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Thesis (Ph.D. in Political Science)--University of California, Berkeley, May 1937. ; Bibliography: leaves 211-216. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The article theorises how covering social risks through cash transfers and in-kind services shapes public attitudes towards including/excluding immigrants from these programmes in Western European destination countries. The argument is that public attitudes are more restrictive of granting immigrants access to benefits than to services. This hypothesis is tested across ten social protection programmes using original survey data collected in Denmark, Germany and the UK in 2019. Across the three countries, representing respectively a social democratic, conservative and liberal welfare regime context, the article finds that the public does indeed have a preference for easier access for in-kind services than for cash benefits. The article also finds these results to be stable across programmes covering the same social risks; the examples are child benefits and childcare. The results are even stable across left-wing, mainstream and radical right-wing voters; with the partial exception of radical right-wing voters in the UK. Finally, the article finds only a moderate association between individual characteristics and attitudinal variation across cash benefits and in-kind services.

It has been a general finding across Europe that very few job matches are facilitated by public employment services (PES). The article explains this failure by highlighting the existence of a double-sided asymmetric information problem on the labour market. It is argued that although a PES potentially reduces search costs, both employers and employees have strong incentives not to use PES. The reason is that employers try to avoid the 'worst' employees, and employees try to avoid the 'worst' employers. Therefore these services get caught in a low-end equilibrium that is almost impossible to escape. The mechanisms leading to this low-end equilibrium are illustrated by means of qualitative interviews with 40 private employers in six European countries. Adapted from the source document.

It has been a general finding across Europe that very few job matches are facilitated by public employment services (PES).The article explains this failure by highlighting the existence of a double‐sided asymmetric information problem on the labour market. It is argued that although a PES potentially reduces search costs, both employers and employees have strong incentives not to use PES. The reason is that employers try to avoid the 'worst' employees, and employees try to avoid the 'worst' employers. Therefore these services get caught in a low‐end equilibrium that is almost impossible to escape. The mechanisms leading to this low‐end equilibrium are illustrated by means of qualitative interviews with 40 private employers in six European countries.