Al-Qaida prend des coups et perd sa base
In: Alternatives Internationales, Band 7, Heft HS, S. 18-18
96 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Alternatives Internationales, Band 7, Heft HS, S. 18-18
In: La revue internationale et stratégique: revue trimestrielle publiée par l'Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), Band 75, Heft 3, S. 101-104
In: The Middle East journal, Band 63, Heft 2, S. 213-226
ISSN: 1940-3461
In: Journal of Palestine studies: a quarterly on Palestinian affairs and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 24-41
ISSN: 0377-919X, 0047-2654
World Affairs Online
Al-Qaeda built its ideological doctrine largely in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood's pervasive and once dominant approach to Islam's political revival. For many years, the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to ignore al-Qaeda's challenge and concentrated instead on beefing up its own organizational and ideological alternative to the ruling secular regimes in the Arab world and elsewhere. This pattern changed dramatically after September 11, 2001, when it became more difficult for the Brotherhood to disregard al-Qaeda and the two movements began competing more openly for leadership of the overall Islamist movement.
BASE
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, established in January 2007, is the latest in a long line of Algerian jihadi groups. Like many terrorist organizations, AQIM enjoys global media exposure on activist Internet sites, but unlike other al-Qaeda franchises, it has managed to maintain its indigenous leadership. The group has become known for fearsome suicide attacks, which were previously unheard of in Algeria, but has failed to incorporate the jihadi outfi ts from neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. AQIM has therefore focused on the northern Sahara, carving out safe havens and threatening weak government forces,first in Mauritania, and now increasingly in Mali. At the outset, AQIM's global strategy was based on the triangular dynamic of the Middle East (where Iraq serves as a magnet for potential recruits), North Africa (where the group functions as a regional jihadi recruiting hub), and Europe (where it pursues aggressive propaganda against the French and Spanish "Crusaders"). The demise of al-Qaeda in Iraq jeopardized this grand design, undermining AQIM's capabilities on both sides of the Mediterranean, but although it primarily targets Western "Crusaders" in its own Algerian and Saharan environment, AQIM remains wedded to a global agenda.The threat of AQIM must be contained, and hopefully, ultimately eradicated. Algeria and the other targeted states have a long record of fi ghting similar jihadi networks, but they cannot confront transnational movements without international cooperation. To address this threat, regional security organizations can enhance much-needed bilateral exchanges among law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Additionally, the countries implementing the UN global strategy against terrorism should focus considerable attention on North Africa and the Sahel, where the threat is on the rise, but not yet out of control.
BASE
In: The Middle East journal, Band 63, Heft 2, S. 213-226
ISSN: 0026-3141
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of Palestine studies, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 24-41
ISSN: 1533-8614
In: Journal of Palestine studies, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 24-41
ISSN: 1533-8614
Franççois Mitterrand, the longest-serving French president in history, never ceased to be a passionate advocate of Israel, in contrast to his Gaullist predecessors. But he was also the most committed to Palestinian statehood, and among the earliest to insist on the PLO's full engagement in the peace process, often at considerable cost to his ties with Israel. By the time Mitterrand left office in 1995, France's Middle Eastern role had greatly declined, with the United States having assumed full control of the peace process; during the 1980s, however, its contributions had been significant. This article examines Mitterrand's fourteen-year presidency and the paradoxes of his Middle East policy.
This chapter analyzes the role that mahdism plays in Shiism. The author argues that the originally politically neutral mahdist belief is increasingly taking root in politics of the Shiite world. He assesses the implications of this development discussing three specific cases.
BASE
In: Le monde diplomatique, Band 56, Heft 659, S. 10-13
ISSN: 0026-9395, 1147-2766
This chapter analyzes the role that mahdism plays in Shiism. The author argues that the originally politically neutral mahdist belief is increasingly taking root in politics of the Shiite world. He assesses the implications of this development discussing three specific cases.
BASE
Al-Qaeda built its ideological doctrine largely in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood's pervasive and once dominant approach to Islam's political revival. For many years, the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to ignore al-Qaeda's challenge and concentrated instead on beefing up its own organizational and ideological alternative to the ruling secular regimes in the Arab world and elsewhere. This pattern changed dramatically after September 11, 2001, when it became more difficult for the Brotherhood to disregard al-Qaeda and the two movements began competing more openly for leadership of the overall Islamist movement.
BASE
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, established in January 2007, is the latest in a long line of Algerian jihadi groups. Like many terrorist organizations, AQIM enjoys global media exposure on activist Internet sites, but unlike other al-Qaeda franchises, it has managed to maintain its indigenous leadership. The group has become known for fearsome suicide attacks, which were previously unheard of in Algeria, but has failed to incorporate the jihadi outfi ts from neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. AQIM has therefore focused on the northern Sahara, carving out safe havens and threatening weak government forces,first in Mauritania, and now increasingly in Mali. At the outset, AQIM's global strategy was based on the triangular dynamic of the Middle East (where Iraq serves as a magnet for potential recruits), North Africa (where the group functions as a regional jihadi recruiting hub), and Europe (where it pursues aggressive propaganda against the French and Spanish "Crusaders"). The demise of al-Qaeda in Iraq jeopardized this grand design, undermining AQIM's capabilities on both sides of the Mediterranean, but although it primarily targets Western "Crusaders" in its own Algerian and Saharan environment, AQIM remains wedded to a global agenda.The threat of AQIM must be contained, and hopefully, ultimately eradicated. Algeria and the other targeted states have a long record of fi ghting similar jihadi networks, but they cannot confront transnational movements without international cooperation. To address this threat, regional security organizations can enhance much-needed bilateral exchanges among law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Additionally, the countries implementing the UN global strategy against terrorism should focus considerable attention on North Africa and the Sahel, where the threat is on the rise, but not yet out of control.
BASE
In: La revue internationale et stratégique: l'international en débat ; revue trimestrielle publiée par l'Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), Heft 75, S. 101-104
ISSN: 1287-1672