Suchergebnisse

The year 2011 was momentous in the European Union's neighborhood. Struggling to deal with the effects of the eurozone crisis and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in the process of being established, the Union was confronted with one its greatest foreign policy challenges, yet: the popular uprisings in its southern neighborhood. This article provides an overview of the impact of the eurozone crisis on the Eu's nighborhood policies and the enlargement process. Adapted from the source document.

For the majority of the year, the European Union's neighbourhood exhibited a high degree of stability and stasis with a significant degree of continuity in the situation that prevailed in 2009 (Whitman and Juncos, 2010). This countered the expectation that the wider neighbourhood was to be the region in which the Lisbon Treaty's foreign policy innovations, and the drawing together of external relations and the common foreign and security policy, were anticipated to have impact. However, the High Representative's preoccupation with the creation of the External Action Service (EEAS) left no room for new policy initiatives or innovation. The Union has now faced two years in which there has been a 'bedding down' of the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean, with neither exhibiting a substantive change in the Union's relationship with its neighbours. Rather, those neighbours largely exhibited familiar traits in their relationships with the Union, with no breakthroughs in relations with the most problematic neighbours or improvement of the neighbourhood's most intractable problems. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThe European Union's response to Russia's war of aggression has run contrary to expectations of EU foreign policy inaction and incoherence as well as warnings of de-Europeanization and renationalization of foreign policy. Drawing on the concept of coordinative Europeanization, we argue that the response to the war has allowed for a more horizontal, cooperative decision-making process involving both member states and EU institutions, as well as a reversal of traditionally Western European-centric dynamics of horizontal Europeanization. With the aim of investigating these changes further, this paper relies on the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine as a case study to explore how crises shape Europeanization dynamics in EU foreign and security policy. Relying on primary and secondary sources as well as interviews with EU and national officials, we show how the coordinative Europeanization we have witnessed since the start of the war can be attributed to the characteristics of the crisis itself. In so doing, the paper contributes to the literature on Europeanization of foreign policy as well as to studies focusing on the effect of crises on the process of European integration.

Abstract
This article reflects on how European Union (EU) narratives of the crisis of the liberal international order (LIO) have reshaped its resilience approach and its foreign and security policy more broadly. Drawing on qualitative textual analysis, we trace the evolution of the EU's resilience approach over time and the way it has been shaped by crisis narratives. While the idea of resilience was introduced in EU foreign policy to foster the resilience of crisis-affected societies from the bottom up, the perception of an increasingly contested world first led to a reinterpretation of resilience in pragmatic ways, with values and interests combined selectively to protect the rules-based international order. More recently, on the grounds of a worsening crisis of the LIO, resilience has taken a defensive turn, adopting a more geopolitical stance to strengthen the EU's own resilience and that of the LIO. We argue that EU crisis narratives about the LIO thus serve to sustain and to rescue it. Furthermore, we conclude that the defensive reinterpretation of resilience is eroding the normative character of EU foreign and security policy. It also challenges the persistence of the LIO in the long term.

This article argues that, despite considerable efforts, EU capacity building activities have struggled to deliver on their objectives. While such programmes have sometimes been able to strengthen pockets of capacity in specific organisations, they have had less success in building capacity in the round and in a sustainable manner. Drawing on empirical evidence from EU capacity building programmes in the Horn of Africa and the Western Balkans, the article shows that, to a great extent, this failure has been a consequence of the difficulties EU capacity builders have had in engaging with complex local actors and political contexts. This in turn has led to a 'legitimacy deficit' for EU programmes, which have often had little involvement from local stakeholders and knowledge, and whose goals have often been at odds with local preferences and priorities.

This handbook has been designed by Natalie Jester, Gilberto Algar-Faria and Ana E. Juncos of the University of Bristol, supported by funding from the Impact Acceleration Account of the Economic and Social Research Council. The PeaceCapacity project draws on the research findings of the EU-CIVCAP project, which examines the role of the EU's civilian capabilities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. EU-CIVCAP is ongoing, however one of its key findings is that local ownership is vital for sustainable peacebuilding. PeaceCapacity has been designed to contribute to filling this ownership gap. ; This handbook is an output of the ESRC IAA PeaceCapacity project, which in turn is an impact project of the Horizon 2020 EU-CIVCAP project.