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This paper explores two quite different visions of the democratic processes that can create congruence between citizen preferences and public policies. In theMajority Control vision, electoral competition and citizen choices result in the direct election of governments committed to policies corresponding to the preferences of the median voter. In theProportionate Influence vision, election outcomes result in legislatures that reflect the preferences of all citizens; legislative bargaining results in policies linked to the position of the median voter. The authors give more explicit theoretical form to those visions and link them empirically to specific types of modern democracies. They then attempt to test the success of each vision in bringing about congruence between citizen self-placements and the estimated positions of governments and policymaker coalitions on the left-right scale in twelve nations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although the analysis reveals weaknesses in each approach, it suggests a consistent advantage for the Proportionate Influence vision.

While much research has indicated that economic factors -- eg, growth, inflation, & unemployment -- affect the popularity of incumbents in democratic countries, cross-national aggregate analyses of "economic voting" show only weak & inconsistent economic effects. It is argued that analyses should systematically incorporate political factors that shape the electoral consequences of economic performance. Multivariate analyses of 102 elections in 19 industrialized democracies are used to estimate the cross-national impact of economic & political factors. Findings show that considerations of the ideological image of the government, its electoral base, & the clarity of its political responsibility are essential to understanding the effects of economic conditions on voting for or against incumbents. 3 Tables, 1 Appendix, 49 References. Adapted from the source document.

To address concerns over the applicability of the electoral system literature to new and developing democracies, we present a framework for understanding the interplay between electoral rules and social, economic, and political context. This framework emphasizes that context typically shapes what we call the "behavioral" linkage between electoral rules and outcomes; moreover, the longer the causal chain connecting electoral rules to outcomes, the greater the number of opportunities for context to exert an effect. We then situate recent literature within this framework. Scholarship from a wide range of authors indicates many different ways in which contextual factors ultimately shape the number of parties. However, perhaps the most important contribution of this literature is to indicate how context conditions the behavioral incentives initially generated by electoral rules, thus promoting or undermining political actors' propensity to behave strategically.

To address concerns over the applicability of the electoral system literature to new and developing democracies, we present a framework for understanding the interplay between electoral rules and social, economic, and political context. This framework emphasizes that context typically shapes what we call the 'behavioral' linkage between electoral rules and outcomes; moreover, the longer the causal chain connecting electoral rules to outcomes, the greater the number of opportunities for context to exert an effect. We then situate recent literature within this framework. Scholarship from a wide range of authors indicates many different ways in which contextual factors ultimately shape the number of parties. However, perhaps the most important contribution of this literature is to indicate how context conditions the behavioral incentives initially generated by electoral rules, thus promoting or undermining political actors' propensity to behave strategically. Adapted from the source document.

Political scientists have contributed to the world of electoral systems as scientists and as engineers. Taking stock of recent scientific research, we show that context modifies the effects of electoral rules on political outcomes in specific and systematic ways. We explore how electoral rules shape the inclusion of women and minorities, the depth and nature of political competition, and patterns of redistribution and regulation, and we consider institutional innovations that could promote political equality. Finally, we describe the diverse ways that political scientists produce an impact on the world by sharing and applying their knowledge of the consequences of electoral rules and global trends in reform.

The effects of party system features and election rules on ideological representation can be seen in parliamentary elections in Western democracies over a fifty-year period. 'Distortion' is short-term representation failure -- the distance between the median voter and the legislature or government immediately after the election. Electoral choice and left-right positions of parties (from the manifesto data) can be used to estimate median voter positions. The number of parties, party polarization, and the election rules all independently affect ideological distances. But party system polarization seems to be the predominate factor shaping distortion of governments' relationship with the median voter. Examining the effects of party systems under different election rules helps clarify the causal connections between legislative and government levels. Adapted from the source document.