Zielbereich der geforderten Umorientierung des Europarechts ist die soziale Dimension Europas. Der Verfasser zeigt zunächst, warum das "soziale Europa" im institutionellen Design der Gemeinschaft nur eine sehr untergeordnete Rolle spielte und dieser Umstand lange vernachlässigt werden konnte. Im Folgenden komme drei Formen des Umgangs mit dem sozialen Defizit des institutionalisierten Europa zur Sprache: eine dezidierte Fortschreibung und Vertiefung des institutionellen Status quo, die Abkoppelung der sozialen von der wirtschaftlichen Verfassung als "sozialer Integrationskompromiss" und die verfassungsvertragliche Konstitutionalisierung. Abschließend wird eine kollisionsrechtliche Alternative aufgezeigt, die das Europarecht als supranationales Kollisionsrecht versteht und durch aktuelle Beispiele aus der Rechtsprechung der Europäischen Gerichtshofs zum kollektiven Arbeitsrecht illustriert wird. (ICE2)
Professor Christian Joerges delivered the Second Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Memorial Lecture in Comparative Law in 2003 and this article is based on his remarks. The article is included in the inaugural volume of CICLOPs that collects the first six Bernstein lectures. Professor Joerges puts forth a three part thesis concerning the "Europeanization of Private Law", the process by which the European Community influences the legal and political policies of its member states within a framework of transnational cooperation. Joerges first establishes the eroding importance of the idea that legal systems operating at the national level fulfill the goals of Europeanization, arguing this to be the result of Europe being a multi-level system rather than a coalition of autonomous nation-states. He then discusses how the process of Europeanization defies the conventional modes of analysis provided by three different patterns of juridification, each attempting to square Europeanization within the framework of legal science. Finally, Joerges focuses on the normative issues raised by Europeanization as process, such as the role Europeanization plays in resolving the extra-territorial effects of policies enacted by the various nation-states within the Community. Throughout his paper, the Europeanization process is described as a useful tool for the members of the Community to coordinate mutually beneficial policies but also as a hindrance to the autonomous exercise of power within the territory of each individual member; illustrated by controversial cases coming out of France, Greece, and Spain.
Der Beitrag konzentriert sich auf das Verhaltnis von Recht und Governance in Europa. Er entwickelt den von Jurgen #eyer und mir vor 10 Jahren unter dem Titel "Deliberativer Supranationalismus" eingefuhrten Ansatz fort. Die rechtstheoretische Grundlage dieses Ansatzes ist die Habermasche Diskurstheorie des Rechts und deren Prozeduralisierung der Rechtskategorie. Auf dieser Grundlage ist es moglich, die Wende zum Regieren1 in rechtsstaatlichen Bahnen zu halten. Dies gilt grundsatzlich fur alle Ebenen des Regierens, erfordert aber Differenzierungen. Die rechtlich vermittelte Legitimation, die das prozeduralisierte Recht im Verfassungsstaat gewahrleisten kann, erfordert in postnationalen Konstellationen eine "kollisionsrechtliche" Wende. Auf der Grundlage eines kollisionsrechtlichen Verstandnisses des Europarechts sind nicht nur dessen Einwirkungen auf das nationale Recht demokratie-vertraglich legitimierbar; auch die neuen (und nicht so neuen) Formen europaischen Regierens lassen sich auf dieser Grundlage eingrenzen und konstitutionalisieren. Diesen Thesen entspricht die Gliederung des Beitrags. Er beginnt mit knappen Hinweisen zur rechtstheoretischen Grundlage. Es folgt ein Ruckblick auf die Kritik an interventionistischen Rechtskonzeptionen, die schon in den 80er Jahren Grundlagen fur einen Umgang des Rechts mit Governance-Praktiken geschaffen hat (1). Die europaische Wende zum Regieren ist das Thema des Hauptteils, der mit einer Chronologie der europaischer Governance-Praktiken beginnt (2.1), um dann zu zeigen, wie sie kollisionsrechtlich erfasst werden konnen (2.2). Vor allem die sog. neuen Formen des Regierens, so wird abschliesend gezeigt, suchen sich freilich rechtlicher Bindungen zu entledigen, und es ist