Suchergebnisse

The various soc sci's have not, so far, contributed equally to the development of peaceful cooperation through UNESCO. This is due, in part, to the fact that the sci's have varied in degree of their acceptance into the structures of the U's, &, in part, by the fact that the various sci's differ in the degree to which they can free themselves from an ideological context & concentrate on problems which are chiefly technical in nature. In this latter respect, pol'al sci is at a serious disadvantage. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.

What is the value of the accusations of irrationality & ineffectiveness leveled at the traditional pol'as structures? If we understand rationality as the sense in which it is used by the engineer in the construction of a bridge, it is clear that pol'al judgement seldom meets this standard. But is this a correct statement of the problem? For the bystander, it is a simple thing to discover in politics many examples of incoherence & ineffectiveness. The periodic attempts made in the direction of correcting such errors (admin've reforms) remain unsuccessful. New techniques (operational res) involve only a small segment of Gov operations. Is this state of affairs due to a continuing problem arising from the very nature of Gov or is it merely an example of lag? The 1st hypothesis seems to be the correct one. The choice of the fundamental criteria of pol'al life cannot be made through rational methods: they are rather derived from ideologies that are themselves a result of ethical preconceptions. The rational calculus can be used to determine the means suitable to achieve the ends. However, there are many obstacles to the exclusive use of rational methods. Moreover, the politician remains, & must remain, the final judge of whether or not to apply the solutions arrived at by the technicians & the experts. The determination of what should be demanded from the citizenry & what should be imposed on it remains the major task of those in charge of the machinery of Gov. It may be necessary to approach the problem from another direction & to attempt to establish a rational pol'al model having its own irreducible traits that could be measured solely in terms of mechanical efficiency. However, the creator of this model is not yet able to specify the criteria & the variables for its establishment. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.

There is a lack of practical res concerning the problems of the executive (Exec) in the modern state. The tasks of the Exec tend to be broad in scope & over the last 20 yrs they have been increasing in number, partially because of the general extension of gov'al activity. The Exec is usually expected to provide the impetus for special programs, act as abitrator between conflicting interests, represent the public interest & deal with issues affecting the life of the nation requiring quick decisions. Efforts to fit the Exec to the increasing responsibilities which now devolve upon it may be classified into 3 tendencies: (a) an attempt to set up a sort of leadership within the ranks of the Exec, (b) providing the nucleus thus established with an admin'ive structure of its own & (c) modernizing the Exec machinery through the org of admin'ive activity as influenced by the information available to pol'al leaders & the rest of the country. All the characteristics of a gov'al structure may have repercussions on the functioning of the Exec. To consider only parliamentary assemblies & the admin-for many reasons parliaments have not adapted themselves satisfactorily to the modern state & there has been a general decline in the real power of assemblies. One potential danger is that assemblies may try to offset this by continually attempting to interfere with the work of the Exec. In addition the expansion of admin'ive machinery & personnel has been accompanied by the assuming of an increasingly important role in decisionmaking by persons thought to be in non-policy-making positions, the bur. The success of the Exec's attempts to bring this activity of the civil service departments into harmony with its policies depends on the statutory position of civil servants & the legal relationship between exec & admin. There is a complex mutual influence between the Exec & the public, & its 2 main mechanisms of transmission are the pol'al parties (which form the articulation between the gov'al system & society as a whole) & the pressure groups. The chief danger of pressure groups lies in the Exec's surrender to them & consequent failure in his role of arbitrator & his responsibility for the general welfare. Movements for reforming the Exec include efforts to weaken the relative position of the Exec (Yugoslavia & Poland) & opposing exp's attempting to strengthen the Exec through either a modification in legal institutions or an attack on pol'al structures. B. J. Keeley.