Suchergebnisse

In this article we evaluate whether the Supreme Court's much‐discussed decision in Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Council (1984) signaled a lasting difference in how the justices decide administrative law cases, by comparing and testing the predictions of three distinct theories of Supreme Court behavior. The legal model predicts an increase in deference to administrative agencies. This prediction is shared by the jurisprudential regime model, which also predicts that the justices evaluate key case factors differently before and after Chevron. The attitudinal model predicts no change in the justices' behavior as a result of Chevron. Although we find that attitudes matter, the fact that we also find support for the legal and jurisprudential regime models undermines the assertion of the attitudinal model that law cannot explain Supreme Court votes on the merits.

The access of citizens to the courts has recently begun to gain attention from political scientists. An approach to this question is outlined, in which primary emphasis is given to macrolevel variables. It is suggested that propensity to litigate & mode of litigation will both be affected by political culture. Three political cultures are contrasted: traditionalistic, individualistic, & moralistic ones. Data from 5 federal judicial districts are examined, including those from: household telephone surveys of 5,148 households; court records of 1,649 cases in state & federal courts; telephone interview data with litigants in those cases; & survey data from interviews with 96 federal & state trial judges. The overall findings do not appear explicable on a political culture basis. However, certain specific findings appear to be related to political culture differences; for example, the state of SC can be interpreted as a traditionalistic culture, Philadelphia, Pa, as an individualistic one. It appears that current conceptions of political culture may be too narrow to include the legal dimension. 9 Tables. W. H. Stoddard.