fraglich, ob das Recht gegenuber diesen Tendenz bestehen wird (3.). ; Questo contributo si incentra sul rapporto tra diritto e governance in Europa. Esso sviluppa l'approccio, introdotto dieci anni fa da Jurgen Neyer e da me con il nome di "sovranazionalismo deliberativo", le cui fondamenta teoriche sono la teoria habermasiana del discorso e la connessa procedimentalizzazione del diritto. In questa prospettiva diviene possibile trattenere la "svolta verso la governance"1 entro i binari proprio dello stato di diritto. Cio vale per tutti i livelli di governo, e tuttavia alcune differenziazioni sono opportune. La legittimazione attraverso il diritto, realizzata nello stato costituzionale dal diritto procedurale, richiede nella "costellazione postnazionale" una svolta alla luce del "diritto dei conflitti"2. Sulla base di una concezione del diritto europeo come diritto dei conflitti fra le norme e possibile non soltanto legittimare democraticamente l'influenza del diritto europeo sul diritto nazionale, ma anche limitare e costituzionalizzare le nuove (e meno nuove) forme di governance europea. A queste tesi corrisponde l'articolazione del presente contributo. Ad un breve riferimento al sostrato teorico segue uno sguardo retrospettivo alla critica delle concezioni interventiste del diritto, che gia negli anni Ottanta ha avvicinato il diritto alle prassi di governance (1.). La parte centrale si occupa della svolta europea verso la governance, iniziando con una cronologia delle prassi europee di governance (2.1.), ed illustrando poi come queste possano venire intese secondo l' approccio del diritto dei conflitti (2.2.). Infine, si mostra come soprattutto le cd. nuove forme di governance tendano a sottrarsi ai vincoli giuridici, sollevando interrogativi circa la permanenza stessa del diritto.
"Das europäische Recht weist eine Doppelstruktur auf. Als Primarrecht, insbesondere durch die Grundfreiheiten, initiiert es den Integrationsprozess. Als Sekundarrecht zielt es auf Problemlösungen, die Folgen einer bloß negativen Integration abfangen oder durch transnationale Regelungen ergänzen. Die Wende zum 'Regieren' folgt den daraus resultierenden Sachzwängen. Dabei muss sich die Problemorientierung des Regierens über die Formalstrukturen der Gemeinschaftsmethode hinwegsetzen. Dadurch droht aber eine Erosion rechtsstaatlich gebotener Bindungen des Regierens und der Idee rechtlich vermittelter Legitimität überhaupt. Aus diesem Dilemma möchte die Re-Konzeptualisierung des Europarechts als eines Kollisionsrechts neuen Typs herausführen: Das 'Kollisionsrecht erster Ordnung' zielt auf eine horizontale Verfassung der EU; das 'Kollisionsrecht zweiter Ordnung' soll transnationale Governance-Arrangements konstitutionalisieren." (Autorenreferat)
This paper seeks to synthesise two concerns which are usually discussed separately One concerns the much discussed democracy deficit of the European polity. In this respect, it is considered that the democratic quality of the EU needs to be discussed in conjunction with Europe's potential to enable European citizens to see themselves as the sovereigns of the economic and social order. The decoupling of Europe's economic constitution from the social constitutions of Member States by the 1957 EEC Treaty has created a 'social deficit' of the European construction which needs to be overcome if the EU is to gain full democratic legitimacy. The second concern is with the modes of governance that Europe has established in order to respond to irrefutable regulatory needs, including the quests for a European social model. Here, Europe is, especially in areas of social policy, resorting to soft law and non-legal governance techniques, which seem hardly reconcilable with Europe's commitment to the rule of law. Before paying the high price of de-legalisation, Europe should try out the alternative of re-conceptualising European law as new type of conflict of laws. This law would seek to attain what the Constitutional Treaty had called the 'motto of the Union', namely, a reconciliation of 'unity and diversity'; it would not only help to rescue the rule of law but also serves to enhance Europe's chances of coping with the unresolved substantive tensions, including the social deficits of the European polity.
