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In law, the category of reasonableness, when used in a "strong sense", is inherently lied up with proportionality, and also with the test of necessity, and thus is a guarantee of a minimal restriction of constitutional rights compatible with the attainment of a given purpose. This approach to the scrutiny of restrictions of constitutional rights carries certain disadvantages because of an unfortunate alignment of the judicial role with the role of legislator, but it also has some great advantages when compared with alternative approaches: it is more transparent when it comes to revealing to the public all the ingredients of the judicial calculus, and most importantly, it reduces the sense of defeat for the losing party. As such, it is consensus-oriented because it acknowledges explicitly that there are valid constitutional arguments on both sides. In turn in political philosophy the notion of reasonableness applies to the determination of the standards of justifications for authoritative decisions so that they can be considered legitimate, i.e. calling for respect even from those subjected to them who do not agree with them on merits. The attractiveness of this idea results from the fact that it combines two enormously popular traditions in democratic theory: those of social contract and of deliberative democracy. So it can be seen that both these conceptions: reasonableness in law and reasonableness in political theory have some obvious commonalities at the level of their deep justifications; both appeal to liberal, egalitarian and consensus-oriented values.

Both the defenders and critics of judicial review assume tacitly that there is a special moral capacity needed for a correct articulation of constitutional (explicit or implied) rights, and they only disagree about who is likely to possess this moral capacity to a higher degree. In this working paper I challenge this unstated assumption. It is not the case that the reasoning oriented towards rights articulation is more moral than many non-rights-oriented authoritative public decisions in the society. Further, I suggest that rights-related reasoning cannot be shown to be differently moral in a way which would support the idea that this relevant difference may justify why some political agents (such as judges) may be more suited to performing this particular type of moral reasoning than others (such as legislators). The best argument for such a distinction refers to the opportunity for and habit of conducting "moral thought experiments" which is what, as part of their professional duties, judges normally do, and which they can therefore instinctively do also when they engage in a "concrete" judicial review of a statute. But there is no good moral reason to believe that "moral thought experiments" triggered by specific fact-situations should be privileged as a method of moral reasoning, compared to an unashamedly abstract, principle-based moral reasoning. If anything, a good case may be made (referring to the need to openly acknowledge moral conflict, secure impartiality, equality and legitimacy) for deliberately abstracting from specific cases and focusing on the abstract and general level, only modifying it later, if one is compelled to such modifications by considering evidence from specific instances. Not even one half (the bottom-up half) of the Rawlsian famous "reflective equilibrium" apparatus can be of help in this regard.

There is a strong temptation to take the metaphor of "coup d'état" too seriously and follow it up by showing that it is not all that accurate. Normally we speak of a coup d'état, at least in a democratic setting, when there is an illegitimate capture of the existing power structures by a group that has no mandate (normally, electoral) to rule. So the coup d'état used in its proper locus, that is, in the description of the political power-capture, has both normative and descriptive content: (1) normatively, it has usually a condemnatory color; (2) descriptively, it identifies a change of the ruling group within more-or-less unchanged authority structures. None of these ingredients applies to the intriguing and thought-provoking analysis offered by Alec Stone Sweet: (1) juridical coups d'état are clearly not condemned by him: at least he tells us that his analysis is purely descriptive rather than normative; (2) juridical coups d'état result in fundamentally altered authority structures: indeed, it is, for Stone Sweet, their main definitional feature. So taken pedantically, the metaphor of coup d'état is singularly inadequate for Stone Sweet's purposes.

The language of common European constitutional identity is distinguishable from that of common European constitutional traditions in that the former does not focus so centrally on the past, and is independent of the legal doctrinal language of the EU law. When discussing constitutional identity, there are, in particular, the following four questions which deserve to be addressed: (1) What are we doing when we are "constructing" the European constitutional identity; what are the features of the interpretation leading to such a construction? (2) What values/ideals/principles are a part of our constitutional identity? (3) How does European constitutional identity relate to the specific constitutional identities of European nation-states? (4) What is the relationship between the discourse about political integration within the EU and the existence of European CI, as separate from, and paramount to, identities of member states? On that last issue it is submitted that there is no simple connection between ascertaining the dominant identity at a particular level and the implications for the division of authority between the European and national levels within the EU.

Soon after the accession of eight post-communist States from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU, the constitutional courts of some of these countries questioned the principle of supremacy of EU law over national constitutional systems, on the basis of their being the guardians of national standards of protection of human rights and of democratic principles. In doing so, they entered into the well-known pattern of behaviour favoured by a number of constitutional courts of the "older Europe", which is called a "Solange story" for the purposes of this article. But this resistance is ridden with paradoxes, the most important of which is a democracy paradox: while accession to the EU was supposed to be the most stable guarantee for human rights and democracy in postcommunist States, how can the supremacy of EU law be now resisted on these very grounds? It is argued that the sources of these constitutional courts' adherence to the "Solange" pattern are primarily domestic, and that it is a way of strengthening their position vis-à-vis other national political actors, especially at a time when the role and independence of those courts face serious domestic challenges.

This paper claims that the intuitive and widespread legitimating power of majority rule (MR) arises from the link between majority rule and the principle of equality of political opportunity. The egalitarian character of MR is established by exploring "puzzles" in democratic theory, such as the insensitivity of democratic voting procedures to unequal intensity of citizens' preferences, the inalienability of voting rights, and the relationship between the principle of unanimity (sometimes thought better to respect citizens' equality) and MR. Special attention is directed to the relationship between political equality, and equality in the outcomes of political decisions: the claim is made that the language of equal political opportunity captures well the idea of equal political influence, in the circumstance of disagreement about what is required to achieve equal treatment through the outcomes of political decisions.

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.

It has become a commonplace belief that the constitutionalization of rights implies the introduction of strongly counter-majoritarian devices into the political system. Conventional wisdom in the current constitutional discourse in the postcommunist countries of Eastern and Central Europe has it that constitutional rights, in order to be meaningful, require a system of constitutional review of political branches performed by non-elected branches of the government, and in particular, by the judiciary. The rise of constitutional tribunals in almost all the countries of the region - though in some countries they achieve higher prominence, independence, and power than in others - is a testimony to the force of this conventional wisdom.