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Using population data on six state populations of interest organizations from 1980 and 1990, the authors find that (a) organized interests frequently exit the lobbying community; (b) institutions exit at a higher rate than associations or membership groups; (c) exit rates potentially have great influence on the composition of interest organization populations; and (d) exit, but not entry, rates are greatly influenced by the density of interest organization populations. On the basis of these findings, the authors make a number of suggestions for the further study of the demography of interest organization communities.

In this paper, we replicate our 1975 and 1980 analyses of American state interest group system density and diversity with new data from 1990. The results generally support our previous findings with two important exceptions. First, contrary to all theoretical expectations and prior empirical work, including our own, we find economic wealth to be negatively associated with interest group diversity. And second, the curvi linear responsiveness of interest group density to economic size, which was already declining from 1975 to 1980, disappears in the 1990 results. This suggests that states need not drift into hyper-interest group politics as their economies expand.

ABSTRACTThis paper extends previous analyses of industrial policy from a corporatist perspective. We advocate a mid-level measure of group influence; the measure is based upon analysis of newspaper stories. A preliminary exploration of NewsBank data is reported, and several interesting trends in economic development policy are isolated. Business and education are heavily involved in policymaking whereas labor and political parties are not at all involved. On the whole, a meso-corporatist model in which business, state government, and education are partners seems to fit better than a business capture model. Some speculations are offered about this new American form of corporatism and its resemblance to the Japanese case.