Suchergebnisse

In this paper, we analyze the effects of trade, concentration and ownership on the pricing behavior of firms in two transition countries, Bulgaria and Romania. We use an extensive dataset of more than 3000 firms and sector level infirmation to estimate the effects of these three factors on the price cost margin (PCM) for the period 1994-1998. We find: 1) that trade disciplines the industry in concentrated industries; 2) that high concentration is associated with more market power; 3) that private and foreign owned firms heve higher PCMs. This indicates that the pricing strategy of private firms is inherently differentthan the one of State firms, either as the results of different objectives or induced by the abuse of market power.

Abstract
This paper provides a new method to estimate price-cost margins in the presence of fixed costs of production. By exploiting properties of the primal and dual sales-based and cost-based Solow residuals, we are able to simultaneously estimate price-cost margins and the share of fixed costs in total costs for each input. Ignoring fixed costs in production underestimates price-cost margins and overestimates excess profit shares. Using a thirty-year panel of Belgian firms, we estimate price-cost margins, as a fraction of sales, of 25.4% on average, which can be decomposed between fixed costs of 22.9% and excess profits of 2.5%. Belgian price-cost margins have declined (−5.9%) in the past three decades due to a combination of falling fixed costs (−4.0%) and decreasing excess profits (−1.9%), suggesting that output markets have become even more competitive over time. While large firms have higher profit shares than small firms, they have lower fixed cost shares as well as lower price-cost margins.

AbstractThis paper analyzes the granularity hypothesis in a large emerging economy, Kazakhstan. We use a new longitudinal dataset at the firm level and at quarterly frequency between 2012 and 2018 to document the size distribution of firms and to provide evidence that it follows a power law. We find that the largest 30 firms explain nearly 80 percent of the growth in aggregate total factor productivity. This confirms earlier research for the U.S. and other developed countries. However, the granular nature of the Kazakh economy is even more outspoken than in other countries. Thus idiosyncratic shocks and the way they ripple through the production network matter to understand changes in aggregate productivity growth. Moreover, since these granular firms are concentrated in the oil industry it exposes the vulnerability of the economy more to unexpected shocks in one industry in particular.

The ex ante merger control process that exists at the EC as well as in many of the constituting member states is a particular type of government intervention, namely one in the market for corporate control. As such, it is supposed to correct for a market failure. Here in particular, merging firms could gain market power and raise prices at the expense of consumers in a way the welfare standard is reduced.

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of international rent sharing in multinational enterprises. It looks at changes in rent sharing before and after the acquisition of a company by a foreign entity, and assesses the role of target and acquirer profitability in the wage setting process for the target firm. It therefore contributes to the evaluation of the impact of a form of globalization (inward foreign direct investment (FDI)) onto wages.Design/methodology/approach– The authors use a unique firm level longitudinal dataset of M & As in Belgium between 1998 and 2010. The authors construct a micro-level dataset containing takeover and accounting information for target and acquiring firms. The empirical set up permits to net the estimates from selection effects in the choice of target firm, using propensity score matching and a difference-in-difference approach.Findings– The authors find evidence that the deal does not significantly affect the degree of domestic rent sharing, but it enables international rent sharing. The authors qualify the results in terms of the acquirer's location, industry link with the target and controlling stake. Further robustness specifications include different profits and controls, and a comparison with a sample of domestic acquisitions.Research limitations/implications– The sample of matches for acquired firms is constructed using propensity scores, which may not perfectly capture the differences between targeted and non-targeted companies. Although estimates should be net of selection effects, other sources of endogeneity may still make the estimates inconsistent.Practical implications– Updating the discussion on the labor market consequences of globalization, and on foreign takeovers in particular.Social implications– The discussion on international takeover should take into account not only the extensive margin (i.e. labor adjustments) but also salaries. The authors argue that through a precise channel (rent sharing) international takeovers of domestic companies may benefit the domestic labor force.Originality/value– The dataset was constructed for the purposes of this analysis; rent sharing is tested in a takeover scenario for the first time, thus avoiding selection biases.