Suchergebnisse

This project examines the prospects for Russia-Western practical cooperation against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and, more broadly, for a rapprochement between Russia, NATO and key NATO member states post-Crimea. The analytical point of departure is two-fold: Firstly, the project will examine how Russia's longstanding rejection of a 'Western' world-order, along with various Western leaders' increasing depiction of Russia as an 'adversary', shape the two parties' room for manoeuvre with respect to practical collaboration on the ground in Syria. Secondly, and operationalizing 'the West' as two key 'Atlanticist' member states in NATO, the United States and Britain, it will examine how Russian and Western domestic debates constrain governments and political leaders' scope for action, and their ability to adjust their commenced policy paths in Syria. When adversarial statements about 'the other' are voiced by state leaders in an international setting, they are often portrayed in the media as being reflective of that particular leader or government's position alone. In this project, we suggest that the dynamics of Russia-Western relations cannot be properly understood without alsoconsidering how states' security policies are empowered and limited by domestic security policy debates. The project will provide an up-to-date, in-depth analysis of how contemporary Russian, American and British security policies are being constituted and constrained by domestic debates. Furthermore, it will trace how domestically negotiated security policies materialize in actions on the ground in Syria. Against the backdrop of the empirical analysis, publications from this project will discuss the likelihood of these states finding common ground against IS in Syria, and the prospects for Russia-Western rapprochement more generally.

In October 2016, international media reported that the Russia– US diplomatic dialogue over Syria had collapsed, with both sides holding the other party to blame. While the US State Department observed that 'everybody's patience with Russia has run out', Russia's Foreign Minister criticized the United States for using 'a language of sanctions and ultimatums while continuing selective cooperation with our country' (CNN 2016). The breakdown and the statements that ensued marked the endpoint of a turbulent diplomatic year, which had begun with a brief handshake between presidents Obama and Putin at the UN General Assembly late in September 2015. In the months following that handshake, Russia and the US-led coalition participated in talks and activities aimed at finding a negotiated solution to the civil war in Syria as well as to defeat international terrorism there.

This article theorises containment as a diplomatic response mode for states when faced with potentially harmful attacks on their international identity and reputation. Despite widespread agreement in International Relations (IR) scholarship that identities matter in the context of state security, studies of crisis management have paid little attention to ontological security crises. Scholarly literature on public diplomacy has concerned itself mainly with proactive nation branding and reputation building; work on stigma management has privileged the study of how 'transgressive' states respond to identity attacks by recognising, rejecting or countering criticism. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we make the case that states do not perform as uniform entities when faced with ontological security crises – government representatives, bureaucratic officials and diplomats have varying roles and action repertoires available to them. Second, we argue that containment is a key but undertheorised part of the diplomatic toolkit in crisis management. Unpacking containment as a crisis management response mode, we combine insights from IR scholarship on emotions and diplomacy with insights on therapeutic practices from social psychology. We substantiate our argument with a case study of how Norwegian government representatives, bureaucratic officials and diplomats responded to escalating international criticism against Norway's Child Welfare Services following a wave of transnational protests in 2016. A key finding is that whereas the dominant response mode of government ministers and bureaucratic officials was to reject the criticism, diplomats mainly worked to contain the situation, trying to prevent it from escalating further and resulting in long-term damage to bilateral relations. ; publishedVersion

This article theorises containment as a diplomatic response mode for states when faced with potentially harmful attacks on their international identity and reputation. Despite widespread agreement in International Relations (IR) scholarship that identities matter in the context of state security, studies of crisis management have paid little attention to ontological security crises. Scholarly literature on public diplomacy has concerned itself mainly with proactive nation branding and reputation building; work on stigma management has privileged the study of how 'transgressive' states respond to identity attacks by recognising, rejecting or countering criticism. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we make the case that states do not perform as uniform entities when faced with ontological security crises – government representatives, bureaucratic officials and diplomats have varying roles and action repertoires available to them. Second, we argue that containment is a key but undertheorised part of the diplomatic toolkit in crisis management. Unpacking containment as a crisis management response mode, we combine insights from IR scholarship on emotions and diplomacy with insights on therapeutic practices from social psychology. We substantiate our argument with a case study of how Norwegian government representatives, bureaucratic officials and diplomats responded to escalating international criticism against Norway's Child Welfare Services following a wave of transnational protests in 2016. A key finding is that whereas the dominant response mode of government ministers and bureaucratic officials was to reject the criticism, diplomats mainly worked to contain the situation, trying to prevent it from escalating further and resulting in long-term damage to bilateral relations. ; under the project 'EPOS: Evaluating Power Political Repertoires' ; publishedVersion

When this issue of International Politics published it gone for just a week ago the Nobel Peace Prize for 2014 was awarded to Oslo. This year parts Indian Kailash Satyarthi and Pakistani Malala Yousafzay price for its fight against the oppression of children and adolescents and for children's right to education. 'Children must go to school, not exploited for economic purposes,' writes Nobel Committee in its grounds, and continues: 'In the poor countries is 60 percent of the population currently under 25 years. It is a prerequisite for a peaceful development globally that children and young people's rights are respected. Especially in conflict areas helps child molestation that conflicts are passed on through generations. '. Adapted from the source document.