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There is a great demand for theories in international relations. The term "theory" has become so honorific that hypotheses, statements of fact, and intuitive guesses are often dressed up as theories. In part this longing for theory can be ascribed to a desire for the status of a "hard science" like physics, since the "hard sciences" are often viewed by laymen as the theoretical sciences par excellence. They have displayed their power in revealing the secrets of nature and, when applied to the affairs of men, have achieved notable practical successes like the construction of the atomic bomb.On the whole this demand for theory is probably good. We cannot reason without generalization and, where matters are complex, the web of reasoning logically takes the form of a theory. Most historical investigations and case studies employ theories inexplicitly—often in the belief that the generalizations follow from the straightforward presentation of "purely factual" material. There is usually no recognition that interpretations of factual material can always be presented in a form isomorphic with theories from the sciences of economics, psychology, sociology, and so forth.

This volume consists of a series of essays that were published in substantially the same form in various scholarly journals in 1957-1960. In them, Schelling attempts to adapt game theory to sociologically relevant aspects of the strategic process not encompassed within the formal mathematics of the theory. Thus his book represents a strikingly original contribution to the literature. In general, the essays share the theme that formal game theory is not a sufficiently good tool for sociological analysis of the bargaining process that takes place in real life. (This contention would not be denied by orthodox game theorists, since they do not regard the provision of such a tool as the purpose of game theory.) Except for this unifying thread, the various aspects of Schelling's analysis do not seem to me to evince a consistent point of view. To press this point, however, would be pedantic, for in The Strategy of Conflict the reader will discover a number of illuminating and penetrating sociological analyses of strategic problems.

THE importance of nuclear deterrence in the modern world does not require exposition. It became an issue of extended public discussion after the speech on massive retaliation by Secretary of State Dulles, who in the opinion of this writer came closer to an adequate theory of deterrence than most of his critics. This article will develop the view that the threat of counterattack is the best strategy against the possibility of aggression and that a nuclear counterattack is the most effective version of that strategy.

The postwar years have been a period of great interest in the theory of international politics. A contributor to this Review has surveyed the state of the study of that theory and indicated the alternatives open to it. Within the last year the Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University has held a series of seminars on the subject in an effort to push forward research frontiers.Interest in theory is no reflection upon the merits of scholarly endeavors that are not oriented primarily to theoretical considerations. But it does assume the independent importance of a theory of international politics. The present essay assumes the importance of theory in general, but is based upon a particular kind of theory, namely, systems theory.

THESIS: The injunction by Hobbes to found a Leviathan is thoroughly consistent with the end of life specified by Hobbes, namely, the avoid ance of death. It is equally inconsistent with a theory of sovereignty, i.e., with a theory which makes the state the source of obligation. Hobbes believed, however, that it would be dangerous to the security of lif e — that is, to the maintenance of the powerful state which was the great protector of life — if this position were stated openly. There fore he employed a private and a public language in the Leviathan. He shifted the definitions of his crucial concepts, though informing the careful reader he was doing so, in order to create the benign myth of legal sovereignty. From this, it also follows that man is not by nature asocial according to the theory of Hobbes and that consent does not provide a source of obligation.