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This article analyzes the evolution, content, and fate of the back-channel negotiations between senior Soviet and Japanese officials in 1989–1990, a time of radical changes in most aspects of Soviet foreign policy. Sources that have recently become available—especially the private papers of Aleksandr Yakovlev and Anatolii Chernyaev and several recently published collections of documents—not only confirm what has long been suspected about this critical channel of negotiation but shed valuable light on motives and complications in Moscow that precipitated the channel's ultimate failure. Because Japanese documents on the matter have not yet been declassified, the article cannot offer a full account of these talks, but the Soviet documents are sufficient to indicate why a bilateral rapprochement has been so elusive.

"This book brings together recent research on the end of the Cold War in the Third World and engages with ongoing debates about regional conflicts, the role of great powers in the developing world, and the role of international actors in conflict resolution.Most of the recent scholarship on the end of the Cold War has focused on Europe or bilateral US-Soviet relations. By contrast, relatively little has been written on the end of the Cold War in the Third World: in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. How did the great transformation of the world in the late 1980s affect regional conflicts and client relationships? Who "won" and who "lost" in the Third World and why do so many Cold War-era problems remain unresolved? This book brings to light for the first time evidence from newly declassified archives in Russia, the United States, Eastern Europe, as well as from private collections, recent memoirs and interviews with key participants. It goes further than anything published so far in systematically explaining, both from the perspectives of the superpowers and the Third World countries, what the end of bipolarity meant not only for the underdeveloped periphery so long enmeshed in ideological, socio-political and military conflicts sponsored by Washington, Moscow or Beijing, but also for the broader patterns of international relations. This book will be of much interest to students of the Cold War, war and conflict studies, third world and development studies, international history, and IR in general"-- Provided by publisher.

This book brings together recent research on the end of the Cold War in the Third World and engages with ongoing debates about regional conflicts, the role of great powers in the developing world, and the role of international actors in conflict resolution. Most of the recent scholarship on the end of the Cold War has focused on Europe or bilateral US-Soviet relations. By contrast, relatively little has been written on the end of the Cold War in the Third World: in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. How did the great transformation of the world in the late 1980s affect regional conflicts and client relationshipsWho "won" and who "lost" in the Third World and why do so many Cold War-era problems remain unresolvedThis book brings to light for the first time evidence from newly declassified archives in Russia, the United States, Eastern Europe, as well as from private collections, recent memoirs and interviews with key participants. It goes further than anything published so far in systematically explaining, both from the perspectives of the superpowers and the Third World countries, what the end of bipolarity meant not only for the underdeveloped periphery so long enmeshed in ideological, socio-political and military conflicts sponsored by Washington, Moscow or Beijing, but also for the broader patterns of international relations. This book will be of much interest to students of the Cold War, war and conflict studies, third world and development studies, international history, and IR in general.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- I. The Personal Factor -- 1. Untrusting and Untrusted: Mao's China at a Crossroads, 1969 -- 2. "No Crowing": Reagan, Trust, and Human Rights -- 3. Trust between Adversaries and Allies: President George H. W. Bush, Trust, and the End of the Cold War -- II. Risk, Commitment, and Verification: The Blocs at the Negotiating Table -- 4. Trust and Mistrust and the American Struggle for Verification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1969-1979 -- 5. Trust and Transparency at the CSCE, 1969-1975 -- 6. Trust or Verification? Accepting Vulnerability in the Making of the INF Treaty -- III. Between Consolidation and Corrosion: Trust inside the Ideological Blocs of East and West -- 7. Whom Did the East Germans Trust? Popular Opinion on Threats of War, Confrontation, and Détente in the German Democratic Republic, 1968-1989 -- 8. Not Quite "Brothers in Arms": East Germany and People's Poland between Mutual Dependency and Mutual Distrust, 1975-1990 -- 9. Institutionalizing Trust? Regular Summitry (G7s and European Councils) from the Mid-1970s until the Mid-1980s -- 10. Trust through Familiarity: Transatlantic Relations and Public Diplomacy in the 1980s -- IV. On the Sidelines or in the Middle? Small and Neutral States -- 11. "Footnotes" as an Expression of Distrust? The United States and the NATO "Flanks" in the Last Two Decades of the Cold War -- 12. Switzerland and Détente: A Revised Foreign Policy Characterized by Distrust -- Conclusion -- Contributors -- Index

The essential resource on strategy and the making of the modern worldThe New Makers of Modern Strategy is the next generation of the definitive work on strategy and the key figures who have shaped the theory and practice of war and statecraft throughout the centuries. Featuring entirely new entries by a who's who of world-class scholars, this new edition provides global, comparative perspectives on strategic thought from antiquity to today, surveying both classical and current themes of strategy while devoting greater attention to the Cold War and post-9/11 eras. The contributors evaluate the timeless requirements of effective strategy while tracing the revolutionary changes that challenge the makers of strategy in the contemporary world. Amid intensifying global disorder, the study of strategy and its history has never been more relevant. The New Makers of Modern Strategy draws vital lessons from history's most influential strategists, from Thucydides and Sun Zi to Clausewitz, Napoleon, Churchill, Mao, Ben-Gurion, Andrew Marshall, Xi Jinping, and Qassem Soleimani.With contributions by Dmitry Adamsky, John Bew, Tami Biddle, Hal Brands, Antulio J. Echevarria II, Elizabeth Economy, Charles Edel, Eric S. Edelman, Andrew Ehrhardt, Lawrence Freedman, John Lewis Gaddis, Francis J. Gavin, Christopher J. Griffin, Ahmed S. Hashim, Eric Helleiner, Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, Seth G. Jones, Robert Kagan, Jonathan Kirshner, Matthew Kroenig, James Lacey, Guy Laron, Michael V. Leggiere, Margaret MacMillan, Tanvi Madan, Thomas G. Mahnken, Carter Malkasian, Daniel Marston, John H. Maurer, Walter Russell Mead, Michael Cotey Morgan, Mark Moyar, Williamson Murray, S.C.M. Paine, Sergey Radchenko, Iskander Rehman, Thomas Rid, Joshua Rovner, Priya Satia, Kori Schake, Matt J. Schumann, Brendan Simms, Jason K. Stearns, Hew Strachan, Sue Mi Terry, and Toshi Yoshihara