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Is the state still the basic unit of political authority in OECD countries? International relations scholars discuss whether international institutions undermine or buttress state authority. Students of comparative political economy argue about the extent to which political authority has migrated to private market actors. We inventory and compare the main arguments in both debates. Our findings suggest a different pattern of state transformation than most participants in the debates implicitly assume. The key feature is not a zero-sum shift of political authority to nonstate actors but an unbundling and reconfiguration of authority. The segmental differentiation into largely self-contained national states is overlaid by a functionally differentiated order in which different dimensions of authority are exercised by different state and nonstate actors. The state remains focal, but its role changes from virtual monopolist to manager of political authority.

The paper analyzes the common assumption that the EU has little power over taxation. We find that the EU's own taxing power is indeed narrowly circumscribed: Its revenues have evolved from rather supranational beginnings in the 1950s towards an increasingly intergovernmental system. Based on a comprehe nsive analysis of EU tax legislation and ECJ tax jurisprudence from 1958 to 2007, we show that at the same time, the EU exerts considerable regulatory control over the member states' taxing power and imposes tighter constraints on member state taxes than the US federal government imposes on state taxation. These findings contradict the standard account of the EU as a regulatory polity which specializes in apolitical issues of market creation and leaves political issues to the member states: Despite strong safeguards, the EU massively regulates the highly salient issue of member state taxation.

Is the state still the basic unit of political authority in OECD countries? International relations scholars discuss whether international institutions undermine or buttress state authority. Students of comparative political economy argue about the extent to which political authority has migrated to private market actors. We inventory and compare the main arguments in both debates. Our findings suggest a different pattern of state transformation than most participants in the debates implicitly assume. The key feature is not a zero-sum shift of political authority to nonstate actors but an unbundling and reconfiguration of authority. The segmental differentiation into largely self-contained national states is overlaid by a functionally differentiated order in which different dimensions of authority are exercised by different state and nonstate actors. The state remains focal, but its role changes from virtual monopolist to manager of political authority. Adapted from the source document.

How does international tax competition affect fiscal democracy? To what extent does it constrain the autonomy of democratic governments in choosing the level and structure of national taxation? While tax competition has not reduced the level of total taxation in OECD-22 countries, it has revenue effects at the level of selected taxes, especially taxes falling on mobile tax bases such as the corporate tax or taxes on private capital income. The nominal tax burden has shifted from capital to labor and consumption (domestic redistribution). While this result suggests that tax competition has a negative effect on national tax autonomy, because all competing countries see their ability to tax mobile capital constrained, small countries see their capacity to raise revenue from mobile capital increased at the expense of large countries (international redistribution). Because of these countervailing effects, the overall effect on small countries is ambiguous. By contrast, the tax autonomy of large countries has unambiguously declined because international and domestic pressures work in the same direction. Given that governments have to meet mandatory spending requirements on the expenditure side this may have contributed to higher fiscal deficits in large countries. ; Die Arbeit untersucht, ob Steuerwettbewerb die Autonomie demokratisch legitimierter Regierungen einschränkt. Schränkt er ihre Fähigkeit ein, die Höhe und Struktur der Steuereinnahmen im Lichte der Wählerpräferenzen zu priorisieren? Eine solch pessimistische Einschätzung lässt sich nicht aufrechterhalten. Trotz Steuerwettbewerbs waren die Einnahmequoten in den OECD-Ländern in den letzten 30 Jahren weitgehend stabil. Jedoch beschränkt der Steuerwettbewerb die Optionen bestimmte Produktionsfaktoren zur Besteuerung heranzuziehen. Während bei der Körperschaftsteuer bzw. bei der Besteuerung von Kapitaleinkommen im Allgemeinen zusehends milder besteuert wird, verschiebt sich die Steuerstruktur verstärkt in Richtung immobiler Bemessungsgrundlagen, so dass eine Änderung der Steuerstruktur und folglich Umverteilungsprozesse innerhalb eines Nationalstaats ausgelöst werden. Diese innerstaatlichen Umverteilungsprozesse überlagern sich mit zwischenstaatlicher Umverteilung. Großen Ländern fällt es schwerer mit kleinen Ländern um mobile Bemessungsgrundlagen zu konkurrieren. Da auch in diesen Ländern ein Großteil der Ausgaben - zumindest kurzfristig - nicht disponibel ist, könnte ein Teil des Handlungsdrucks auf die Zukunft externalisiert worden sein, da größere Länder bis zum Ausbruch der Finanzkrise höhere Defizitquoten hatten als kleine Länder. Für kleine Länder lässt sich eine Einschränkung der Handlungsautonomie nicht zwingend konstatieren: Auf der einen Seite finden zwar auch in kleinen Länder innerstaatliche Umverteilungsprozesse hin zu Kapitaleinkommen statt; auf der anderen Seite erweitern kleine Länder wiederum ihren Spielraum, da sie (teilweise auf Kosten größerer Staaten) Kapitalzuflüsse verzeichnen und durch diesen Zufluss an Kapital wiederum Arbeitsplätze und Steuereinnahmen entstehen.

Cet article, à visée essentiellement analytique, a été écrit en s'appuyant sur les travaux empiriques et théoriques développés dans le cadre du programme TranState (voir l'introduction du numéro). Reprenant les principales tendances passées de la nationalisation de l'autorité politique, il met en évidence les dynamiques de dénationalisation de l'autorité politique, qui se trouve de nouveau partiellement assumée par des institutions non étatiques : internationales, transnationales ou privées. Cependant, cette autorité dénationalisée ne rend pas l'État superflu. Un modèle analytique de l'État contemporain est élaboré montrant que celui-ci reste absolument central, même si son rôle a changé : il n'exerce plus le monopole de l'autorité politique, il l'administre . La conclusion porte sur la limite de cet argument et sur l'articulation des visions concurrentes sur l'avenir de l'État.

This article challenges the common assumption that the European Union (EU) has little power over taxation. Based on a comprehensive analysis of EU tax legislation and European Court of Justice (ECJ) tax jurisprudence from 1958 to 2007, the article shows that the EU exerts considerable regulatory control over the Member States' taxing power and imposes tighter constraints on Member State taxes than the American federal government imposes on American state taxation. These findings contradict the standard account of the EU as a regulatory polity that specialises in apolitical issues of market creation and leaves control of highly politicised core functions of government (defence, taxation, social security, education, etc.) to the Member States; despite strong treaty safeguards, national tax autonomy is undermined by EU regulation. Adapted from the source document.