Enhancing Tax Compliance Through Coercive and Legitimate Power of Tax Authorities by Concurrently Diminishing or Facilitating Trust in Tax Authorities
In: Law & Policy, Band 36, Heft 3, S. 290-313
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In: Law & Policy, Band 36, Heft 3, S. 290-313
SSRN
In: Law & policy, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 214-225
ISSN: 1467-9930
In: Journal of economic psychology, Band 70, S. 125-139
ISSN: 0167-4870
In: Social science information, Band 55, Heft 1, S. 60-77
ISSN: 1461-7412
A representative sample of 471 Austrian self-employed taxpayers was investigated and types of taxpayers selected on the basis of their motivational postures were extracted. By means of a cluster analysis four basic clusters of taxpayers were identified. 'Solidary' taxpayers pay their taxes because they perceive the tax system as fair. 'Non-solidary' taxpayers experience their tax burden as unfair. 'Critical' taxpayers feel unfairly treated and show high resistance but do not necessarily react by evading taxes. 'Strategic' taxpayers feel fairly treated but still try to reduce their tax burden if they perceive the opportunity to do so. The results show that positive and negative attitudes, respectively, to taxes do not necessarily lead to tax compliance or tax evasion. Cooperative and uncooperative behaviour originates from different motives.
In: International review of law and economics, Band 56, S. 42-52
ISSN: 0144-8188
In: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series No. 2024-02
SSRN
In: JBF-D-22-01338
SSRN
In: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series No. 2020-10
SSRN
Working paper
In: European psychologist, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 298-304
ISSN: 1878-531X
Is the effort invested to achieve taxable income a relevant factor for tax compliance? If the value of income increases with the effort exerted, reluctance to pay taxes should be high. On the other hand, if income is perceived as compensation for one's endeavor, there is too much at stake to take the risk of being audited and paying a fine. Consequently, tax evasion should be more likely if income was obtained easily. These contradicting predictions were tested in a questionnaire study with samples from eight countries (Australia, Austria, England, France, Italy, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland; N = 1,223). Results show that the effort exerted to obtain taxable income and the aspiration level matter in compliance decisions. Hard-earned money is more likely to be reported honestly to tax authorities, particularly if the aspiration level can be satisfied by honest tax reporting.
In: European psychologist: official organ of the European Federation of Psychologists' Associations (EFPA), Band 13, Heft 4
ISSN: 1016-9040
The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection. ; final draft ; peerReviewed
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peer-reviewed ; The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection. ; ACCEPTED ; peer-reviewed
BASE
The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ ineconomic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.
BASE
The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.
BASE
The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.
BASE