Suchergebnisse

Do income taxes levied at a state or regional level affect the after-tax distribution of income? Or do workers merely move between regions, causing pre-tax wages to adjust? This question is relevant both in across states in the United States, and across countries within the European Union. Using the full income tax parameters for all US states from 1977-2002, I create a "simulated tax redistribution index", which captures the mechanical impact of the changes in tax policy on the gini coefficient, but is exogenous to any behavioral response. Analyzing the effect of this redistribution index on inequality, I find that gross wages do not adjust so as to fully offset the effect of more redistributive taxes. Exploring the adjustment process further, I create a new class of tax redistribution measures, based on the S-Gini, which differentially weight effects at the bottom and top of the distribution, and conclude that neither taxes that particularly affect the rich or the poor seem to affect the distribution of wages. Redistributive taxes do not appear to affect interstate migration or total state personal income. From a political economy perspective, I also find some evidence that more inequality leads states to implement more redistributive taxes, which may help explain why earlier studies observed a positive relationship between redistribution and inequality.

Do voters reward national leaders who are more competent economic managers, or merely those who happen to be in power when the world economy booms? According to rational voting models, electors should parse out the state of the world economy when deciding whether to re-elect their national leader. I test this theory using data from 268 democratic elections held between 1978 and 1999, comparing the effect of world growth ("luck") and national growth relative to world growth ("competence"). In the preferred specification, which allows for countries to have different degrees of global integration, an extra percentage point of world growth boosts incumbents' chances of re-election by 9 percent, while an extra percentage point of national growth relative to world growth only boosts an incumbent's chances of re-election by 4 percent. Voters are more likely to reward competence in countries that are richer and better educated. Controlling for income, higher rates of newspaper readership reduce the returns to luck, while higher rates of television viewing reduce the returns to competence.

What impact do income and other demographic factors have on a voter's partisan choice? Using post-election surveys of 14,000 voters in ten Australian elections between 1966 and 2001, I explore the impact that individual, local and national factors have on voters' decisions. In these ten elections, the poor, foreign-born, younger voters, voters born since 1950, men, and those who are unmarried are more likely to be left-wing. Over the past 35 years, the partisan gap between men and women has closed, but the partisan gap has widened on three dimensions: between young and old; between rich and poor; and between native-born and foreign-born. At a neighbourhood level, I find that, controlling for a respondent's own characteristics, and instrumenting for neighbourhood characteristics, voters who live in richer neighbourhoods are more likely to be right-wing, while those in more ethnically diverse or unequal neighbourhoods are more likely to be left-wing. Controlling for incumbency, macroeconomic factors do not seem to affect partisan preferences – Australian voters apparently regard both major parties as equally capable of governing in booms and busts.

Do voters reward national leaders who are more competent economic managers, or merely those who happen to be in power when the world economy booms? According to rational voting models, electors should parse out the state of the world economy when deciding whether to re-elect their national leader. I test this theory using data from 268 democratic elections held between 1978 and 1999, comparing the effect of world growth ("luck") and national growth relative to world growth ("competence"). In the preferred specification, which allows for countries to have different degrees of global integration, an extra percentage point of world growth boosts incumbents' chances of re-election by 9 percent, while an extra percentage point of national growth relative to world growth only boosts an incumbent's chances of re-election by 4 percent. Voters are more likely to reward competence in countries that are richer and better educated. Controlling for income, higher rates of newspaper readership reduce the returns to luck, while higher rates of television viewing reduce the returns to competence.

What impact do income and other demographic factors have on a voter's partisan choice? Using post-election surveys of 14,000 voters in ten Australian elections between 1966 and 2001, I explore the impact that individual, local and national factors have on voters' decisions. In these ten elections, the poor, foreign-born, younger voters, voters born since 1950, men, and those who are unmarried are more likely to be left-wing. Over the past 35 years, the partisan gap between men and women has closed, but the partisan gap has widened on three dimensions: between young and old; between rich and poor; and between native-born and foreign-born. At a neighbourhood level, I find that, controlling for a respondent's own characteristics, and instrumenting for neighbourhood characteristics, voters who live in richer neighbourhoods are more likely to be right-wing, while those in more ethnically diverse or unequal neighbourhoods are more likely to be left-wing. Controlling for incumbency, macroeconomic factors do not seem to affect partisan preferences – Australian voters apparently regard both major parties as equally capable of governing in booms and busts.

AbstractThe results of my study (Leigh 2003, 2004) on the effect of minimum wages on employment have been brought into question by Watson (2004), which raises some potential methodological concerns. Careful reanalysis of the Western Australian minimum wage experiment demonstrates that this critique is not well founded. Further checks show that the results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, in addition to those presented in the original article.

AbstractTo estimate the impact of raising the minimum wage on employment, this article uses a natural experiment, arising from six increases in the Western Australian statutory minimum wage during the period 1994–2001. Relative to the rest of Australia, the employment to population ratio in Western Australia fell following each of the six rises, twice by a statistically significant margin. Aggregating the increases, the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the Western Australian statutory minimum wage is found to be −0.13.

The technique of strategic foresight — developing policy based on long‐run scenario planning — has much to offer Australian governments. By paying greater attention to identifying emerging issues, and drawing on a broad range of information sources, policies are more likely to prove durable and effective. Drawing on examples from the private sector, and from governments in the UK, USA and Australia, I outline what strategic planning entails, and how it might be implemented.