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This article examines current Russian expert and official narratives on the Arctic, situating them in the broader context of the debate on Russia's role in the international system. Combining a critical geopolitics approach to the study of international relations with content analysis tools, we map how structural geopolitical changes in the wider region have shaped narratives on the Arctic in Russia today. Two types of Russian narratives on the Arctic are explored—the one put forward by members of the Russian expert community, and the one that emerges from official documents and statements by members of the Russian policymaking community. With the expert narratives, we pay particular attention to the Arctic topics featured and how they are informed by various mainstream approaches to the study of international relations (IR). In examining policy practitioners' narrative approaches, we trace the overlaps and differences between these and the expert narratives. Current expert and official Russian narratives on the Arctic appear to be influenced mostly by neorealist and neoliberal ideas in IR, without substantial modifications after the 2014 conflict, thus showing relatively high ideational continuity.

This article examines current Russian expert and official narratives on the Arctic, situating them in the broader context of the debate on Russia's role in the international system. Combining a critical geopolitics approach to the study of international relations with content analysis tools, we map how structural geopolitical changes in the wider region have shaped narratives on the Arctic in Russia today. Two types of Russian narratives on the Arctic are explored—the one put forward by members of the Russian expert community, and the one that emerges from official documents and statements by members of the Russian policymaking community. With the expert narratives, we pay particular attention to the Arctic topics featured and how they are informed by various mainstream approaches to the study of international relations (IR). In examining policy practitioners' narrative approaches, we trace the overlaps and differences between these and the expert narratives. Current expert and official Russian narratives on the Arctic appear to be influenced mostly by neorealist and neoliberal ideas in IR, without substantial modifications after the 2014 conflict, thus showing relatively high ideational continuity. ; publishedVersion

The Northern Dimension of the Russian Gas Strategy / by Jakub M. Godzimirski. - S. 2-5 Gazprom and Russia's Great Eastern Pipe-Dreams / by Nina Poussenkova. - S. 5-11

- ; [Abstract] The goal of this report is to examine Russia's policy towards secessionist conflicts in the post-Soviet space. In order to better understand Russia's policy choices in that sphere, the report addresses three key issues: the internal Russian debate on separatism as a security challenge in the post-Soviet space; Moscow's policies with regard to international institutions, regimes and frameworks; and the rising security agenda of international terrorism. The report is divided into five sections. The first chapter briefly outlines the scope of the study. The second chapter presents a theoretical framework used to address the issue of Russian policy towards the secessionist conflicts. The third chapter contains a detailed case study of Russian policy towards the secessionist conflict between Moldova and Transdniester. The fourth analyses Russia's policy towards the conflicts between Abkhazia and Georgia and South Ossetia and Georgia, while the fifth chapter presents authors' conclusions. The theoretical framework chosen by the authors of this study derives from two major schools in IR theory – the liberal-institutional one, and the constructivist one. On the one hand they raise the traditional neo-liberal question of the validity of institutions in international relations; on the other hand they ask how the ability of institutional frameworks to address various problems is affected by the identities of the actors who interact in the institutional arena. The report addresses the issue of Russian policy towards the secessionist conflicts in the post-Soviet space designed and implemented by President Vladimir Putin's administration. It departs from the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, where agreements on the withdrawal of Russian forces from both Moldova and Georgia were reached. According to the Istanbul Pact, Russia was to withdraw its forces from these two countries in line with the CFE Treaty. At the same time, however, Russia has been playing an active part in the international community's attempt at finding a viable solution to secessionist conflicts in the same areas. The report analyses how the Putin administration has framed the issue of secessionist conflicts and separatism in statements and doctrines and how this has influenced Russia's policy towards the conflicts themselves and towards the institutions that are actively involved in the work on conflict resolution. In the authors view, Russia has since the early 1990s pursued an inconsistent and incoherent policy towards the separatist conflicts in the post-Soviet space. After having recognized the importance of separatism as a security challenge and threat within Russia and within the post-Soviet space, Russia has however chosen not to translate this approach into a viable and coherent policy towards these conflicts. Instead of pursuing a policy of unambiguous support for the territorial integrity of the states haunted by secessionist conflicts, Russia seems to have adopted a policy of playing the separatist card for its own purposes and has sought to maximize its geopolitical gains and retain some control in the areas that it deems important for the realization of its partly outdated geopolitical strategy. This policy may yield some short-term geopolitical gains, but in the longer term it may undermine Russia's credibility as a predictable and serious international partner, as a 'normal' great power seeking its own new place on the recently redrawn global power map. ; The Norwegian Ministry of Defence

- ; The EU has usually considered immigration policy for third country nationals and the free movement framework for EU citizens to be two separate policy fields. Increasingly, they are being conflated. This places a country such as Poland in an ambivalent position. When it comes to the treatment of third country nationals, Central and Eastern European member governments—including that in Warsaw—are reluctant to agree on fixed quotas to relocate forced migrants from the south, fearing that this could strain their limited resources and entail heavy political costs. When it comes to free movement, by contrast, Poland and other sending countries of the region are having to defend the status of their own citizens residing in Western Europe and call on support and solidarity there. This report examines how this may affect the specific situation of the Polish migrant community in Norway. Poland can draw lessons from Norway, which has only recently made the transition to becoming a country of immigration.

- ; The EU has usually considered immigration policy for third country nationals and the free movement framework for EU citizens to be two separate policy fields. Increasingly, they are being conflated. This places a country such as Poland in an ambivalent position. When it comes to the treatment of third country nationals, Central and Eastern European member governments—including that in Warsaw—are reluctant to agree on fixed quotas to relocate forced migrants from the south, fearing that this could strain their limited resources and entail heavy political costs. When it comes to free movement, by contrast, Poland and other sending countries of the region are having to defend the status of their own citizens residing in Western Europe and call on support and solidarity there. This report examines how this may affect the specific situation of the Polish migrant community in Norway. Poland can draw lessons from Norway, which has only recently made the transition to becoming a country of immigration.

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and its subsequent decision to stop its gas export to Europe, Europe's energy dependence on Russia was put on full display. In this paper, we map energy relations with Russia in three European countries that in the period of analysis between 2012 and 2022 were among the most important energy customers of Russia: Poland, Germany and the Netherlands. Moreover, we examine how this issue has been addressed – if at all – in party programs in elections in the same period. Examining party programs, we argue, brings new insights and a better understanding of how energy policies and relations with Russia were viewed in the three countries – and in the EU in general in that period. The paper identifies two ideal types – the 'liberal pragmatists', who treated strong energy interdependence as a possible conflict-mitigating measure, and the 'hard core realists', who viewed strong energy dependence on Russia as a possible source of strategic threat.