How Preferences Change Institutions: The 1978 Energy Act
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 76, Heft 2, S. 430-445
ISSN: 0022-3816
73 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 76, Heft 2, S. 430-445
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 115-137
ISSN: 1476-4989
The uncovered set has frequently been proposed as a solution concept for majority rule settings. This paper tests this proposition using a new technique for estimating uncovered sets & a series of experiments, including five-player computer-mediated experiments & 35-player paper-format experiments. The results support the theoretic appeal of the uncovered set. Outcomes overwhelmingly lie in or near the uncovered set. Furthermore, when preferences shift, outcomes track the uncovered set. Although outcomes tend to occur within the uncovered set, they are not necessarily stable; majority dominance relationships still produce instability, albeit constrained by the uncovered set. Adapted from the source document.
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 115-137
ISSN: 1476-4989
The uncovered set has frequently been proposed as a solution concept for majority rule settings. This paper tests this proposition using a new technique for estimating uncovered sets and a series of experiments, including five-player computer-mediated experiments and 35-player paper-format experiments. The results support the theoretic appeal of the uncovered set. Outcomes overwhelmingly lie in or near the uncovered set. Furthermore, when preferences shift, outcomes track the uncovered set. Although outcomes tend to occur within the uncovered set, they are not necessarily stable; majority dominance relationships still produce instability, albeit constrained by the uncovered set.
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 68, Heft 4, S. 838-851
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 68, Heft 4, S. 838-851
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: Administrative science quarterly: ASQ, Band 51, Heft 1, S. 29-58
ISSN: 1930-3815
This paper examines contracting between a principal and an agent from the perspective of both social exchange theory and rational choice theory. Two experiments were conducted that tested competing predictions from the two theories. The first study examined effort decisions made by an agent under a series of contracts that varied in social context and compensation structure. The second experiment examined the negotiation of a compensation scheme between a principal and an agent and the agent's subsequent contract fulfillment, to test the mediating effects of verbal communication between parties on contracting and contract fulfillment. Both studies yielded results consistent with social exchange theory. Exchange theory appears to provide a better basis for deriving principles of organization design than rational choice.
In: Administrative science quarterly: ASQ ; dedicated to advancing the understanding of administration through empirical investigation and theoretical analysis, Band 51, Heft 1, S. 29-58
ISSN: 0001-8392
In: American journal of political science, Band 44, Heft 3, S. 523
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 44, Heft 3, S. 523-540
ISSN: 0092-5853
The constitutional requirement that legislation must be approved by a majority of two chambers increases the likelihood that a core will exist, even in situations in which a core would not exist under a unicameral majority rule. Laboratory experiments were run on forty six-person groups, with constant induced preferences in a two-dimensional policy space. Groups were assigned to one of four treatments. In three treatments, members were assigned to two three-person chambers, & a majority of each chamber was required to make policy decisions. In two of these treatments, the assignment induced a bicameral core; in one it did not. The fourth, a control treatment, was a unicameral, simple majority-rule game with no core. The variance in each of the two cases with a bicameral core was significantly less than in the no-core bicameral or the unicameral treatments. In the cases with a bicameral core, the outcomes clustered closely around the predicted core outcomes. The results provide strong support for the stability-inducing properties of bicameralism & for the core as a predictor of this effect. Players received statistically greater rewards in those treatments in which their role was pivotal in achieving the core. 4 Tables, 4 Figures, 3 Appendixes, 17 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 44, Heft 3, S. 523-540
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 187
ISSN: 1520-6688
In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 288
ISSN: 1540-6210
In: American political science review, Band 106, Heft 2, S. 367-386
ISSN: 0003-0554