Suchergebnisse

One of the little-noticed consequences of the democratization of the Asia-Pacific has been reforms to key political institutions such as electoral systems, political parties, and parliaments. I argue that, across the region, these reforms have been motivated by common aims of increasing government stability, reducing political fragmentation, and limiting the potential for ethnic politics. As a result, similar strategies of institutional design are evident in areas such as the increasing prevalence of 'mixed-member majoritarian' electoral systems, attempts to develop aggregative political party systems, and constraints upon the formation of small, ethnic or regional parties. I argue that these political reforms have increasingly converged on an identifiable "Asian model" of institutional design.

Over the past two decades, numerous East Asian states have undergone transitions to democracy. One of the most distinctive aspects of democratization has been the way East Asian democracies have sought to manage political change by institutional innovations that aim to influence the development of the region's party systems. These reforms have typically tried to promote more centrist and stable politics by encouraging fewer, and hence larger, political parties. The result is an increasing evolution of the region's electoral and party system constellations toward more majoritarian elections and, in some cases, nascent two-party systems.

During the past two decades, numerous Asia-Pacific states have made transitions to democracy founded on basic political liberties and freely contested elections. A little-noticed consequence of this process has been strikingly congruent reforms to key political institutions such as electoral systems, political parties, and parliaments. Across the region, these reforms have been motivated by common aims of promoting government stability, reducing political fragmentation, and limiting the potential for new entrants to the party system. As a result, similar strategies of institutional design are evident in the increasing prevalence of "mixed-member majoritarian" electoral systems, new political party laws favoring the development of aggregative party systems, and constraints on the enfranchisement of regional or ethnic minorities. Comparing the outcomes of these reforms with those of other world regions, there appears to be an increasing convergence on an identifiable "Asian model" of electoral democracy.