Suchergebnisse

In applying discourse analysis to the study of the conflict and peace process in Northern Ireland, this book offers a new and pertinent way to understand and examine three core subjects: conflict studies, Irish politics and applied discourse analysis. As a product of collaboration and intellectual engagement between scholars from a variety of disciplines, institutions, countries and even generations, it analyses the close, yet still mystifying, relationship between political discourse and conflict resolution.

AbstractThis article considers the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the UK–EU Withdrawal Agreement as a 'flexible and imaginative' response to the problems that Brexit has created for the island of Ireland. It looks at the purpose of the Protocol and its origins, noting the reasons why flexibility was required from both sides. It then considers the ways in which precariousness from its conception has been demonstrated in its first year of operation. This focuses upon four main areas: implementation, dynamic alignment, the democratic consent vote, and the UK–EU relationship. Its core argument is the 'flexibility' that the Protocol requires also means a certain degree of ambiguity. In the absence of a stable UK–EU relationship, this precariousness could exacerbate the difficulties of meeting the policy challenges that surround the Protocol for Northern Ireland, the UK, Ireland and the EU.

This article considers the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the UK–EU Withdrawal Agreement as a 'flexible and imaginative' response to the problems that Brexit has created for the island of Ireland. It looks at the purpose of the Protocol and its origins, noting the reasons why flexibility was required from both sides. It then considers the ways in which precariousness from its conception has been demonstrated in its first year of operation. This focuses upon four main areas: implementation, dynamic alignment, the democratic consent vote, and the UK–EU relationship. Its core argument is the 'flexibility' that the Protocol requires also means a certain degree of ambiguity. In the absence of a stable UK–EU relationship, this precariousness could exacerbate the difficulties of meeting the policy challenges that surround the Protocol for Northern Ireland, the UK, Ireland and the EU.

Since 2006, according to the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, the largest portion of people in Northern Ireland identify themselves not as Unionist nor Nationalist but as Neither. This fact is difficult to tally with the patterns of polarised election results and the narratives of a 'culture war' that dominate most analyses of contemporary Northern Ireland. This article examines the existence of this large portion of the population in Northern Ireland who reject the identities upon which the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement is centred. We find that those identifying as neither Unionist nor Nationalist are predominantly female, they come from all religious backgrounds, all age groups, and both British and Irish national identities. The majority of those who identify as Neither appear to do so as a statement of rejection of what is on offer from the political parties in Northern Ireland; rather than supporting a centrist party, they support no party at all. The article concludes that the 1998 Agreement has created the conditions for a growing number of people to identify as neither Unionist nor Nationalist, but at the same time it makes the emergence of any strong alternative, 'third way' type of politics difficult to envisage.

Since 2006, according to the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, the largest portion of people in Northern Ireland identify themselves not as Unionist nor Nationalist but as Neither. This fact is difficult to tally with the patterns of polarised election results and the narratives of a 'culture war' that dominate most analyses of contemporary Northern Ireland. This article examines the existence of this large portion of the population in Northern Ireland who reject the identities upon which the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement is centred. We find that those identifying as neither Unionist nor Nationalist are predominantly female, they come from all religious backgrounds, all age groups, and both British and Irish national identities. The majority of those who identify as Neither appear to do so as a statement of rejection of what is on offer from the political parties in Northern Ireland; rather than supporting a centrist party, they support no party at all. The article concludes that the 1998 Agreement has created the conditions for a growing number of people to identify as neither Unionist nor Nationalist, but at the same time it makes the emergence of any strong alternative, 'third way' type of politics difficult to envisage.

The study notes that there are obvious differences – Northern Ireland faces a unique complex of problems associated with the Irish border and the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, but there are also important similarities. For both Scotland and Northern Ireland, the impact of Brexit revolves around the exacerbation of internal political divisions, economic and social consequences, and increased tensions vis-a-vis Westminster and the UK government. Devolution – and the implications of two devolved areas voting remain – appears to have been viewed more as an irritation than a central concern in the UK's Brexit planning to date.

Fianna Fail is a party used to government, authority and influence in the domestic sphere. This has been to a large part secured by the vitality and strength of its local organization. The party has, in contrast, struggled to find its place in the sphere of European politics. Its main successes in the EU arena have arisen from its experience as Ireland's governing party. This is reflected in the fact that the pro-Europeanism that exists within the party is pivoted on the belief that its leadership will defend national interests and negotiate good deals for Ireland in Brussels. These two 'fundamentals' in party support - localism and power - were thrown into doubt by the results of the 2008 Lisbon referendum and the 2009 European and local elections. This article draws on original, qualitative interviews with Fianna Fail MEPs and party members across Ireland conducted in the wake of these election results. Using Ladrech's (2002) model as an outline, it reveals the ways in which the party's localism has delimited the effects of Europeanization. Furthermore, it argues that the crisis faced by the Fianna Fail government in late 2009 represented the culmination of local/central and national/European tensions within the party and beyond its control. Adapted from the source document.