Are Female Legislators Different? Exploring Sex Differences in German MPs' Outside Interests
In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of comparative politics, Band 67, Heft 4, S. 841-865
ISSN: 1460-2482
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In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of comparative politics, Band 67, Heft 4, S. 841-865
ISSN: 1460-2482
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 19, Heft 9, S. 1357-1376
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: German politics, Band 21, Heft 3, S. 255-273
ISSN: 1743-8993
Members of parliament in many countries are legally permitted to execute (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate. It is often argued that such moonlighting activities are unproblematic for the chain of democratic delegation and accountability as long as outside interests/earnings are disclosed to citizen-principals; the latter may then sanction (perceived) misconduct through the ballot box. Using principal-agent theory as an analytical framework and the German national parliament as a case study, this paper discusses why the accountability mechanisms of moonlighting disclosure and electoral control are often impaired in practice. We also illustrate that these concerns generalise beyond the German setting.
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In federal countries, competence for policy matters is often shared between various levels of government. As only overall outcomes are observed, this might blur accountability by decreasing voters' ability to infer information about the performance of their leaders. In this article, we analyse how party cues (i.e., politicians' party membership acting as a cue towards their characteristics) affect voters' incomplete information about politicians in a federal setting. We first of all show that party cues allow indirect inference regarding politicians using observed policy outcomes, alleviating the accountability problem. Empirical evidence from US presidential election results across all 50 US states over the period 1972-2008 provides support for this proposition. Yet, while the availability of party cues in a federal setting increases the national incumbents' effort in some cases, it may reduce effort particularly when the regional incumbent if of a different party.
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Studies of spatial policy interdependence in (local) public policies usually concentrate on the relations between jurisdictions within a single analysed region, and disregard possible extra-regional effects. However, the theoretical spatial statistics literature shows that biased estimates might emerge if spatial interactions extend beyond the boundaries of the available data (i.e., the boundary value problem). This paper empirically assesses the practical relevance of this concern by studying German local politicians' assessments of their jurisdictions' main competitors in the struggle to attract firms. We find that location near a border significantly undermines politicians' perception that the fiercest competitive pressure derives from jurisdictions within their own state. This effect sets in about 20km (10.2km) from a national (international) border. These results indicate that nearest municipalities perceive each other as competitors regardless of the state or country where they are located, which has important implications for estimating spatial dependence models.
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As part of a collective answer to the threat posed by the Great Recession to several Member States' public finances, the European Commission's November 2011 Green Paper discussed the introduction of Stability Bonds (or Eurobonds) that would partially or completely replace the national bonds of the Euro Area's Member States. Having triggered fierce debates among policy-makers across and within European countries, this article investigates European citizens' opinions about Eurobonds, and the step towards further European fiscal integration they represent. Using a novel dataset derived from the Eurobarometer surveys, we show that, at the individual level, political ideology, distrust towards EU institutions and altruism appear more relevant than self-interest in shaping preferences for/against Eurobonds. However, at the country level, opinion towards Eurobonds strongly reflects the expected costs/benefits from Eurobonds' introduction for ones country. Finally, a notable intra-generational divide exists across young citizens of PIIGS and non-PIIGS countries, reflecting the diverse expected future costs and benefits of Eurobonds across both regions.
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In: Journal of European public policy, Band 19, Heft 9, S. 1357-1376
ISSN: 1350-1763
World Affairs Online
In: German politics: Journal of the Association for the Study of German Politics, Band 21, Heft 3, S. [255]-273
ISSN: 0964-4008
World Affairs Online
In: European societies, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 57-81
ISSN: 1469-8307
In: Environment and planning. C, Government and policy, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 410-427
ISSN: 1472-3425
Building on the revenue structure theory developed by Hettich and Winer, with this paper we are the first to investigate the economic and political determinants of local tax mix choices. We thereby use panel data on 289 municipalities in the Flemish region of Belgium (period 1995–2002), where local governments enjoy extensive fiscal autonomy and have a wide choice of available tax instruments. Estimating a system of five reduced-form equations for the five central revenue sources (income, property, business, user fees, and other own revenues), our results show that economics plays a significantly more important role than politics in shaping the local tax mix. Moreover, supporting theoretical predictions about marginal cost equalization across available tax instruments, absolute reliance on each revenue source increases as the overall revenue requirement gets larger (a 'scale effect').
Studies of spatial policy interdependence in (local) public policies usually concentrate on the relations between jurisdictions within a single analysed region, and disregard possible extra-regional effects. This paper evaluates the validity of such restriction by studying German local politicians' assessments of their jurisdictions' main competitors in the struggle to attract firms. We find that location near a border significantly undermines politicians' perception that the fiercest competitive pressure derives from jurisdictions within their own state. This effect sets in about 20km (12.5km) from a national (international) border. We also confirm that intranational borders are perceived as much less constraining for firms than international ones, even in a highly integrated area such as the European Union. Overall, these results indicate that nearest municipalities perceive each other as competitors regardless of the state or country where they are located. The practical implications of these findings for future studies on spatial policy interdependence are discussed.
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In: Environment & planning: international journal of urban and regional research. C, Government & policy, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 410-428
ISSN: 0263-774X
Elected representatives in many countries are legally allowed to carry out (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate, often referred to as moonlighting. Despite the important selection and incentive effects such outside positions might engender, academic studies evaluating the prevalence, desirability and/or consequences of politicians' moonlighting have remained relatively scarce; often due to severe data restrictions. In recent years, however, more stringent disclosure rules have increased data availability, and large-sample analyses are becoming increasingly feasible. Besides surveying recent empirical contributions to this developing research field, this paper also outlines unresolved issues and thereby develops an agenda for future enquiry.
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This paper analyzes the relation between different forms of civic engagement and corruption. This first of all extends earlier analysis linking generalized trust to corruption by incorporating another element from the social capital complex (namely formal forms of civic engagement). Second, based on the idea that social networks' beneficial or harmful impact may depend on their characteristics, it investigates how the structure of social networks (i.e., inclusive vs. exclusive and isolated vs. connected) matters. Evaluating the engagement - corruption nexus for a cross-section of 20 European democracies in 2002/2003, we confirm that social networks are linked to corruption even when controlling for the effect of generalized trust, and that their relation to corruption is typespecific. These findings survive under various model specifications and robustness checks.
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