Suchergebnisse

Examines the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in terms of value added to the decisionmaking process as compared to open source intelligence (OSINT). At issue is offering a survey of academic commentary on Chinese foreign policy, comparing the Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) produced on the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis to reports from the New York Times. The incident is reviewed before comparing the NIE & crisis SNIE intelligence with the press reports, breaking events out into a precrisis phase & four stages of development that run through the postcrisis phase, 1958/59. Differences between the NIE & OSINT are seen in the analysis of underlying factors & the character of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Further, presentation of information is another point of comparison that speaks to the issue of analysis transparency & the degree of (un)certainty underlying the analysis. It is contended that the NIE's value added lies in the likelihood that an expression of uncertainty will travel with a judgment taken out of context; however, NIE readers are unable to process intellectually, thus policy may simply reflect policymaker biases more than processed intelligence. Tables. Adapted from the source document.