Europa hat es augenscheinlich verstanden, die Durchsetzung der Warenverkehrsfreiheit mit der Entwicklung moderner regulativer Politiken zu verbinden. Der Beitrag fragt vor diesem Hintergrund, ob man die europäischen Erfahrungen für die Bewältigung von Konflikten auf internationaler Ebene zwischen dem Freihandelsziel und nationalstaatlichen Maßnahmen nutzen kann. Gezeigt wird erstens, dass mit den institutionellen Innovationen Europas bei der "Vollendung des Binnenmarktes" symbiotische Verbindungen von Markt und regulativer Politik gelungen sind, die ein Kernstück des europäischen Mehrebenensystems ausmachen. Im einen zweiten Schritt werden die Möglichkeiten regulativer Politik im Welthandelssystem erörtert. Dessen institutionelles Zentrum, die Welthandelsorganisation (WTO), verfügt nicht über jene Regelungskompetenzen und -ressourcen, auf die sich Europas Binnenmarktpolitik stützen kann. Der Autor zeigt, dass sich der Übergang vom alten GATT- zum neuen WTO-Regime als ein zweiseitiger Prozess begreifen lässt, in dem zwar die regulative Autonomie der Nationalstaaten erodiert, deren regulativen Anliegen jedoch gleichzeitig in den neuen transnationalen Governance-Konfigurationen "aufgehoben" werden. Der letzte Schritt erörtert Fragen der Legitimität transnationalen Regierens. Es existieren hier zwischen den verschiedenen Governance-Ebenen - der europäischen und der internationalen - Parallelen bei den Reaktionen auf regulative Anliegen. (ICA2)
The historical evolution of free trade has been accompanied by a plethora of debates, concerning both its positive effects and social costs. During the last decade, the subject of these disputes has markedly changed. The main objective of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) concluded 1947, was initially the reduction of tariffs introduced by states to protect their national economy. In this respect, the agreement has been markedly successful. Since the early 1970s, however, non-tariff barriers to free trade have moved to the centre of attention. This change of focus was fostered by more intensified domestic regulation especially in the fields of health and safety, consumer and environmental protection. These concerns are of such domestic significance that they cannot simply be abandoned for the sake of free trade; however, it also is common opinion that regulations in these areas cannot be accepted, if they merely mask protectionist interests. In 1994, the international trade system adapted to this situation by transforming the GATT into the World Trade Organization (WTO). The most important reforms included an overhaul of its procedures of dispute settlement and the conclusion of special agreements concerning non-tariff barriers to free trade such as the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). These agreements aim at the balancing of their main economic objective, free trade, with domestic regulatory concerns of WTO members. This bundle of regulations has certainly furthered the emergence of transnational 'governance arrangements'. Such new forms of 'transnational governance' have lent renewed importance to 'old' legal issues: How can new forms of transnational governance be qualified legally? What can be said about their (social) acceptance and (normative) legitimacy? Can this form of governance be 'constitutionalized' in such a way that law can defend or even regain its function as guarantor of and yardstick for legitimate governing?
This essay is continuing the path between the disciplines of law and political science that I have been following for a couple of years now. This is a somewhat delicate exercise. In addressing my own discipline, law, I argue that it should renew its perceptions of reality and open up its normative and dogmatic conceptual structure. To political scientists engaged in integration research, I suggest that they ought to take the law's normative structure seriously and open up their analytical and empirical models to this peculiar reality. 'Two goals?! No wonder he never gets anywhere!' By no means, I would object, we are only looking at the two sides of the same coin. And there are good reasons to undertake such efforts: Europe's constitution is too important to be left up to the lawyers; but it is also something that cannot be grasped by empirical and analytical approaches which are unable to address the normative dimension of the 'real' world.
