Suchergebnisse

While frequently used to explain the origin and development of fiscal structures, the concept of "fiscal illusion" has proven remarkably soft when use for purposes that go beyond the most general interpretations of fiscal politics. This results in part because of the lack of any agreement on precisely which revenue mechanisms are illusionary; nearly all of the revenue sources available to state and local governments have been identified as illusionary in one way or another. If all or nearly all revenue sources are used as tools of fiscal illusion, then the concept is of little use in explaining interstate variation in fiscal structures. This article attempts to assess which, if any, of 11 revenue mechanisms or characteristics of the tax system as a whole are used as tools of fiscal illusion by testing the hypothesis that use of illusionary mechanisms is positively related to the level of "electoral stress" in a state. That is, if politicians under electoral pressure do manipulate fiscal instruments in order to generate fiscal illusions, we would expect greater reliance on illusionary mechanisms under conditions of more extreme electoral pressure than under conditions of minimal electoral pressure. The hypothesis is tested with state revenue and electoral data for 46 continental states for the periods 1960 to 1977 and 1977 to 1982.

Discusses a test using US state data for the FY77-FY82 period. Little support is found for the expectation that reliance on illusion tools influences revenue yield. (Abstract amended)

Assesses whether state and state-local revenue systems are more or less equitable, responsive to economic changes, complex, and centralized than they were prior to 1978 by examining state and state-local revenue systems from 1977 to 1982. (Original abstract--Amended)

Effect of real property tax limits on state and state-local revenue systems; U.S. In terms of equity, economic responsiveness, system complexity, and fiscal centralization.

THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE PROPOSITION THAT POLITICIANS MANIPULATE FISCAL POLICY FOR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE IS LARGELY UNTESTED. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, SUCH MANIPULATION IS ONLY ASSUMED TO OCCUR ON THE BASIS OF OBSERVED MOVEMENTS IN INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT. AND THE FEW DIRECT TESTS OF THE MANIPULATION HYPOTHESIS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY LIMITED CONSIDERATION OF THE FULL POSSIBILITIES FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE, INADEQUATE CONTROL FOR NONPOLITICAL STABLIZATION POLICY, AND INCONSISTENT RESULTS. THIS PAPER CONSTRUCTS SEVERAL MODELS OF POLITICAL FISCAL POLICY, INCORPORATES THEM INTO A SIMPLE MODEL OF KEYNESIAN STABILIZATION POLICY, AND TESTS THE COMBINED MODELS USING U.S. BUDGET SURPLUS /DEFICIT DATA THE RESULTS PROVIDE LITTLE SUPPORT FOR EITHER THE ELECTORAL MOTIVATION OR PARTISAN DIFFERENCES INTERPRETATIONS OF THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE FINDINGS FOR THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE LITERATURE, LONG-TERM ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, AND DEFICIT-DIRECTED PROPOSALS FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM ARE DISCUSSED.