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Regime analysis has focused on issues of market failure, the resolution of which depends upon knowledge and institution building. Global communications regimes, however, have been concerned either with issues of pure coordination or with coordination problems with distributional consequences. Outcomes have been decided by the underlying distribution of national power. In those areas where power was asymmetrically distributed and there was no agreement on basic principles and norms—radio broadcasting and remote sensing—no regime was formed. In those areas where distributional issues could not be unilaterally resolved—allocation of the radio spectrum and telecommunications—regimes were created, although both principles and rules changed with alterations in national power capabilities.

Barriers to international coordination of global communications. Includes historical discussion of telecommunications policies and roles of the US INTELSAT and Comsat organizations.

Contemporary social science analysis is dominated by utilitarian or functional approaches in which institutional structures are assumed to adapt in an optimal fashion to changing environmental conditions, and the preferences and capabilities of individual actors are ontologically posited. In contrast, an institutional perspective insists that past choices constrain present options; that the preferences and capabilities of individual actors are conditioned by institutional structures; and that historical trajectories are path dependent. Institutional structures persist even if circumstances change. In a world of nuclear weapons and economic interdependence, any adequate analysis of the nature of sovereignty operationalized with regard to transborder controls and extraterritoriality must be informed by an institutional perspective.

Krasner considers the decline of the global economic power the United States enjoyed from the 1940s through the 1960s and prescribes a policy of specific repricocity that aims not at restoring the country's postwar position but at allowing it to compete effectively in an emerging and changing economic climate. Specific repricocity focuses on short term pay-offs, outcomes, and differences in the domestic institutional arrangements of major economic partners. It aims at maintaining global stability while supporting the national best interest.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL SCIENCE ANALYSIS IS DOMINATED BY UTILITARIAN OR FUNCTIONAL APPROACHES IN WHICH INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES ARE ASSUMED TO ADAPT IN AN OPTIMAL FASHION TO CHANGING ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, AND THE PREFERENCES AND CAPABILITIES OF INDIVIDUAL ACTORS ARE ONTOLOGICALLY POSITED. IN CONTRAST, AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE INSISTS THAT PAST CHOICES CONSTRAIN PRESENT OPTIONS; THAT THE PREFERENCES AND CAPABILITIES OF INDIVIDUAL ACTORS ARE CONDITIONED BY INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES; AND THAT HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES ARE PATH DEPENDENT. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES PERSIST EVEN IF CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE. IN A WORLD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE, ANY ADEQUATE ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF SOVEREIGNTY OPERATIONALIZED WITH REGARD TO TRANSBORDER CONTROLS AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY MUST BE INFORMED BY AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE.

Die internationale Wirtschaftspolitik der USA in der Nachkriegszeit beruhte stärker auf globalen sicherheits- und ordnungspolitischen Interessen, als auf Reziprozität in den Austauschbeziehungen. Diese Politik war für die befreundeten westlichen Staaten und hier insbesondere Japan von großem Vorteil. Seit dem Beginn des Verfalls der Machtposition der USA im internationalen Maßstab, und seitdem sich eine Verlagerung des Machtzentrums in der Weltpolitik abzeichnet, steht auch das Prinzip der sogenannten diffusen Reziprozität in der internationalen Wirtschaftspolitik der USA zu Diskussion. (SWP-Bmt)

Marc Williams' 'The Third World and global reform' raises several fundamental questions about my analysis of the Third World's quest for a New International Economic Order. His most serious criticisms are that I (1) misunderstood the relationship between politics and economics; (2) covertly endorse an orthodox liberal policy prescription for the North; and (3) mis-state the implications that can be drawn from data on the economic situation of developing countries. I will address each of these issues.