Suchergebnisse

ABSTRACT
Using the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1991) and the GLOBE study (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta 2004), Cieslewicz (2016) examines accounting supervisors' intentions to influence and collude with their subordinates to manipulate accounting information. The influence of cultural variables of collectivism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance on the research model is also examined. In addition to finding support for the Theory of Planned Behavior, the study finds that collectivism and power distance positively impact and uncertainty avoidance negatively impacts, accounting supervisors' intentions to engage in collusive supervision. In my comments below, I discuss some potential areas for improvement in research design, application of Theory of Planned Behavior, and conceptualization of culture at the individual level. I also discuss some potential research areas for researchers who aim to study accountants' behaviors and inculcate culture at different levels in the accounting research.

Since the microfinance sector is comparatively new relative to other sectors, MFIs follow an intuitive process (and not strategic) for any kind of innovation.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many academics, think tank analysts, journalists, and government officials came to perceive India as a de facto nuclear weapons power. The consensus among U.S. policymakers was that normative, rather than technical or organizational hurdles, prevented India from transforming its latent nuclear capability into an operational one. New evidence shows, however, that India lacked technical means to deliver nuclear weapons reliably and safely until 1994–95. Further, until the outbreak of the Kargil War in the summer of 1999, political leaders refrained from embedding the weapons within organizational and procedural routines that would have rendered them operational in the military sense of the term. These deficiencies can be traced to a regime of secrecy that prevented information sharing and coordination among the relevant actors. This secrecy stemmed from risk aversion among Indian decisionmakers, who feared international pressures for nuclear rollback, particularly from the United States.