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Military Review, November - December 2009 ; It is an oft-cited maxim that in all the conflicts of the past century, the United States has refought its last war. A number of analysts and journalists have mentioned the war in Vietnam recently in connection with Afghanistan.1 Perhaps fearful of taking this analogy too far, most have backed away from it. They should not—the Vietnam War is less a metaphor for the conflict in Afghanistan than it is a template. For eight years, the United States has engaged in an almost exact political and military reenactment of the Vietnam War, and the lack of self-awareness of the repetition of events 50 years ago is deeply disturbing.

The Pakistan-Afghanistan border area has become the most dangerous frontier on earth, and the most challenging for the United States' national security interests. Critically, the portion of the border region that is home to extremist groups such the Taliban and al-Qaida coincides almost exactly with the area overwhelmingly dominated by the Pashtun tribes. The implications of this salient fact—that most of Pakistan's and Afghanistan's violent religious extremism, and with it much of the United States' counterterrorism challenge, are contained within a single ethnolinguistic group—have unfortunately not been fully grasped by a governmental policy community that has long downplayed cultural dynamics. The threat to long-term U.S. security interests in this area is neither an economic problem, nor a religious problem, nor a generic "tribal" problem. It is a unique cultural problem. In both southern Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan, rather than seeking to "extend the reach of the central government," which simply foments insurgency among a proto-insurgent people, the United States and the international community should be doing everything in their means to empower the tribal elders and restore balance to a tribal/cultural system that has been disintegrating since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.

This article explores the reasons why religious and political extremism in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region ends neatly at the borders of the Pashtun lands. It begins with a brief overview of the geography and typography of the border, followed by a condensed study of the key ethnographic and cultural factors. An understanding of the tribal and social framework of the border, particularly its alternative forms of governance, is critical to the subsequent discussion of the current instability and radicalization. In addition to religion, tribal mores that predate Islam shape insurgent behavior and should inform all aspects of engagement on both sides of the border. The article concludes with an examination of the history and the unintended consequences of border politics, and offers policy recommendations to begin to reverse the ongoing slide into Talibanization.

Atlantic Monthly, October 2008 ; June was the deadliest month for the U.S. military in Afghanistan since the invasion in October 2001. July became the second straight month in which casualties exceeded those in Iraq, where four times as many U.S. troops are on the ground. More Americans have been killed in Afghanistan since the invasion began than in the first nine years of the Vietnam War, from 1956 to 1964.

book chapter, Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century. International Perspectives. Vol 2. Combating the Sources and Facilitators. Edited by: James J. Forest. Praeger Security International, 2007. ; Over the last decade, Afghanistan and terrorism have become synonymous in the eyes of many analysts and policy makers. Afghanistan of course, was the first campaign stop- Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) - of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and has since been viewed as a hotbed for global terrorists and jihadists.

Als Ergänzung zu einem von den gleichen Autoren in der Dezember-Ausgabe 1984 dieser Zeitschrift veröffentlichten Aufsatz zum Thema afrikanischer Staatsstreiche und Militärregierungen werden weitere Analysen dieses für Afrika typischen Phänomens bis einschl. 1985 vorgelegt und diskutiert. Rangordnung afrikanischer Staaten nach der Häufigkeit militärischer Interventionen 1956-85 und 1980-85. Liste versuchter und erfolgreicher Coups in den Jahren 1984 und 1985. (DÜI-Hlb)

Für den Zeitraum von 1960 bis 1982 werden die Erfahrungen und Hintergründe von 35 afrikanischen Staaten südlich der Sahara im Hinblick auf erfolgreiche und versuchte Staatsstreiche analysiert. Auf dieser Basis wird ein Modell entwickelt, das die Neigung zu Umsturzversuchen angibt und damit der Vorhersage bestimmter Entwicklungen in den als besonders gefährdet erscheinenden Ländern dienen kann. Test dieses Modells am Beispiel der Jahre 1983 und 1984, deren tatsächliche Staatsstreiche und Umsturzversuche schon bekannt sind, und Vorhersage entsprechender Entwicklungen für 1985. (DÜI-Hlb)

Strukturanalyse der zahlreichen Staatsstreiche in Schwarzafrika seit den 50er Jahren. Unabhängig von der Regierungsform bilden gewaltsame Umstürze die häufigste Form von Regierungswechseln. Entscheidende Rolle des Militärs. Hintergrundanalyse im zwischenstaatlichen und zeitlichen Vergleich unter Berücksichtigung kolonialer, regionaler und wirtschaftlicher Einflüsse (z.B. die gescheiterte Industrialisierungspolitik). Im Anhang: Chronologischer Überblick über 56 erfolgreiche Staatsstreiche von 1958-1984. (DÜI-Hlb)