argue that parties that follow foreign leaders will arrive at policy positions closer to their own (domestic) median voter, which increases their electoral support. The analysis is based on a two-stage model specification of parties' vote shares and suggests that following foreign leaders is a beneficial election strategy in national election because it allows them to better identify the position of their own median voter. These findings have important implications for our understanding of political representation, parties' election strategies, and for policy diffusion.

ObjectiveWe address whether intraparty democracy conditions political parties' responsiveness to rival parties' policy shifts.MethodWe estimate parameters of a spatial econometric model of parties' policy positions in 11 established democracies.ResultsInternally democratic parties respond to shifts in rival parties' policies, and internally undemocratic parties do not respond to rival parties' policy shifts.ConclusionWe argue that this occurs because intraparty deliberation provides a channel through which rival parties influence their competitors' policies. Because rank‐and‐file party members are influenced by deliberative processes more than party leaders—and the policy goals of internally democratic parties' policies are heavily influenced by their party members—deliberative processes lead democratic parties to respond to shifts in rival parties' policy positions. This work has important implications for our understanding of parties' election strategies, intraparty politics, and how policies diffuse between parties competing in the same election.

Do parties learn from or emulate parties in other political systems? This research develops the argument that parties are more likely to employ the heuristic of learning from and emulatingforeign successful (incumbent) parties. Spatial-econometric analyses of parties' election policies from several established democracies robustly confirm that political parties respond to left-right policy positions of foreign political parties that have recently governed. By showing that parties respond to theseforeign incumbent parties, this work has significant implications for our understanding of party competition. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on public policy diffusion, as we suggest that political parties are important vehiclesthroughwhich public policies diffuse.

Do "niche" parties—such as Communist, Green, and extreme nationalist parties—adjust their policies in response to shifts in public opinion? Would such policy responsiveness enhance these parties' electoral support? We report the results of statistical analyses of the relationship between parties' policy positions, voters' policy preferences, and election outcomes in eight Western European democracies from 1976 to 1998 that suggest that the answer to both questions isno. Specifically, we find no evidence that niche parties responded to shifts in public opinion, while mainstream parties displayed consistent tendencies to respond to public opinion shifts. Furthermore, we find that in situations where niche parties moderated their policy positions they were systematically punished at the polls (a result consistent with the hypothesis that such parties represent extreme or noncentrist ideological clienteles), while mainstream parties did not pay similar electoral penalties. Our findings have important implications for political representation, for spatial models of elections, and for political parties' election strategies.

Previous research explains the evolution of parties' ideological positions in terms of decision rules that stress the uncertainty of the political environment. The authors extend this research by examining whether parties adjust their ideologies in response to two possible influences: shifts in public opinion, and past election results. Their empirical analyses, which are based on the Comparative Manifesto Project's codings of parties' post-war programmes in eight West European nations, suggest that parties respond to shifts in public opinion, but that these effects are only significant in situations where public opinion is clearly shifting away from the party's policy positions. By contrast, no evidence is found here that parties adjust their ideologies in response to past election results. These findings have important implications for parties' election strategies and for models of political representation.

We combine two dominant approaches to studying how issues influence elections: one that emphasizes parties' issue positions, and the other parties' issue ownership. Research from the latter approach shows that voters ascribe greater economic competence to right-wing parties. Based on this finding, we argue that parties enhance their economic issue ownership when voters perceive them shifting to the right. In the following step, we show that perceived rightward shifts of parties also lead to subsequent increases in electoral support. We analyze economic ownership survey data and election outcomes in 15 democracies over the period 1986–2015 that supports the expectations that parties' perceived rightward shifts result in increases in economic ownership and subsequent vote shares. We also show that the right-shift vote gains are strongest during recessions when voters prioritize parties' economic competence.

Adams and Merrill have developed a model of policy-seeking parties in a parliamentary democracy competing in a PR electoral system, in which party elites are uncertain about voters' evaluations of the parties' valence attributes such as competence, integrity and charisma. This article extends that model to situations where voters hold coalitions of parties collectively responsible for their valence-related performances, such as how voters evaluate governing parties' competence in handling issues like the economy, crime and foreign policy crises. It may also be relevant to voters' evaluations of proto-coalitions of opposition parties. Computations suggest the central substantive conclusions reported in Adams and Merrill extend to this generalized model, and that collective responsibility enhances coalition members' incentives to converge to similar policy positions but depresses their prospects of achieving their policy objectives. Adapted from the source document.