Suchergebnisse

Models of expressive voting postulate that voters will 'consume' ideological stances on issues by voting for them, even when they are against the voter's own narrow self interest, if the probability of being a decisive voter is low. When a voter is unlikely to sway the outcome, the odds that a voter will incur any real personal cost (a higher tax burden, for example) from her own expressive vote is small. We test & find support for Tullock's straightforward empirical implication of this model, that government welfare (transfer) payments are inversely related to the probability of being the decisive voter. 2 Tables, 1 Appendix, 25 References. Adapted from the source document.

Utilizing 4-digit industry data by county, we compare the allocation of resources across industries in state capital areas with noncapital areas. We are able to identify which industries are expanded & contracted relative to noncapital areas. Our results provide the first direct evidence & measurement of the forgone productive activity resulting from resources being reallocated toward rent-seeking & interest group activity. Our data also allow us to measure total rent-seeking, & to isolate the extent of indirect & in-kind rent-seeking, which can account for part of the Tullock paradox. 4 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 18 References. Adapted from the source document.