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AbstractThis article includes some thoughts on reappraising the role of Eprem Khan in the constitutional failure in Iran during the early 20th century. Eprem Khan's crucial role in this event has always been the centre of scholarly discussions. While often criticised for having capitulated to the Russian threat and for not standing steadfast with the parliamentarians, an unbiased look at some primary accounts helps create a more adequate picture of the Armenian-Iranian military man. It is through an objective, though very brief, review of the historical facts that scholars are suggested to re-evaluate the role of Eprem Khan and form an opinion based on the options he faced, rather than judge him by the outcome of the momentous events of 1911.

This article explores the impact of consolidated principles of delegation on top civil servants' perceptions of autonomy in management and policy-making processes across European parliamentary democracies. Particular attention is devoted to the extent to which bureaucratic capacity can be equated as a principle of delegation, considering the lenses and perspectives of bureaucrats instead of relying on politicians' formal mechanisms to control bureaucratic activities. Empirically, this article is based on a large-scale study survey of senior public executives applied in eight European countries. While consolidated principles of delegation seem to be able to explain perceptions of autonomy across parliamentary democracies, results also suggest the importance of including bureaucratic capacity as a predictor of autonomy in the last chain of delegation. This emerges as one of the strongest explanatory variables of perceptions of managerial autonomy, regardless of the hierarchical position of respondents. However, it does not impact on bureaucrats' perception of policy autonomy, as respondents' position within the administrative state and the distinct traits of national public bureaucracies in Europe have a greater impact on the delegation of authority.

Transaction cost theory is largely used to investigate the formal domain of land and housing. In the informal domain, however, this perspective has been employed largely as a supplement in addressing the other fundamental notion in new institutional economics—property rights—despite the possibility that informality in land development can emerge regardless of the informality or formality of such rights. To cover this gap, this study developed a theoretical framework based on transaction cost theory to explain the formal–informal dichotomy in land development. The proposed framework maintains that land development depends on engaging in transactions that involve total or partial ownership of a combination of capital and land through lease and/or sale contracts, which enable landowners to earn from the new rental prices produced by the increase in land prices. Landowners are afforded two avenues from which to reduce transaction costs, namely, formal and informal institutional frameworks, each defining and enforcing restrictive rules on agents' actions. These avenues, however, are simultaneously a source of new transaction costs that can affect the expected financial return of land development. Landowners therefore tend to choose the institutional framework that entails lower transaction costs but enables higher gains. Thus, the higher transaction costs associated with a formal institutional framework are the primary deterrents to the selection of this structure. In turn, informal land development continues to expand, regardless of the existence of formal prohibitive measures. We investigated the formal–informal dichotomy in the rural land development process in Tehran Province, Iran. The results indicated that transaction costs cause inefficiency in formal institutions, thereby driving the perpetuation of informal development.