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Almost all U.S. cities are established by state charter as either mayor-council or council-manager cities. For decades, these two legal-statutory categories have been used by researchers as dichotomous variables in descriptions of city government form and in statistical equations. This study indicates that the mayor-council and council-manager categories, although legally based, mask several important empirical characteristics of U.S. city government. Using a large data set, the authors indicate that the structures of U.S. cities are surprisingly dynamic. Cities tend to change their structures incrementally. Over time, cities with mayor-council statutory platforms will incrementally adapt many of the characteristics of council-manager form cities to improve their management and productivity capabilities. Over time, cities with council-manager statutory platforms will adopt features of mayor-council form cities to increase their political responsiveness, leadership, and accounting capabilities. Because each of the two legal forms of cities adopts primary features of the other, these cities now constitute a third form of the U.S. city—the adapted city.

To explain negative perceptions of government ethics, particularly the ethics of public administrators, the paradox of distance & the absence of role differentiation are employed. In the paradox of distance, the public holds negative views of government generally & public administrators in the abstract, but they have favorable to very favorable views of governmental programs with which they interact & favorable views of the bureaucrats whom they encounter. Much of the negative perception of government ethics & the ethics of public officials is based on public observations of the misdeeds of those who are elected or politically appointed. These negative perceptions are well founded. Unfortunately, the public holds similarly negative views of merit civil servants, although these public officials are much less often associated with corruption or unethical behavior. It is suggested that several contemporary governmental reforms will, in the long run, result in more rather than less government corruption. Adapted from the source document.

To explain negative perceptions of government ethics, and particularly of the ethics of public administrators, the authors use the paradox of distance and the absence of role differentiation. In the paradox of distance, the public holds negative views of government generally and public administrators in the abstract, but they have favorable to very favorable views of governmental programs with which they interact and favorable views of the bureaucrats whom they encounter. Much of the negative perception of government ethics and the ethics of public officials is based on public observations of the misdeeds of those who are elected or politically appointed. These negative perceptions are well founded. Unfortunately, the public holds similarly negative views of merit civil servants, although these public officials are much less often associated with corruption or unethical behavior. Finally, the authors suggest that several contemporary governmental reforms will, in the long run, result in more rather than less government corruption.