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This article develops a conceptual framework for the systematic analysis of the interaction between international institutions as a first step towards building a theory of international interaction. It examines how international institutions may exert causal influence on each other's development and effectiveness and suggests that four general causal mechanisms can elucidate the distinct routes through which influence travels from one institution to another. Institutional interaction can thus rely on transfer of knowledge, commitments established under an institution, behavioural effects of an institution, and functional linkage of the ultimate governance targets of the institutions involved. The article also puts forward hypotheses about the likely effects of specific types of institutional interaction for governance within the international system. The causal mechanisms and types of interaction are mutually exclusive models that help analyse real-world interaction situations. They may also serve as a basis for the systematic analysis of more complex interaction situations.

"This article develops a conceptual framework for the systematic analysis of the interaction between institutions as a first step towards building a theory of international interaction. It examines how international institutions may exert causal influence on each other's development and effectiveness and suggests that four general causal mechanisms can elucidate the distinct routes through which influence travels from one institution to another. Institutional interaction can thus rely on transfer on knowledge, commitments established under an institution, behavioural effects of an institution, and functional linkage of the ultimate governance targets of the institutions involved. The article also puts forward hypotheses about the likely effects of specific types of institutional interaction for governance within the international system. The causal mechanisms and types of interaction are mutually exclusive models that help analyse real-world interaction suitations. They also serve as a basis for the systematic analysis of more complex interaction situations." (author's abstract)

"Decisions within the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the
Kyoto Protocol are made by an expert body that acts as a trustee agent
of the member states. Trustee agents help overcome the credible commitment
problems of their principals and promise reason-based decisions.
In contrast to traditional principal-agent settings, trusteeship
relations are typically triadic. Beside the preferences of the principals
and the trustee, decision criteria provide an external point of reference.
They reflect the principals' long-term interest and define the trustee's
decision rationale. The triadic structure helps protect the autonomy of
trustees and allows for making them accountable for their decisions.
Accountability mechanisms intend to ensure that a trustee's decisions
are in line with established decision criteria. Against this backdrop, we
explore the incentives created by the existing institutional arrangement
for the making of CDM decisions and examine selected cases. We
conclude that CDM arrangements provide a model for nonpartisan
international regulation." (author's abstract)

The legitimacy and effectiveness of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) depends on problem-adequate listing decisions. Decisions are frequently highly controversial, because they commit the member states to imposing trade restrictions on listed species. We examine whether—and how—CITES' impressive institutional apparatus deprives the member states of their bargaining power and empowers actors who can make reasoned arguments on the merits of a listing decision. For this purpose, we demonstrate theoretically that appropriately designed decision-making procedures can diminish stake-holders' opportunities for exploiting their bargaining power and provide room for reason-based deliberation. Subsequently, we explore member states' and other stakeholders' incentives, created by the CITES listing procedure, for refraining from bargaining and accepting scientifically sound decisions. Finally, we examine three recent controversial listing decisions as examples of the actual operation of the listing procedure.

AbstractInstitutions stimulate deliberative decision‐making if they hinder stakeholders from introducing bargaining power into the decision process. This article explores the conditions for, and limits of, the creation of deliberative legitimacy in single market regulation. An assessment of the standardization procedure demonstrates that legitimacy arises only from the combination of political and technical deliberation.