Rational Bandits: Plunder, Public Goods, and the Vikings
In: Public choice, Band 117, Heft 3-4, S. 255-272
ISSN: 0048-5829
The paper applies & extends insights from Mancur Olson's study of state making to the Vikings. In a world of roving bandits, a sub-optimal provision of public goods exists, most notably of security. Roving banditry leads to over-plundering & zero profits for the plunderers, which makes stationary banditry profitable. The most efficient bandits monopolize violence, begin to tax, & provide some amounts of public goods in order to stimulate economic growth. The analysis demonstrates how the Vikings' activities & settlements are consistent with such an explanation, with the dynamics of the process being reflected in the variation in the number of raids & the amount of wealth extracted. 2 Tables, 2 Figures, 34 References. Adapted from the source document.